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Abstract: According to one productive and influential approach to cognition, categorization, object recognition, and higher level
cognitive processes operate on a set of fixed features, which are the output of lower level perceptual processes. In many situations,
however, it is the higher level cognitive process being executed that influences the lower level features that are created. Rather than
viewing the repertoire of features as being fixed by low-level processes, we present a theory in which people create features to subserve the
representation and categorization of objects. Two types of category learning should be distinguished. Fixed space category learning occurs
when new categorizations are representable with the available feature set. Flexible space category learning occurs when new
categorizations cannot be represented with the features available. Whether fixed or flexible, learning depends on the featural contrasts
and similarities between the new category to be represented and the individual’s existing concepts. Fixed feature approaches face one of
two problems with tasks that call for new features: If the fixed features are fairly high level and directly useful for categorization, then they
will not be flexible enough to represent all objects that might be relevant for a new task. If the fixed features are small, subsymbolic
fragments (such as pixels), then regularities at the level of the functional features required to accomplish categorizations will not be
captured by these primitives. We present evidence of flexible perceptual changes arising from category learning and theoretical
arguments for the importance of this flexibility. We describe conditions that promote feature creation and argue against interpreting them
in terms of fixed features. Finally, we discuss the implications of functional features for object categorization, conceptual development,
chunking, constructive induction, and formal models of dimensionality reduction.
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1. Introduction
We believe that an influential and powerful idea in cogni-
tive science must be revised in order to provide a full
account of cognition. This idea is that cognitive processes
such as categorization and object recognition operate on a
fixed set of perceptual or conceptual features, which are the
building blocks for complex object representations. We will
argue that categorization and object recognition often re-
quire the creation of new features. The featural repertoire,
rather than being fixed, is dependent on situational de-
mands, novel categorization requirements, and environ-
mental contingencies.
In this target article, a feature will refer to any elementary
property of a distal stimulus that is an element of cognition,
an atom of psychological processing. This does not imply
that people are consciously aware of these properties.
Instead, features are identified by their functional role in
cognition; for example, they allow new categorizations and
perceptions to occur. Stimulus dimensions are ordered sets
of feature values, such as size, brightness, and hue. Two
features can create a new stimulus dimension, for example,
by interpolating the intermediate values between poles
defined by the two features.
1.1. Fixed feature vocabularies
In a typical application of the fixed features approach to
categorization (see, e.g., Bruner et al. 1956), subjects are
shown simple objects and are instructed to learn the rule for
sorting them. Such rules are based on logical combinations
of features that are manifestly present in the stimuli. For
example, a subject might learn a rule that objects that are
white and square should be put in the same category. The
subject does not have to create the relevant features to be
used for categorization. Instead, there is an implicit agree-
ment between the experimenter and the subject about what
features compose the stimuli.
Although categorization research has come a long way
since these early experiments, many recent approaches to 
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categorization have continued to use stimuli that “wear
their features on their sleeves.” Clear-cut dimensions with
distinct values are often used for reasons of experimental
hygiene. Researchers have used simple shapes (Murphy &
Ross 1994), line positions (Aha & Goldstone 1992), colors
(Bruner et al. 1956), and line orientations (Nosofsky 1987)
as the sources of variation in their experiments. This ten-
dency to compose stimuli out of components has also
influenced other fields. In the recognition by components
(RBC) theory (Biederman 1987), combinations of a fixed
set of 36 geometric elements are used to account for the
recognition of a very large set of objects. Theories of
phoneme (Jacobson et al. 1963) and letter (Gibson 1971;
Selfridge 1959) recognition are also based on a limited set
of primitives. Schank’s (1972) conceptual dependency the-
ory likewise postulates a fixed set of about 20 semantic
primitives such as PTRANS (physical transfer) and
INGEST (cf. Katz & Fodor, 1962, for a related point of
view). This work varies widely in the kinds of components
used and how they are combined, but all theories assume
that representations are composed from a fixed feature set.
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Fixed features are the lowest level building blocks of
object representation and categorization. Any functionally
important difference between objects must be represent-
able as differences in their building blocks if it is to be
represented within the system. It is typically assumed that
these features are nondecomposable units or “atoms,” al-
though, if pressed, many researchers would concede that
their atoms may be decomposable if necessary. All the
strengths of “mental chemistry” are inherited by this ap-
proach: a very large number of object descriptions can be
generated from a finite set of elements and a set of combi-
nation rules. In addition, combinations of features allow for
structured hierarchical representations (Palmer 1977), as
opposed to the template approach to recognition (Ullman
1989), which typically does not assume a decomposition
into building blocks. In addition, the systematic relations
between different objects can be expressed in terms of their
features and their combination rules (Fodor & Pylyshyn
1988).
We wish to retain these powerful properties of compo-
nential representations, but we also wish to provide a
framework for augmenting feature sets with new features.
Componential theories of cognition should provide ways to
develop new representations. Fixed feature theories limit
new representations to new combinations of the fixed
features. Consequently, all possible categorizations are
bounded by the possible combinations of the features. If a
categorization requires a feature not present in, or deriv-
able from, the feature set, then the categorization cannot be
learned. This is a rather limiting view of representational
change. There may be occasions when features not origi-
nally present in the system are useful for distinguishing
between important categories in the world that newly
confront the organism. A system that is constructed flexibly
enough to learn such features would be able to tailor its
feature repertoire to the demands of categorization. In
many situations, it is unrealistic to think that a system comes
fully equipped to deal with all possible contingencies in a
complex environment.
We will provide an account of feature learning in which
the components of a representation have close ties to the
categorization history of the organism. We will discuss the
empirical evidence suggesting that such development oc-
curs, and the reasons why learned features are necessary.
Although we will not propose a specific implementation of
flexible feature learning, we will discuss computational
models that can account for learned features and how
current models must be supplemented. Our analysis is
addressed to literatures on both object recognition and
categorization. Although these fields have not traditionally
been linked, both deal with the question “What is this
object?” To recognize an object as a cart is equivalent to
placing the object into the category of things called “carts.”
In both cases, the problem is to detect the relevant features
of the object in the visual array.
1.2. Empirical evidence for learned features
Although it is not addressed by fixed feature approaches
to categorization, there is evidence that substantial
changes occur to perceptual systems during learning.
The most parsimonous explanation for some of these
perceptual changes is that structures in the environment
are discovered and incorporated as new features of psy-
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chological processing. This is what we mean by “feature
creation.”
Before we review the evidence, a few ground rules are
needed. First, we distinguish between feature weighting
and feature creation. A feature that is useful (diagnostic) for
a categorization may be selectively attended. This selective
attention may be simply a decisional strategy that does not
affect the appearance of the object to be categorized (Elio
& Anderson 1981; Nosofsky 1987). For example, to categor-
ize efficiently, Elio and Anderson’s subjects learned to base
their judgments on diagnostic features even though they
could still easily perceive the nondiagnostic features. Some
researchers, however, have hypothesized that features are
selectively weighted if they are diagnostic, and that this
selective weighting affects perceptual, rather than only
strategic or final decisional processes (Gibson 1969). In
both of these views, it is assumed that the changes are based
on previously existing features or dimensions. A third view
is possible, in which new features or dimensions are created
in the service of categorization requirements. The creation
of new features is implied if the required number of
prespecified features would otherwise be implausibly large.
Second, the reported experiments that we review differ
in the level at which representational change is assumed to
take place. Sometimes, representational changes are rela-
tively late and strategic. Learning may consist of coming to
use a previously diagnostic feature under new conditions
(Lawrence 1949). On other occasions, feature changes are
relatively perceptual and nonstrategic. Relevance for cate-
gorization may influence relatively perception-based tasks.
It is notoriously difficult to draw a sharp distinction be-
tween perceptual and conceptual tasks; we will argue that it
is ill-advised to make the distinction. For example, same–
different judgment tasks (tasks in which subjects are re-
quired to judge whether or not two simultaneously pre-
sented stimuli are physically identical) have usually been
thought of as providing relatively clear evidence for per-
ceptual similarity. However, to the extent that subjects
always have to represent, remember (albeit for a very
short time), and attend to aspects of the compared stimuli,
we cannot be certain that these tasks tap purely sensory
representations. Still, by examining the particular stimuli
and task demands, we might be able to assess the relative
contributions of strategic and perceptual factors.
1.2.1. Preexposure. The simplest form of perceptual learn-
ing that has been studied is predifferentiation (Gibson &
Walk 1956). In predifferentiation, exposure to stimuli be-
fore testing results in heightened sensitivity to those stim-
uli. For example, human subjects are better able to distin-
guish between “doodles” (a contiguous concatenation of
randomly selected complex curves) after repeated expo-
sures to them. Researchers (see, e.g., Gibson 1991) have
interpreted preexposure results as perceptual differentia-
tion, a process in which aspects of the stimuli that serve to
distinguish them are made more salient. Feedback on the
classification or use of stimuli is not required for sensitiza-
tion; simple exposure to the stimuli suffices.
1.2.2. Diagnosticity-driven learning. Although preex-
posure effects indicate that category feedback is not a
prerequisite for learning new aspects of the stimuli, other
studies have suggested that categorization exerts an addi-
tional influence on how subjects deal with the stimuli.
Subjects become selectively attuned to diagnostic features
that facilitate discrimination between categories. Lawrence
(1949) described a theory of acquired distinctiveness in
which the cues relevant to a task become more differenti-
ated. For example, rats were rewarded for choosing one
stimulus over another in a rough–smooth discrimination
task. Subsequently, the rats were tested on a discrimination
task in which, for example, rough patterns required left
responses and smooth patterns required right responses.
Rats learned this second discrimination more quickly than
rats who were first given a black–white discrimination.
Although experiments of this sort show that dimensions
can be selectively sensitized, they provide little evidence for
perceptual changes per se. One simple explanation of these
results is that the organism simply generalizes the useful-
ness of a dimension from one situation to another. However,
other recent data suggest that categorization diagnosticity
(the predictability of a category from its building blocks)
influences an object’s representation in terms of features. It
can affect perceptual changes in at least two ways. First, it
can influence the discriminability of values within existing
dimensions, or the discriminability of entire preexisting
dimensions. For example, Goldstone (1994a) gave human
subjects categorization training on squares varying in size or
brightness. After prolonged training, subjects were tested
in a same–different task. When a dimension had been
relevant for categorization, same–different judgments
along this dimension were more accurate (using the d9
measure from signal-detection theory) than those of sub-
jects for whom the dimension had been irrelevant or those
of control subjects who had not undergone categori-
zation training. The greatest acuity increase along the
categorization-relevant dimension was found between
those points that had served as the boundaries between the
learned categories. However, this sensitization of the rele-
vant dimension also extended to other points along that
dimension even though those were originally placed in the
same category. In addition, one case of acquired equiva-
lence was found in which discrimination along a dimension
that was irrelevant for categorization became less acute
than it was in control subjects. Because same–different
judgments involve “cognitive” factors such as (very) short-
term memory, attention, and encoding, these results do not
guarantee that the changes were perceptual, but at least it
can be said that the categorization training influences a task
that many researchers have assumed to tap relatively low-
level perceptual processes. Andrews et al. (1997) have
found similar influences of categorization on similarity
judgments.
Category diagnosticity can also influence perception by
participating in the creation of new features for object
categorization. For example, Schyns and Murphy (1991;
1994) provide evidence for such a process. In a typical
experiment, subjects had to learn to label new objects
and were later tested on the features used to encode
the categories. The stimuli were continuous, three-
dimensional, rock-like “blobs” (see Fig. 3a). The stimuli
had a complex blob structure so that naive subjects showed
little agreement in how they decomposed them before
categorization training. The categories were defined by a
coherent group of a few contiguous parts present in each
category member; the rest of the blobs of an object had
random shapes. After learning to categorize them, subjects
were instructed to decompose the objects into parts that
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they thought were relevant. These parts tended to be the
ones that were diagnostic for categorization. This parsing
differed from what it had been before the training and
occurred despite a strong bottom-up constraint (the min-
ima rule; Hoffman & Richards 1984) on object parsing that
would predict parsings other than those obtained in the
experiments. Schyns and Murphy’s subjects did their par-
sing by outlining the parts of each object (using either a
computer mouse or a pen). Although it is not free of
cognitive influences, this technique has the advantage of
leaving subjects free to report any fragment of a stimulus
they wish (independently of whether it has an easily expres-
sible name). Braunstein et al. (1989) found that an outlining
method gave the strongest evidence for parsing with the
minima rule, so Schyns and Murphy should have found
evidence of physically determined parsing with this task;
instead, parsing was determined mostly by categorization
constraints.
For the Martian rocks experiments, hypothesizing that
the effects are due to shifts of attention to existing features
would require positing an implausibly large number of
dimensions or features. Explanations in terms of mecha-
nisms for dynamically creating new features seem more
parsimonious in these cases.
1.2.3. Differentiation. Several researchers have suggested
that experience with stimuli results in subjects differentiat-
ing stimulus dimensions that were originally processed
together. There is substantial developmental evidence that
children are more likely to perceive stimuli in an un-
differentiated manner, whereas adults analyze the stimuli
into distinct dimensions. For adults, some pairs of dimen-
sions, such as size and brightness, are called “separable”
(Garner 1974). They are processed separately; attention
can be selectively placed on just one of the dimensions, and
similarities between stimuli are computed by summing
their separately determined dimensional differences.
Other pairs of dimensions, such as the saturation and
brightness of a color, are called “integral.” Such dimensions
appear to be psychologically “fused,” in that it is difficult to
attend selectively to just one of them, and similarities
between stimuli are computed by considering the two
dimensional differences simultaneously. Several studies
have indicated that children process separable dimensions
in the same way in which adults process integral dimensions
(Smith & Kemler 1978; Ward 1983). One explanation for
these results is that part of the maturation process is to
separate dimensions that were not originally separated.
Such a process has also been implicated for learning distinc-
tions between more abstract dimensions such as heat and
temperature (Smith et al. 1985). The differentiation of
dimensions seems to occur even in adulthood. Through
training, the saturation of a color can be psychologically
differentiated from its brightness (Burns & Shepp 1988;
Goldstone 1994a).
There is a second type of differentiation in which catego-
ries, rather than dimensions, are split apart. Developmental
studies find that the lexical categories of young children are
often broader than the lexical categories of adults (Clark
1973). For example, when children overgeneralize category
labels, they may group together all round objects as in-
stances of “ball” (Chapman et al. 1986). Eventually, after a
progressive reorganization of their concepts, children’s lexi-
cal categories narrow and match those of adults. Adding
features to an initially broad concept presumably allows it to
be differentiated into more specific concepts. The acquisi-
tion of new features more specifically tuned to the categori-
zation tasks at hand may also underlie the development of
adults’ conceptual expertise. Tanaka and Taylor (1991)
studied categorizations by dog and bird experts. Experts
were particularly adept at making fine discriminations
within their category of expertise, suggesting that they
acquire features specific to their domain of expertise.
Schyns (1991) provided a neural network model of this type
of conceptual differentiation. In a two-layered net, units
initially representing a broad category became pro-
gressively specialized in representing finer categories on
the basis of a feature-extraction process.
1.2.4. Summary. The experimental evidence reviewed
above indicates that our categorizations, rather than being
based on existing perceptual features, determine the fea-
tures that enter the representation of objects. Some per-
ceptual changes may arise from mere exposure to objects,
but others depend on the way in which objects of the
environment are organized into categories. In addition,
perceptual dimensions and categories both undergo a dif-
ferentiation process based on environmental contingen-
cies. These results provide an initial indication that cate-
gorical constraints could influence features: Rather than
being fixed and unaffected by experience, features could be
progressively extracted and developed as an organism cate-
gorizes its world.
2. A functional approach to feature creation
2.1. The function of features
The function of a feature is to mark commonalities between
members of the same category and to distinguish between
categories. In fixed feature approaches to categorization
and object recognition, a functional constraint guides the
construction of the repertoire of features. Researchers
develop their feature sets by keeping in mind the question
“What features would be required to solve this categoriza-
tion task?” In many cases, the researchers then test their
theories using stimuli that were constructed from these
feature sets.
We agree that features should be functionally deter-
mined. However, their constraints should be defined by the
environment and not simply by the experimenter. Even if
the fixed feature researcher manages to draw upon a
plausible feature set, it will probably be limited to a specific
domain and will not adapt to temporary or local environ-
mental states. More importantly, to restrict research to the
problem of combining obvious, clearly demarcated features
is to oversimplify the task of categorization.
Consider the current object recognition literature, in
which Biederman’s geon theory of object recognition
(Biederman 1987) is contrasted with the multiple-views
approach (Edelman & Bu¨lthoff 1992; Poggio & Edelman
1990; Tarr & Pinker 1989). In recognition by components
(Biederman 1987), objects are represented by a set of
geometric elements derived by taking various geometric
slices through the possible transformations of a generalized
cone. The resulting elements can be distinguished from
each other on the basis of a few nonaccidental features,
features that are invariant over a wide range of transforma-
tions (rotational, translational, and scalar). Transforma-
Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:1 5
tional invariance is a desirable property; telephones do not
change their category membership (the fact that they are
telephones) simply because they are rotated. However,
Biederman’s feature set is severely limited in its application
to many natural objects (Kurbat 1995; Ullman 1989); it does
not allow discriminations between many similar categories,
and objects within the same category will not necessarily be
represented by the same geon structure. These limitations
are problems not for Biederman’s theory alone but also for
any approach that cannot adapt its building blocks flexibly
to categorical constraints.
For example, recent object recognition research has
demonstrated that the relationship between the observer
and the object influences recognition performance (see,
e.g., Edelman & Bulthoff 1992; Palmer et al. 1981; Tarr &
Pinker 1989). Viewpoint-dependent recognition was inter-
preted by Tarr and Pinker (1989) as evidence that objects
are represented in memory by a collection of specific views
(see also Poggio & Edelman 1990). When views of an object
are the basis of object representation, it is difficult to
determine which subset of the set of all possible views best
predicts categorizations. Categorizations are so diverse that
there may not be a unique, canonical, task-independent,
view-based representation of a particular object (Hill et al.
1997; Schyns, in press). For example, any view of your face
could reveal diagnostic information to distinguish it from a
car, but fewer views would be well suited to discriminate
your face from a face of the other sex, and still fewer views
would reliably distinguish your face from another face of
the same gender. Viewpoint dependence appears to be
relative to the diagnostic information in the task considered
and to the location of the information on the object.
Hence, both the geon- and the view-based approaches to
object recognition must tune their representations to the
functional roles of their building blocks. That is, both
theories must consider the possible categorizations of an
object before considering the possible geometric elements
or views that will be used to represent the object.
2.2. Categorical constraints on feature creation
A categorical context is composed of the categories and
features individuals know at a particular point in their
conceptual development, plus the new category to be
encoded. The individual knows what the categories are
from external feedback, that is, the consequences of their
miscategorizations. Contrary to the classical assumption
that category learning operates on fixed features, we sug-
gest that features are flexible; that is, they adjust to the
perceptual experience and the categorization history of the
individual. Flexible features open the possibility that the
same input is differently perceived and analyzed before
being categorized. Hence, a complete theory of conceptual
development should not only explain the ways in which
object features are combined to form concepts, it should
also explain the development of the features participating
in the analysis of the input.
The role of categorization constraints on feature creation
was explicitly studied by Schyns and Rodet (1997) using
three categories of unknown stimuli called “Martian cells”
(see Fig. 1). Categories were defined by specific blobs
common to all category members to which irrelevant blobs
were added (to simulate various cell bodies). Figure 1
shows, from left to right, an exemplar of the XY category, an
Figure 1. Design of Schyns and Rodet’s (1997) feature creation
experiment. From left to right, the top pictures are Martian cell
exemplars from the XY, X, and Y categories. From left to right, the
bottom pictures are the features xy, x, and y, defining the catego-
ries. Note that the feature xy is a combination of feature x and
feature y. Subjects in the XY→X→Y (vs. X→Y→XY) group
learned the category in this order.
exemplar of X, and one of Y. The figure also shows the
features x, y, and xy defining each category. Note that xy is
the conjunction of x and y.
The main goal of Schyns and Rodet’s experiment was to
demonstrate that different categorization constraints could
induce orthogonal perceptions of the defining component
of XY, that is, perceptions of xy as an x plus y feature con-
junction or as an xy unitary feature. One group of subjects
was asked to learn X before Y before XY(X→Y→XY); the
other group learned the same categories in a different order
(XY→X→Y). Reliable classifications of X, Y, and XY stimuli
in the testing phase indicated, without any doubt, that all
subjects saw and attended to the components x and y. X-Y
cells were used to understand the perceptual analysis of XY.
X-Y cells were XY exemplars in which the x and y compo-
nents were not adjacent to each other. The reasoning was
that subjects should categorize X-Y cells as XY members if
they perceived and represented XY as a conjunction of two
individuated features. Results revealed that only one group
(X→Y→XY) performed this categorization; the perception of
XY in the other group prompted X or Y classifications of
X-Y. In sum, orthogonal classifications of X-Y, when its
component features were both clearly perceived and used
in the experimental groups, suggested that different fea-
tures were acquired to analyze perceptually and to repre-
sent XY. Network simulations further suggested that the
feature vocabularies were FX→Y→XY 5 hx,yj and FXY→X→Y 5
hxy,x,yj, respectively. Together, these results challenge the
main claim of fixed feature approaches that category learn-
ing consists only of weighting the features of a fixed set that
tend to characterize categories. It appears that category
learning also changes the features used perceptually to
analyze the input.
Rodet and Schyns (1994) also tested more specifically the
role of the context of categorization on the perceived
similarity of stimuli. In the first part of Rodet and Schyns’s
Experiment 3, two groups of subjects learned two Martian
cells categories that would later serve as the background
context for learning a third category. The categories were
designed so that the two groups would learn different
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concepts using the same learned features. Both groups
learned that the feature x characterized the first category X.
The two groups differed on the nature of the second
category. The first group was exposed to an XY category
defined by the x feature adjacent to the y feature. The
category of the second group was defined only by the y
feature. Subjects then learned a third XYZ category defined
by adjacent x, y, and z components. Subjects’ encoding of
the new category was tested with a sorting task and a same–
different speeded judgment task. It was found that the
second group of subjects, but not the first group, distin-
guished XY stimuli from XYZ stimuli. These results con-
firmed the hypothesis that different histories of categoriza-
tion generate different feature spaces to encode similarities
and contrasts between objects.
2.3. Two types of concept learning
The experiment described above indicates that a history of
categorization can trigger different concept learning mech-
anisms. By the time the third concept is to be acquired,
subjects of the second group have the necessary features x
and y to identify the third category; subjects of the first
group must create a third, novel feature, z, in order to
identify the third category.
In the concept learning space fixed by x and y, Group 2
subjects represent XYZ as a combination of the two previ-
ously acquired features. This particular encoding illustrates
what we call “fixed space learning,” the familiar
diagnosticity-driven learning that Gibson (1991), Lawrence
(1949), and concept learning researchers have discussed.
However, the combination of x and y already represents the
second category of Group 1, so subjects must develop a new
feature, z, to distinguish the third category (see Rodet &
Schyns 1994). We call this encoding “flexible space learn-
ing,” to emphasize the expansion of the categorization
space to include a new feature or dimension.
2.4. Functional features and primitives
The premise that features are created to subserve categori-
zations applies to the creation of functional features but is
neutral regarding their perceptual realization. For exam-
ple, the object property “square” could be featurally repre-
sented as a concatenation of image pixels, as four line
segments, as four corners, as four smaller squares, as two
smaller rectangles, as a linear combination of sinusoids, and
so forth. In short, there are many possible realizations of a
functional feature. We have proposed that properties of an
object that become diagnostic for important categorizations
can become functional features of a system’s repertoire.
However, one potential problem that must be addressed is
the degree to which these functional features are them-
selves based upon a (more) primitive set of features. If a
primitive set of features can capture all the regularities and
categorizations accommodated by the functional features,
then the new functional features do not increase the repre-
sentational capacity of the system. If this is the case, then
the hypothesis that feature creation is necessary to allow a
system to represent object properties that it was previously
incapable of representing cannot be maintained. We will
argue accordingly that functional features are not always
constructed from a fixed catalog of primitive features.
A set of shape primitives that could ground categoriza-
tion must satisfy at least three conditions: the primitives
must exist prior to experience with the objects they repre-
sent, they must be sufficient to represent the entire set of
representable objects, and they must be able to bootstrap
complex recognition systems. Ultimately, there are two
ways of conceptualizing these primitive features, each with
its own problem. Either primitives are fine-grained and
relatively unstructured, or they already represent complex
structures of the environment.
2.4.1. Unstructured primitives. According to the unstruc-
tured approach, if one takes sufficiently fine-grained primi-
tives (e.g., very small line segments, or even pixels) together
with powerful combination rules, diagnostic compositions
of the primitives could represent complex properties of
objects. However, functionally important object regu-
larities (symmetry, serif, beauty, etc.) are often not captured
by simple pixel-based features. It is unlikely that systems
that hypothesize object properties such as symmetry as a
primitive of object recognition (Gibson 1969) can explain
them by commonalties at the pixel-level (but see Barlow
1980; Barlow & Reeves 1979). Moreover, as is discussed
below in the section on formal models of feature extraction,
it is not practically feasible (although it is logically possible)
to extract relevant categorization features from pixel-based
(or similarly unstructured) representations of the input.
2.4.2. Structured primitives. According to another ap-
proach to primitives, the catalog includes more complex
primitives, such as larger curves, corners, squares, circles,
triangles, or even three-dimensional shapes such as cones
and cylinders (see, e.g., Biederman 1987; Garner 1974;
Treisman & Gelade 1980). Complex (rather than simple)
primitives would already mirror important structures of the
visual environment and could therefore account for com-
plex recognition by initially segmenting the visual environ-
ment into useful primitives for recognition. However, such
preformed recognition systems are blind to structures that
are not represented as primitives and that are not composi-
tions of simpler primitives.
To illustrate, in Fisher’s (1986) influential model of letter
recognition (cited in Czerwinski et al. 1992), a capital “A” is
identified by composing three primitives (two diagonal bars
and a horizontal one). Clearly, diagonal and horizontal bars
were selected as primitives with the task of letter categori-
zation in mind; the same primitives would be particularly
clumsy in categorizing varieties of ellipses. One might
imagine adding a second subset of primitives for distin-
guishing ellipses. However, any large-scale, highly struc-
tured set of primitives is bound to be too coarse to detect
(and internally represent) all of the distinctions that might
be required by different categories of objects.
2.4.3. Interactions between choice of primitives and task
constraints. Task constraints almost always influence the
primitives that investigators import into their componential
theories of recognition. In our view, the task of the subject
creating new functional features for categorization is not
substantially different from the task of the scientist creating
a componential theory of recognition: both must produce a
catalogue of features that are defined by their role in
recognition. If the investigators want to posit a complete
fixed set of primitives, they must envision all possible
recognition problems before conceiving of the features that
would solve them. So, the envisioned set of tasks influences
the primitives of recognition that will be selected by a
Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
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theory of object recognition. Similarly, the particular cate-
gorization tasks confronting individuals influence the units
of representation that they will adopt. Thus, rather than
drawing a correspondence between a particular theory of
object recognition (with its static primitives) and an individ-
ual’s object recognition capabilities, the proper correspon-
dence may be between the individual and the meta-
theoretic search for a proper object recognition theory.
2.5. Functions, perceptions, and their interactions
One constraint on the creation of features is their useful-
ness for categorization. Our hypothesis that there are func-
tionally determined features does not imply that physio-
logical or sensory facts are unimportant for defining the
feature repertoires. Features are also based on general
perceptual constraints, such as contiguity, topological cohe-
sion, changes of curvature, and perceptual salience. In
many cases, these constraints are not a catalogue of shape
primitives, but the constraints nonetheless exert strong
pressures to create certain features. To illustrate, Hoffman
and Richards (1984) have proposed that objects are seg-
mented by creating parts with endpoints that are local
minima of principal curvature. Instead of assuming that
objects are segmented into primitive shapes, the authors
suggest that a particular patch of shape will be identified as
a part because it lies between two points of negative minima
of curvature, not because it matches a primitive element.
This approach does not limit possible shape features to the
compositions of a catalog of primitives. Instead, as a sheet
adjusts to the surface on which it is thrown, new features
can be acquired to mirror the shapes lying between the
segmentations suggested by the minima rule. Hoffman and
Richards’s constraint on object segmentation illustrates that
the structures required for organizing complex representa-
tions are not necessarily structured primitives. Instead,
general shape-processing constraints can produce segmen-
tations that interact with structuring principles. As Hoff-
man and Richards (1984, p. 77) state it, “a boundary-based
scheme, then, is to be preferred over a primitive-based
scheme because of its greater versatility.”
A very interesting aspect of Hoffman and Richards’s
proposal as it applies to the creation of new shape features is
that it allows the feature repertoire to mirror partially the
shapes that categorizers experience in their environment.
This presents new challenges for effective procedures of
feature creation. It is conceivable, even desirable, that
several distinctive methods are used for developing fea-
tures, depending on the idiosyncrasies of different object
classes. For example, smooth objects such as faces could be
parsed into their relevant component features using elastic
3D templates (see, e.g., Hinton et al. 1992). These tem-
plates would behave as elastic masks whose parameters
would adjust to shape variations within the class. At the
time of this writing, there is no agreement on the features,
or feature configurations, these masks would have. Class-
specific variations (e.g., learning to categorize Caucasian
faces) would result in class-specific features that would not
be directly applicable to the shape variations of other
classes (e.g., Asian faces). Mismatches between expected
shapes, and expected shape variations, could give rise to the
“other race effect” in which people perceive faces of their
own race with greater facility than those of another race
(Brigham 1986).
Whereas face stimuli are mostly smooth, many man-made
objects are discontinuous. This imposes different biases on
the eventual elastic templates and also segmentation con-
straints other than Hoffman and Richards’s minima rule,
which operates on continuous surfaces. The templates could
be biased to “break” at sharp discontinuities of the surfaces, if
a categorization required such a break. Such templates could
progressively evolve into a repertoire whose asymptotic state
could resemble Biederman’s (1987) geons, if they were
exposed to many man-made object categories. The extrac-
tion of 2D shape features could also require distinct mecha-
nisms and representations. For example, 2D patterns (let-
ters, numbers, textures, etc.) could use feature creation
mechanisms based on “growth” (see, e.g., Marr 1982;
Ullman 1984). Small 2D patches could locally grow from the
interior of a 2D pattern until boundary edges stop the
growth. New shapes could then be learned from correlations
across category exemplars. To illustrate, consider a simple
example of this process (adapted from Schyns & Murphy
1994). Object 1 is a 2D pattern in which arrows show the
negative minima that are perceptual indicators of its parts
(see Fig. 2). Consider that target and Object 1 (or Object 2)
form a category. If a 2D contiguous patch is grown in target,
its intersection with the patch grown in Object 1 will identify
a part feature (indicated by dashed lines in Fig. 2). A different
feature would result from the intersection of target with
Object 2.
In short, we are arguing that different object categories
are likely to prompt the acquisition of different types of
features. These different categories are likely to necessitate
differently biased mechanisms. Perceptual biases should
facilitate the extraction of features in the objects considered
(e.g., smooth vs. discontinuous; 2D vs. 3D). Categorical
biases should tune the features for the categorizations
performed. The examples discussed suggest the possibility
Figure 2. Possible interaction between perceptual and func-
tional constraints in learning new features of object representa-
tion. The arrows in the target object indicate perceptual con-
straints on its segmentation. The Target and Object 1 (or Object 2)
constitute a category. The dashed lines on the bottom objects
illustrate that the shape features extracted on the target also
depend on its category membership. (Adapted from Schyns &
Murphy 1994.)
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of creating such features, but they do not provide detailed
realizations. It will be a difficult (but necessary) task to
extract class-specific perceptual biases to build task-specific
feature extraction mechanisms. We will come back to this
point when we discuss formal mechanisms of feature ex-
traction.
Both functional (categorical) and perceptual constraints
determine what features will be created. We see these
constraints as mutually interactive rather than strictly se-
quential (see also Wisniewski & Medin 1994). We might
envision a system that first created a set of candidate
features by applying perceptual constraints and then se-
lected the new feature from this set of candidates by
applying functional constraints. Such a system, however,
would suffer from several problems. First, in many cases, an
implausibly large number of candidates would have to be
considered because objects are underdetermined by per-
ceptual constraints (e.g., a 2D object silhouette with 20
bumps on it would have 380 possible parsings even if only
contiguous segments were considered). If functional con-
straints are considered only secondarily, then processing
will be inefficient in that too many candidate features that
are not potentially useful will be considered; the constrain-
ing role of functionality would not be fully exploited.
Second, if strong perceptual constraints are applied (e.g.,
shape primitives), then the relevant feature will often fail to
be in the set of candidates. Third, there is substantial
evidence that the functionality of a feature influences
relatively low-level perceptual processing (Algom 1992;
Goldstone 1994a; 1995; Oliva & Schyns 1995; Rodet &
Schyns 1994; Schyns & Murphy 1991; 1994; Schyns &
Rodet 1997). The cumulative effect of this evidence makes
it unlikely that functionality is considered only after percep-
tual processing has been completed.
Whereas we admit the intrinsic futility of searching for
the boundary between perception and conception, we
believe it is useful to describe a continuum from the
perceptual to the conceptual. What varies along this
continuum is how much and what sort of processing has
been done to the input. Specifying exactly where experien-
tial and categorical pressures influence processing along
the perception–conception continuum is a real, although
highly empirical, problem. One apparently fruitful ap-
proach to specifying how early an influence conceptual
factors have is to identify influences on other processes.
Thus, there is evidence that conceptual factors (knowledge
of categories and attitudes) not only influence physical and
immediate color judgments (Delk & Fillenbaum 1965;
Goldstone 1995) but also exert an influence before the
perceptual stage that creates color afterimages has com-
pleted its processing (Moscovici & Personnaz 1991). Simi-
larly, there is evidence that conceptual factors related to
one’s knowledge of object categories exert an influence
before the processing stage that produces figure–ground
segregation (Peterson & Gibson 1994).
Another approach to specifying locations of influence on
a perceptual–conceptual continuum is to observe the time
course for the use of particular types of information. For
example, on the basis of priming evidence, Sekuler et al.
(1992) argue that knowledge about what an occluded object
would look like were it completed influences perception
after as little as 150 milliseconds. In general, there are
experimental tools available that can identify when – abso-
lutely and relative to other processes – conceptual factors
modify information processing. Although the bulk of the
work needed to specify the precise locus of influences has
yet to be done, current evidence suggests a surprisingly
early contribution of conceptual factors such as background
knowledge and learned categories.
2.6. Feature extraction and experimental materials
For reasons of control, many experiments in concept learn-
ing have used very simple stimuli varying on clearly demar-
cated dimensions. Real-world objects often vary along
many dimensions, however, and in most cases it is difficult
to know what the relevant dimensions are. Although there
are excellent reasons for using simple, easily described
experimental materials, one major disadvantage with this
approach is that it may systematically underestimate the
importance of finding an appropriate encoding for the
stimuli. It may even be that the traditional use of simple
materials produces a bias against finding evidence for
feature creation.
Table 1 illustrates some properties of different types of
materials used in experiments. The properties listed in the
left column characterize many typical stimuli used in con-
cept learning experiments. The properties listed in the right
column, “alternative materials,” characterize materials that
are likely to promote the creation of new features during
concept learning. Conceptually, all the properties listed in
the left column serve to make task-relevant features easy to
isolate and identify. Conversely, the properties listed in the
right column make it likely that the relevant features are not
originally encoded, but they allow for their derivation.
Alternative materials are typically dense (Goodman
1965) in that there is no limit on the amount of information
that can be obtained from the input or the number of
interpretations that can be made. Therefore, alternative
materials may contain many different levels of intrinsic
structure, allowing for the potential relevance of highly
diverse feature sets. Many blobby structures can be extrac-
ted from, for example, X-ray pictures that are not combina-
Table 1. Stimuli typically used in concept learning and stimuli
likely to give rise to encoding of new features
Traditional materials Alternative materials
Properties of dimensions in isolation
Discrete Analog/continuous
Symbolic Subsymbolic
Parts easy to delineate Parts difficult to delineate
Few features Large number of potential
features
Relevant features are salient Relevant features are not
salient
No emergent properties Emergent properties
Single level of analysis Multiple levels of analysis
Large dimension value
differences
Small dimension value
differences
Properties of dimensions in context
A priori diagnostic features A priori nondiagnostic
features
Features have constant
instantiations
Features are variably
instantiated
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tions of a priori diagnostic features (except to radiologists).
Conversely, traditional materials embody a single level of
analysis into features known a priori. The primary level of
analysis for alternative materials is subsymbolic, because
they are designed to ensure that symbols (“square,” “circle,”
“has legs,” etc.) are not easy to assign a priori to the
important structures of the stimuli. Stimuli that are likely to
be represented in an analog fashion may preserve topologi-
cal relations that leave open the possibility of a stimulus
reinterpretation if new categorizations require such a rein-
terpretation. Discrete stimuli do not allow this possibility
because their interpretation is often unequivocal and auto-
matic. Figure 3 presents several examples of alternative
materials that are used in our experiments on feature
creation. Figure 3a shows a Martian rock (Schyns & Mur-
phy 1991; 1994), Figure 3b some doodles (Goldstone, in
preparation), Figure 3c some Japanese hiragana characters
(Ryner & Goldstone, in preparation), Figure 3d shows from
left to right an XY and an X Martian cell (Rodet & Schyns
1994), Figure 3e, a Martian lobster (Thibaut 1995), and
Figure 3f, a Martian landscape (Schyns & Thibaut, in
preparation).
The task confronting subjects who are given what we are
calling alternative materials is similar to the task confront-
ing the child who must learn such concepts as dog, table,
and father. The child must learn the features that make up
Figure 3. Examples of the alternative materials used in our
experiments. Picture a shows a Martian rock (Schyns & Murphy
1991; 1994), b shows some doodles (Goldstone, in preparation), c
shows some Japanese hiragana characters (Ryner & Goldstone, in
preparation), d shows two Martian cells (Rodet & Schyns 1994;
Schyns & Rodet, in press), e shows a Martian lobster (Thibaut, in
preparation), and f shows a Martian landscape (Schyns & Thibaut,
in preparation).
these objects in addition to learning the proper characteri-
zation of the concept. Many formal approaches to categori-
zation explicitly avoid issues of feature representation.
Researchers often adopt a stance of “You tell me what the
features are, and I will tell you how they are integrated to
perform the categorization.” Such formal approaches often
place no constraints on what may count as a feature. In fact,
the lion’s share of the work in concept learning seems to be
in finding the “right” description space for concept learn-
ing.
2.7. Evidence for novel functional features
Novel features are sometimes created and may not be
reducible to previously existing features of the system. One
version of this claim is certainly false. Novel visual features
are certainly reducible to their retinal encodings, and
possibly to existing structures at early, lower level represen-
tations. Thus, it is a conceptual challenge to characterize a
“novel feature.” Part of the difficulty is that novelty implies
a reference point. At the level of the retina, different
encodings of the same object are always novel owing to
differences in the retinal projections of the input. However,
conceptual encodings of this object are much more stable.
Functional, high-level features presumably supply the basis
for this stability in the cognitive architecture. The question
thus becomes, When is a functional feature novel?
Functionally, a feature may be novel simply because it
encodes a categorization that was not performed previously.
Our conception of functionality is more constrained than
this, however, referring to the synthesis of new elements
from raw data. There are two difficulties with the latter
variety of novelty. The first difficulty is preexistence: How
do we show empirically that a “created” functional feature
did not exist prior to the categorization problem? The
second difficulty is reduction. How can we ensure that a
“created” functional feature does not result from the com-
bination of preexisting functional features?
An ideal empirical test of preexistence would demon-
strate that a functional feature, fx, not initially present in the
feature repertoire becomes a member of the set as a result
of learning a new categorization. The absence of fx from the
initial repertoire, together with successful categorizations
of the new objects, would suggest that fx was created
(instead of merely weighted for its diagnosticity), assuming
that fx is required to perform the categorization. However,
empirical evidence for the absence versus presence of fx is
limited to a behavioral manifestation of the new feature
(e.g., in a transfer or priming task). Unfortunately, a nonex-
istent feature is behaviorally equivalent to an existing fea-
ture with an “attentional weight” of 0. This makes it difficult
to tease apart feature weighting from feature creation based
on simple, direct tests of the existence of a feature in
memory. Evidence of feature creation is, hence, necessarily
indirect, testing the implications of foundational assump-
tions of fixed feature theories. Two of these assumptions are
(1) that objects are characterized by a prespecified, fixed,
unambiguous, and nondecomposable set of features and (2)
that learning always selects, combines, and weighs the fixed
features that tend to characterize categories. An important
implication of these two assumptions is that category learn-
ing is only strategic. That is, learning weighs features of the
fixed set, but it does not change the perceptual analysis and
the perceptual appearance of the input.
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One way to provide evidence for feature creation would
be to show that category learning changes features that
participate in the perceptual analysis of identical stimuli.
This was the goal of the experiment of Schyns and Rodet
(1997) described above. This experiment was controlled so
that the features x and y were each diagnostic of one
category in the two categorization conditions (X→Y→XY
and XY→X→Y). Hence, they should in principle elicit
identical featural analysis and identical perceptions of the
same category exemplars; that is, subjects in the two cate-
gorization conditions should equally see XY exemplars as
feature conjunctions. However, the outcome was mutually
exclusive perceptions of XY stimuli (a conjunctive and a
configural perception), making a feature weighting inter-
pretation of these data difficult to justify. Feature creation is
preferable to feature weighting if category learning induces
a mutually exclusive perceptual analysis of an objectively
identical object property when the experimental design
would predict identical perceptual analysis if the subjects
used fixed features.
The other problem of feature reduction is comparatively
simpler to address empirically. In principle, if a functional
feature is the combination of two or more other features,
these other features would become active each time the
new feature was presented. However, priming tests on
these subfeatures would indicate whether or not they
participated in the perceptual encoding of the new feature.
It is always difficult to refute a feature weighting inter-
pretation of categorization results. Part of the reason is that
feature weighting is difficult to refute when it is used a
posteriori to interpret patterns of data. Feature weighting is
a form of curve fitting with free parameters (the weights
assigned to features). Feature weighting therefore covers
not one model but a potential infinity of models of categori-
zation and can potentially accommodate any pattern of
experimental data if its features are not prespecified. At-
tempting to explain features through the history of categori-
zation allows the theorist to ask an important question:
What counts as a feature? Most concept learning programs
do not address this, but they nonetheless call for new
features in different situations. We accept the need to
generate different feature sets for different tasks, but we
would like the theorist to explain how the features come to
be generated, instead of simply positing their existence.
2.8. Advantages of new feature learning
A system that allows for the creation of new features during
concept learning offers several advantages over fixed fea-
ture set approaches. First, the most basic advantage, al-
luded to earlier, is that an ability to acquire new features
allows flexible but constrained features. Unlike purely
formal models of similarity and categorization, our ap-
proach places constraints on what can count as features:
features will be incorporated into a system to the extent that
they distinguish between object categories; features should
not be limited to the finite set of a priori features designed
by a particular researcher for a particular domain.
Second, a learned set may be equivalent to, but not
limited to, other proposed fixed feature sets. Fixed feature
sets are motivated by design considerations and psychologi-
cal evidence. For example, Biederman (1987) suggests that
evidence in favor of geons as primitive features comes from
studies that delete line segments from objects. When line
segments are deleted in a way that does not allow geons to
be recovered, object recognition is particularly impaired.
However, to the extent that geons are useful features for
object categorization, it is reasonable to suppose that they
might be generated from functional constraints applied to
simpler building blocks, such as line segments, or corners,
or surfaces. Consequently, evidence in favor of a particular
set of features does not entail that the set of features is hard
wired.
Third, a learned set permits a near-optimal fit between
categorization demands and the expressive repertoire. New
features are created to represent new categorical common-
alties or contrasts and can be optimally adjusted in number
to a wide variety of task demands (e.g., expert categoriza-
tions and subcategorizations). To the extent that each new
feature accommodates at least the categorization for which
the feature was created, the repertoire should be free of
useless features. A fixed feature approach is necessarily
much less parsimonious: many spurious features must exist
in the feature repertoire for the individual to foresee new
categorizations. Moreover, most features of the fixed set
would never be used; they would keep waiting for their
“Godot category.” Fixed features necessarily have subopti-
mal fit outside the scope of the stimuli they were designed
to represent.
Fourth, a flexible set of features tuned to specific catego-
rizations reduces the necessity of complex categorization
rules. To illustrate that good representations often carry
most of the burden of categorization, consider the XOR
problem in learning theory. XOR is a binary function
categorizing the pairs (0, 0) and (1, 1) as members of the “0”
category and the pairs (1, 0) and (0, 1) as members of the “1”
category. Categorization rules that separate the “0” from
the “1” category are complex and nonlinear, because no
linear solution (a straight line) achieves the separation.
Complex learning problems often become simpler with
better representations. Add another number as a third
input to XOR, which is 1 whenever the two input numbers
are (1, 1) or (0, 0), and 0 otherwise. A simple recoding
simplifies the problem: there is now a linear solution.
Although XOR is only a simple formal problem, it nonethe-
less illustrates the general point that carefully crafted repre-
sentations often reduce the complexity of categorization
processes.
Concept learning theories have frequently stressed the
importance of learning categories by discovering complex
rules that integrate several distinct stimulus features
(Bruner et al. 1956; Nosofsky et al. 1994). Concept learning
certainly does sometimes require such integration. How-
ever, these problems have effortful, strategic solutions.
They are rather unnatural; people are not particularly adept
at explicitly combining psychologically separated sources of
information. Our alternative is that new categorizations can
be based on relatively few, specially tailored features.
Fifth, in the flexible feature approach, categorizations
can induce a decomposition of features into subfeatures.
Consider the contrast between glasses and cans. Early in
conceptual development, these objects may be indis-
tinguishable because their memory representation corre-
sponds to a single, undifferentiated feature. Now, assume
that the organism must distinguish between these objects.
This can be achieved by decomposing the undifferentiated
feature into two specific features tailored to glasses and
cans.
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The acquisition of a new feature that segments an initially
undifferentiated, unitary feature could account for concep-
tual differentiation, for example, the basic to subordinate
shift (Tanaka & Taylor 1991), the narrowing of children’s
lexical categories (Chapman et al. 1986), and the construc-
tion of conceptual hierarchies (Schyns & Murphy 1994).
Classical accounts of concept learning distinguish between
features and concepts (which are combinations of features).
However, there is little principled distinction between
these constructs. Cars may be usefully represented with
features such as wheels, but wheels are themselves con-
cepts, which may be decomposable into features (Schyns &
Murphy 1994). Even features such as color, which may
appear unitary and unstructured, can be decomposed into
subunits (hue, saturation, and brightness) under certain
conditions (Foard & Kemler Nelson 1984; Goldstone
1994a).
3. Comparison to other approaches
We have argued that the feature space of object representa-
tions is often created to reflect the specific categorization
requirements of an organism. We described some of the
advantages of a feature set grounded in the organism’s
history of categorization (i.e., the categorizations the organ-
ism had to master plus the corrective feedback it received)
over the fixed feature sets proposed by many theories of
object categorization and recognition. Our proposal for
creating new features touches on several issues related to
perceptual and conceptual change. The following sections
discuss the similarities and contrasts between our proposal
for feature creation and feature chunking, new features in
constructive induction, developmental constraints on fea-
ture extraction, and formal models of feature extraction.
3.1. Chunking and perceptual unitization
Research in the visual search literature has supported
perceptual changes similar to the types of changes that we
have discussed. Training or automatization effects occur
when people actively search for a particular target shape
(for example, the letter “A”) in a visual array of distracter
letters (for example, “M” and “W”). In Fisher’s (1986)
model of visual search, letters are represented by simple
features such as horizontal, vertical, and diagonal line
segments. Similarity between features generally makes it
more difficult to find, for example, an “A” among “W”s than
an “A” among “M”s; “A” and “W” share two diagonal bars
but “A” and “M” have no common feature. However, even
when featural descriptions are quite similar, extensive train-
ing significantly speeds up search times (see, e.g., Fisher
1986).
Czerwinski et al. (1992) suggested that a perceptual
change called perceptual unitization could explain training
effects in visual search. Perceptual unitization produces
perceptual features from a set of more elementary compo-
nents. These new features speed up visual search because
they recode input objects in a more efficient feature reper-
toire, a repertoire tailored to the specifics of the search task.
Our feature creation theory has both similarities to and
differences from unitization and chunking theory. It is
similar in that visual search may be framed as a categoriza-
tion task of distracters and targets. Chunking can then be
viewed as a context-dependent process influenced by the
contrasts and similarities between targets and distracters.
This reformulation of visual search emphasizes functional
constraints that the chunking process must satisfy; units will
be formed that allow members of the target category to be
distinguished from distracters. It also allows specific pre-
dictions to be derived. For example, in Fisher’s (1986) and
Czerwinski et al.’s (1992) models, chunked features could
represent any subpart of the capital letters, the subpart that
reliably unifies and distinguishes the categories. Perceptual
chunking is probably an important mechanism of feature
creation. However, we believe that the principles governing
chunking cannot be fully understood without the notion of
category contrasts and similarities.
The influences of category contrasts and similarities on
the segmentation of objects were specifically studied by
Pevtzow and Goldstone (1994). Stick figures composed of
six lines were categorized in one of two ways. Different
arbitrary combinations of three contiguous lines were diag-
nostic for the different categorizations. After categorization
training, subjects participated in part–whole judgments,
indicating whether a particular set of three lines (a part) was
present in a whole stick figure. Subjects were significantly
faster in determining that a part was present in a whole
when the part was previously diagnostic during categoriza-
tion. The part–whole judgment task is arguably the most
perceptually based task used by Palmer (1977) to explore
the “naturalness” of a way of segmenting an object into
parts. Although Palmer’s model bases the naturalness of a
particular segmentation on properties of the object (e.g.,
the proximities, similarities, and shapes of the line seg-
ments), the results indicate that the subjects’ experience
also influences how they will segment an object into parts.
The differences between unitization and functional fea-
ture creation are mostly consequences of using discrete vs.
continuous stimuli. As its name indicates, unitization re-
quires that the stimuli be discretized before being unitized.
However, it is frequently difficult to assess exactly what
discretization the visual system initially applies to a stimulus
before unitization occurs. Czerwinski et al.’s stimuli and
Palmer’s stick figures are designed to bias processing ac-
cording to a particular discretization, line segments (how-
ever, the authors acknowledge that they can only hope for
this segmentation). These stimuli could give the impression
that our perceptual systems initially segment the environ-
ment into little line segments and then construct complex
task-dependent representations by unitization. However,
the varieties of recognition tasks we face make it very likely
that there is no single scale of representation.
Many psychophysical and computational models are con-
verging on the observation that perception operates simul-
taneously at multiple spatial scales and that the coarser
scales are often sufficient for effective processing of com-
plex pictures (see, e.g., Burt & Adelson 1983; De Valois &
De Valois 1990; Marr 1982; Schyns & Oliva 1994; Watt
1987; Witkin 1986). Multiscale representations suggest that
the input stimuli are discretized at different scales, possibly
using scale-specific feature repertoires. If line segments
may serve as the discrete elements at the finer spatial scales
(though even here there are serious difficulties), “blobs” or
other image measurements are more appropriate for dis-
cretizing the coarser scales. A conjunction of high-
resolution edges often maps onto a single coarse-scale blob,
suggesting that the input signal could initially be parsed into
large components that do not result from fine-scale unitiza-
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tions. Hence, efficient parsings of real-world stimuli could
initially operate with the scale-specific primitives closely
corresponding to the relevant events of the input signal
(see, e.g., Oliva & Schyns 1995). These scale-specific primi-
tives should be adjustable to scale-specific shapes and
should therefore be sensitive to task contingencies (Oliva &
Schyns 1997). Scale-specific vocabularies could arise by
applying our proposal for learning new features to the
spatial scales made available by perception.
In summary, although chunking is probably an important
mechanism for creating new perceptual features, we think
that there are alternatives. Chunking applies only to a priori
discretized stimuli, but evidence suggests that stimuli are
not unequivocally discretized into their smallest structures
(or for that matter into a single, preferred scale). Large
features may be registered without being composed out of
smaller features, and small features may sometimes be
created by decomposing larger features.
3.2. Constructive induction
The idea of creating new featural descriptions has been a
direct concern of a branch of machine learning called
constructive induction (Matheus 1991; Michalski 1983). In
constructive induction, new features are created by apply-
ing inductive operators to the existing set of features. For
example, objects that belong to a category may originally be
described as 74, 78, or 71 cm tall. With the “close interval”
operator, a single new feature “any height between 70 and
80 cm” may be created. Generally, the operators that have
been considered have been highly symbolic, including
logical operators such as “and” and “or,” and hierarchical
relations between category classes. To give an example of
the latter type of operator, a playing card that was originally
represented as “diamond” may be recoded as “red” if the
system knows that diamonds are red.
Hofstader and his colleagues (French & Hofstadter
1991; Mitchell 1993) have also been concerned with com-
putational systems that create new descriptions for input
patterns. For example, Mitchell and Hofstadter’s Copycat
system, when processing the letter sequence “PPQRR,”
may develop either the description “P, followed by the
series PQR, followed by R” or the description “a Q in the
middle, flanked by a pair of Ps on the left and a pair of Rs on
the right.” The description that emerges will depend on the
other developing structures. Copycat creates new descrip-
tions by establishing groups of related letters and by relat-
ing these groups.
Wisniewski and Medin (1994) have recently provided
evidence that people alter their verbal descriptions of
objects to fit the category labels provided (see also Medin et
al. 1993). The same figure in a child’s drawing may be
interpreted as a tie or buttons, depending on how the
drawing is labeled. The authors argue that new descriptions
are created when links are established between abstract
background knowledge (e.g., “creative children should
show more detail in their drawings”) and concrete object
information.
Our proposal for learning new features is consistent with
these proposals. Although many of the ideas are similar, our
emphasis is different in several respects. We have stressed
that relatively raw stimulus properties must be preserved
for new features to be created. As was argued above, if
distilled, symbolic representations are used to create new
features, then there will be severe limitations on what new
object features are possible. This is the case with typical
constructive induction systems. Although they can produce
an infinite number of new features by successive applica-
tion of inductive operators, the new features are highly
constrained by the object interpretation made from the
primitive symbolic features. Both the original features and
the new features in constructive induction algorithms are
discrete symbols that are the product of an object inter-
pretation process. Far greater flexibility in feature creation
can be achieved by beginning with object representations in
terms of raw features that have not undergone interpreta-
tion. The representation should be raw enough so that both
symbolic interpretations of an “X” (“two crossing diagonal
lines” and “a ‘v’ and an upside-down ‘v’ just touching”) can
be generated (McGraw et al. 1994). Harnad (1990) has
made a similar point with respect to the need for grounding
symbols by means of representations that are nonsymbolic.
By stressing the importance of early perceptual repre-
sentations that implicitly preserve distal object properties,
our approach to feature creation also stresses perceptual
constraints on feature extraction. Whereas constructive
induction techniques can create arbitrarily complex fea-
tures, features that are generated by humans are con-
strained by perceptual factors such as topology, spatial
proximity, and global coherence. Thus, features that are
generated by standard constructive induction techniques
may be improperly constrained in opposing ways. They can
be too constrained by the initial symbolic representations,
and they cannot be sufficiently constrained by properties of
our actual perceptual systems.
Another difference is that we have stressed the percep-
tual changes accompanying feature creation. With standard
feature creation techniques, new features are added to the
system’s repertoire, but there is little reason to suggest that
the new features alter the appearance of the described
objects. Rather, they alter the properties that will be in-
ferred about the objects. There is a difference in immediacy
between seeing and inferring that an object might be
expressed in terms of a particular feature. The psychologi-
cal evidence that we have reviewed suggests that percep-
tions of the immediate appearance of objects (e.g., their
discriminability and apparent organization) are altered by
experience. Mitchell and Hofstader’s letter series may pro-
vide an intermediate case (see also Chalmers et al. 1992).
When people interpret “PPQRR” in a particular way, it may
be a cognitive inference, an immediate perceptual phe-
nomenon, or something in between. The same ambiguity
seems to exist for the high-level features (e.g., forks, traps,
and pawn support structures) that are used by chess experts
but not by novices (De Groot 1965).
In summary, work in constructive induction is certainly
relevant to the present theory of feature creation. Our
approach differs from much of this work in focusing on the
perceptual constraints and consequences of feature crea-
tion, and the importance of beginning with relatively raw
object representations for developing novel interpretations
of an object.
3.3. Developmental constraints on object
feature extraction
There are in principle an infinite number of ways to
represent real-world objects with features. This poses a
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serious problem for developmental psychologists who must
explain how children acquire a particular featural object
description from a limited data set. Similarly, in acquiring a
new word meaning, children are “faced with an infinite set
of possibilities about what a novel word might mean”
(Markman 1995, p. 199; see also Jones & Smith 1993;
Landau 1994; Markman 1989; Quine 1960). To reduce the
indeterminacy of featural representations, it has been pro-
posed that young learners come equipped with biases
toward particular properties of stimuli that increase the
speed and accuracy of learning (Eimas 1994; Landau 1994;
Markman 1995). These biases are of two sorts: theories and
beliefs about objects in the real world, and perceptual
structures and processes. We discuss how these biases
constrain the development of functional features, and we
argue that they must be supplemented by categorization
constraints.
3.3.1. The role of theories in object parsing. According to
an influential account of conceptual development, new
features and concepts are direct consequences of the devel-
opment of theories, that is, naive mental explanations of
phenomena (Carey 1985; Gelman 1988; Keil 1989; Murphy
& Medin 1985). Perceptual features (e.g., bodyishape,
lengthiofilegs, numberiofilegs) lie at the periphery of con-
cepts, whereas our theories place the causes of category
membership (e.g., a genetic code) at the core of conceptual
organization. It has been suggested that the conceptual
core exists prior to experience with the world and that it
could bias the features young infants notice in objects
(Carey 1985; Spelke 1994).
There are two different views regarding the development
of theories, discontinuous and continuous. In the discon-
tinuous view, the conceptual core develops through a differ-
entiation process: new explanatory constructs (concepts
and features) result from the differentiation of the existing
constructs of an earlier theory (Carey 1991). Children’s
theories may be incommensurable with corresponding
theories in adults (Carey 1985; 1991; Keil 1989; Smith et al.
1985).
Spelke (1994) suggests that, contrary to the discon-
tinuous view of theory development, there is continuity
with respect to theories used during conceptual develop-
ment. For Spelke, there is an innate, constant core at the
center of the (intuitive, naive) knowledge later used by
older children and adults. Spelke argues that the constant
core consists of general constraints that govern the way
children perceive and reason about objects in different
domains. As Spelke (1994, p. 439) puts it, “learning systems
require perceptual systems that parse the world appro-
priately.” Spelke suggests that, among other constraints, an
innate cohesion principle biases children to group parts that
move together into single objects (see also Eimas, 1994, for
a related point of view). This principle could facilitate the
parsing of objects from their background and could boot-
strap category learning.
In a continuous or discontinuous view of development,
innate knowledge is important because it reduces the
indeterminacy of featural descriptions to those dictated by
preexisting theories. In general, however, there is a concep-
tual difficulty with the idea that (innate) theoretical knowl-
edge constrains perceptual information: going from theo-
ries to predict perceptual data is underconstrained. To
illustrate, if a categorizer is instructed that a set of objects
with an unknown complex structure is a set of hammers, an
existing theory of hammer would list the components repre-
senting these objects in memory. However, unless the
theory also specifies all possible perceptual appearances of
these components, a segmentation procedure would still
have difficulties locating the actual parts in a new object:
the perceptual realization of the parts depends on the new
stimulus itself. This is analogous to the symbol grounding
problem (Harnad 1990).
Thibaut (1994) has recently investigated mappings of
theories on perceptual features. In a feature circling task,
subjects were instructed to parse the stimuli of a category of
unfamiliar objects that displayed the same overall shape
and structure (see Fig. 3e). All subjects were given a
category name so that the corresponding general knowl-
edge could assist their segmentations. When asked to name
the segmented parts, subjects did not use the same name
(e.g., the same part could be called “head,” “leg,” or “body”
by different subjects). Thus, even when a theory provides a
listing of the parts to be searched, the assignment of each
part to a perceptual structure is not completely constrained
by theories (Thibaut & Schyns 1995).
3.3.2. The early role of perception in object parsing.
Theories are one source of constraints to reduce the per-
ceptual indeterminacy of stimuli. However, it has recently
been suggested that perception also biases children’s pre-
dispositions toward objects. Experimental evidence has
revealed that category inductions are guided by a bias for
the shape of objects (see Jones & Smith 1993, and Landau
1994, for reviews of the relevant data). In a typical design,
children are presented with a novel three-dimensional
object with a novel name (a count noun) and are then asked
which objects (of a set of objects that have, or do not have,
the same shape, texture, and size) should be called by the
same name. Their performance is compared with that of
children who are simply asked to select objects that are like
the novel object, with no name provided. Converging
evidence suggests that children generalize from object
names on the basis of shape and neglect large differences in
other object properties. This bias appears to develop until
the age of 2 years; later, the shape bias predominates only
when children are given a count noun (see Jones & Smith
1993).
The shape bias is intended to reduce some of the indeter-
minacy of category induction. However, because complex
shapes are decomposable into many different sets of com-
ponents, a bias toward shape is only a first necessary step.
Other constraints are required to guide the decomposition
of a particular shape into its features. In other words, it
remains to be explained how children learn to decompose a
set of objects into their relevant object features. Such an
explanation of parsing could extend the shape bias to
specifying precisely which aspects of shape attract attention
(and therefore bias segmentation) at different stages of
development. It is conceivable that early biases for shape
are later superseded by biases resulting from experience
with particular object categories. As was argued above,
segmentation routines for different categories of geometri-
cal objects (e.g., continuous vs. discontinuous surfaces)
could develop and help in making the fine segmentations
required by conceptual expertise.
Thibaut (1995) explored the development of segmenta-
tion skills in different age groups. Adults and children aged
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4 and 6 years were instructed to learn a category of un-
known stimuli and were later tested on the parsing of its ex-
emplars. The stimuli shared a global shape and were com-
posed of a common set of shape features that varied slightly
across exemplars (see Fig. 3e). Children’s parsings were
highly inconsistent compared to those of adults. For ex-
ample, although component parts kept the same relative lo-
cations across exemplars, children’s parsings often violated
topological coherence. They changed the location of the
same part across exemplars, and the number of segmenta-
tions was not constant across stimuli. Together, these incon-
sistencies stress that, when children attend to shape, they
can be biased toward local similarities between shape as-
pects at the expense of a consistent integration of shape as-
pects across instances. Consequently, the new shape fea-
tures that children isolate could be structurally different
from those that adults extract from identical materials.
This has important implications for category learning.
Children’s biases toward locally salient properties could
impede, or even prevent, their learning of new categories,
when these are defined by features that are comparatively
less salient. Recent evidence from Thibaut (1995) showed
that 6-year-old children could not learn a simple catego-
rization (a first category defined by the perceptual cue
“a-group-of-three-legs-plus-one” and a second category de-
fined by “two-groups-of-two-legs”) when the sizes and ori-
entations of the legs that were irrelevant for categori-
zation varied across exemplars. However, children of the
same age experiencing the categories without variations
across exemplars had no difficulty learning the categories.
These results emphasize the interaction between the devel-
opment of a feature repertoire and specific perceptual
biases. Over the course of conceptual development, chil-
dren must learn to neglect irrelevant features of the stimuli
when they learn new categorizations. The processing differ-
ences that could explain the determinants of children’s
object segmentations should be an important area of future
research.
In summary, we have presented theories and perceptual
biases as possible predispositions of children toward spe-
cific object properties. These biases were not sufficiently
specific to predict the actual segmentation of an object
belonging to a category. The structure of the categorization
problem itself could be an important constraint on the
featural descriptions of objects, but it remains to be ex-
plained exactly how young children utilize this structure to
discover relevant object features.
3.4. Formal models of feature extraction
The understanding of the mechanisms and biases con-
straining the discovery of relevant structures in data is not
the province only of developmental psychologists. For
decades, mathematicians and statisticians have been con-
fronted with the issue of structure, as the following quota-
tion from a textbook on morphology illustrates (Serra 1982,
pp. 57–58):
The universe of all possible object shapes is vast, even when it is
reduced to equivalence classes. . . . There is therefore a huge
offering of potential structuring elements. Thus, analyzing the
same object X by two dissimilar structuring elements results in
two profoundly different pieces of information on its geometric
structure. . . . Only the interaction of X with structuring ele-
ment B has an objective meaning.
Formal techniques for finding relevant structures in data
could provide useful analogies for theories of feature cre-
ation.
Mathematically, an object is often expressed as an
n-dimensional feature vector. Each component of the vec-
tor encodes the presence vs. absence or the values of the n
attributes describing the object (e.g., its parts and their
shapes, colors, and textures). Geometrically, different
points in n-dimensional space encode different objects, and
categories of similar objects form clouds of points. There
are many ways to encode objects, ranging from the raw pixel
intensities of digitized pictures to sophisticated properties
that are known to be diagnostic for classification, e.g.,
numberiofilegs, hasiwings, hasifur, hasifeathers, and hiber-
nates. Although the latter representation would describe
animals in an appropriate feature space, pixel arrays would
require extensive processing before diagnostic properties
were captured. Our proposal for functional feature creation
concerns the extraction of new structures from perceptual
data. How could hasifeathers be discovered from a training
set of pixel arrays or similarly unstructured representa-
tions?
3.4.1. Properties of high-dimensional spaces and the
bias–variance dilemma. Many models of concept learning
have successfully shown that category representations can
be learned from exemplars when they are composed of a
small, prespecified feature set (see, e.g., Gluck & Bower
1988; Krushke 1992; Rumelhart et al. 1986; Widrow & Hoff
1960); the task is not to discover the feature set from high-
dimensional raw data. However, it could be argued that the
discovery of features from such high-dimensional spaces is
not substantially different from standard mechanisms of
category learning. Both concern the extraction of task-
dependent invariants. Standard concept learning models
operating in low-dimensional spaces could simply be scaled
up to operate in high-dimensional spaces.
One of the problems with this idea is that high-
dimensional spaces are mostly empty. To illustrate, imagine
discretizing a line, a squared plane, a cube, and a hypercube
with tiles of equal size (e.g., 10 tiles per side). There is a
geometrical increase (in this example, 101, 102, 103, 104) in
the number of tiles that cover the objects. If each tile is
represented by an n-dimensional data point, the example
shows that one needs approximately 10n tiles to cover an
n-dimensional space. If the input distribution varies along
many degrees of freedom, a learning problem in high-
dimensional space may require an unrealistically large
training set to reveal robust features, even if an asymptotic
solution exists in principle.
This curse of dimensionality (Bellman 1961) imposes
severe limitations on the idea of directly applying simple
supervised categorization models to discover perceptual
features. Typical concept learning models learn category
decision boundaries from a set of pairings of exemplars and
their respective category labels. Formally, this consists of
finding a function, f, which successfully approximates the
desired category name y from an input x. Often, f is chosen
to minimize a cost function. Popular concept learning
networks minimize the sum of the square of the error
between the estimated and the desired category labels (see,
e.g., Rumelhart et al. 1986; Widrow & Hoff 1960).
Generally speaking, “error-based” categorization models
such as back-propagation are nonparametric statistical
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models (Geman et al. 1992). They are nonparametric
because the networks are not biased to particular classes of
solutions. Instead, the architectures are unbiased such that
they discover structures from data flexibly. Mathematical
analysis has shown that the error term (specifically, the
expected mean square error) of these networks can be
algebraically decomposed into a bias and a variance term
(see Geman et al. 1992, pp. 9–10). These two terms
summarize the bias–variance dilemma (Geman et al.
1992). Networks make a bias error when they are dedicated
to a class of solutions that is not appropriate for the
categorizations at hand. Such networks may be too rigid,
and flexibility (low bias) would be needed to extract task-
specific features. However, low bias comes at the cost of
high variance, the second component of the error (where
variance means the discrepancy between the correct cate-
gorization and the categorization of the network). There is
high variance because a flexible system is too sensitive to
the data: it learns many idiosyncrasies of the exemplars
(e.g., differences in lighting conditions, rotation in depth,
translation in the plane) before learning the invariants of a
category. Consequently, experience with many exemplars is
necessary for the network to “forget” idiosyncrasies and
learn relevant abstractions. Only with great experience is
the system able to categorize accurately (keep the variance
low). The curse of dimensionality is such that unbiased
machines designed to discover many types of new percep-
tual features flexibly will often require implausibly large
training sets to achieve good categorizations. Note that this
problem does not greatly affect fixed feature models, which
usually operate in smaller spaces for which sufficient exem-
plars can be generated. The bias–variance dilemma ad-
dresses practical computability, not principled limitations.
An ideally flexible system should be constructed so as to
keep bias and variance low, using a reasonable training set.
The bias–variance dilemma is somewhat analogous to the
contrast between structured and unstructured features
discussed above. By analogy, fixed sets of structured fea-
tures make it difficult to learn new categorizations (and
therefore raise the bias error). In contrast, unstructured
systems will tend to capture irrelevant aspects of the input
set that have little relation to the actual basis of categoriza-
tion (and therefore raise the variance).
3.4.2. Dimensionality reduction. Complex supervised cate-
gorization problems in high- dimensional spaces would be
simplified were it possible to reduce the dimensionality of
the input. Several linear and nonlinear dimensionality-
reduction techniques have been designed to achieve this
goal. Underlying dimensionality reduction is the idea that
information processing is divided into two distinct stages. A
first stage constructs a representation of the environment
and a second stage uses this representation for higher level
cognition, such as categorization and object recognition. It
is hoped that the constructed representation in a smaller
dimensional space is more useful than the raw input repre-
sentation.
To illustrate, consider the popular technique called prin-
cipal components analysis (PCA). If redundancies exist in
the input data, there should be fewer sources of variation
than there are dimensions (i.e., p ,, n). PCA finds the first
k orthogonal directions of highest variation in a data set. If
each input vector of a high-dimensional space is recoded in
terms of a linear combination of the first k sources of
variation, the intrinsic structure of the data will be pre-
served to a first approximation (see Oja 1982; Sanger 1989).
In general, however, the featural interpretation of principal
components is often difficult because orthogonal directions
of highest variance have little connection to the best projec-
tions for categorization. That is, there are no psychological
constraints on the principal components. Principal compo-
nents need not be spatially or topologically coherent (per-
ceptual constraints) or summarized by a single explanation
(conceptual constraints).
Other dimensionality-reduction techniques aim at repro-
ducing the intrinsic structure of the input space. Examples
of these range from Shepard’s (1957) early multidimen-
sional scaling and Sammon’s (1969) nonlinear mapping to
more recent Kohonen maps (Kohonen 1984) and a prom-
ising extension to Kohonen maps called curvilinear com-
ponent analysis (Demartines & Herault 1997). These al-
gorithms project an n-dimensional space on a smaller
p-dimensional space, while keeping most of the informa-
tion about the organization of the input space. To illustrate,
consider two distinct clouds of points forming two catego-
ries in a “high”-dimensional space composed of four dimen-
sions (n 5 4). Assume further that exemplars of the first
category are identical on two dimensions, whereas exem-
plars of the second category have only one dimension in
common. The points of the first cloud lie on a plane (p 5 2),
but the points of the other category have 3 degrees of
freedom (p 5 3) and, therefore, are in three-dimensional
space. This simple example illustrates that data sets can
have local distributions with different intrinsic dimensions
of variation (in the example, 2 and 3). Projections of high-
dimensional inputs onto lower-dimensional spaces should
account for these intrinsic characteristics if they want to
preserve the important degrees of freedom of the distribu-
tion. Unfortunately, techniques for discovering the intrinsic
dimensionality of a data distribution are also plagued by
high dimensionality. The number of data points necessary
to estimate reliably the structure of a distribution can be
enormous if the intrinsic structure is high. Dimensionality-
reduction techniques also have to give up generality for
biases, at the expense of possibly missing “important”
structures in the data. Nevertheless, the existence of low-
dimensional somatosensory maps in cortex clearly dem-
onstrates that brain structures are particularly adept at
reducing high-dimensional inputs to lower-dimensional
representations (see Kaas, 1995, for a review). Further-
more, there is now growing support for the notion that
these natural processes of dimensionality reduction are
flexible, allowing different types of reorganizations of corti-
cal maps following different forms of sensory deprivation
(Kaas 1995).
By analogy with the functional (re)organization of so-
matosensory maps, we would like the formal definition of
“important lower-dimensional structures” to be closer to
the categorization task the system has to solve. Recent
approaches to dimensionality reduction have incorporated
measures of “feature goodness” in the algorithm for deter-
mining good dimensions of recoding. For example, Intrator
(1992) and Intrator and Gold (1993) discuss a technique in
which input data are projected onto dimensions that have
many distinct clusters of data points (multimodal distri-
butions). This unsupervised technique is more likely to
discover dimensions useful for distinguishing categories
under the assumption that different categories produce
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clusters within the data. Intrator (1992) reports that his
technique worked on stimuli with 3,969 and 5,500 dimen-
sions and that few training data were necessary for extract-
ing robust features. This technique and related techniques
based on projection pursuit (Friedman & Tukey 1974)
provide methods with interesting biases for exploring high-
dimensional data spaces.
In the dimensionality-reduction techniques reviewed,
the feature extraction stage operates independently of
higher level processes; thus, there is no guarantee that the
extracted features will be useful for higher level processes
(Mozer 1994). The functionality principle suggests that
the categorizations being learned should influence the fea-
tures that are extracted. In other words, top-down informa-
tion should constrain the search for relevant dimensions/
features of categorization. Therefore, we believe that the
serial process of (1) projecting high-dimension space onto a
new lower-dimension space and then (2) determining cate-
gorization with new dimensions will have to be modified
such that the second process informs the first (see also
Intrator 1993). However, computational considerations
make it likely that different aspects of perceptual feature
extraction require strong biases that do not trivialize the
categorization problem (as fixed features often do) but that
are sufficiently constraining to allow the learning of general
features from a reasonable number of data points (a similar
opinion is defended by Anderson & Rosenfeld 1988;
Geman et al. 1992; and Shepard 1989, among others). It is
conceivable, for example, that different constraints will be
needed to model the categorization of intrinsically different
object classes such as faces, man-made vs. natural objects
and textures, natural and artificial scenes, and so forth. The
empirical study of these psychological constraints and bi-
ases should explicitly account for the reported interactions
of categorization and perception, even if they significantly
complicate the problem.
4. Conclusions
The function of a feature is to detect and internally repre-
sent commonalties between members of the same category
as well as differences between categories. Either people
come equipped with a complete set of features that account
for all present and future categorizations, or, working back-
wards, people sometimes create new features to represent
new categorizations. We argue for an approach in which
people create features in order to subserve the categoriza-
tion and representation of objects. We have presented
psychological evidence and theoretical arguments for the
necessity of flexible features in object categorization theo-
ries. Flexible features allow the learning of new but percep-
tually constrained features when new categorizations must
be represented. Thus, given an appropriate history of
categorization, a learned set of features may be equivalent,
but not limited, to proposed sets of fixed features. As new
features are created to detect and represent new categori-
cal contrasts and similarities, a learned set permits an
efficient fit between categorization demands and the fea-
ture repertoire, which should then be free of useless fea-
tures. Flexible features are inherently linked to categoriza-
tion tasks and therefore reduce the need for complex
categorization rules by providing efficient representations.
In addition, advantages can be accrued by decomposing
features into subfeatures, without representing all possible
decompositions of a holistic feature a priori. In our view,
there is little difference between concepts and features:
someone’s unitary concept might be someone else’s decom-
posable structure, depending on the individuals’ histories of
categorization.
Experimental materials are more likely to promote fea-
ture creation when they are not designed with a priori
diagnostic features, leading to obvious feature decomposi-
tions. These alternative materials (see Figs. 2 and 3) (1) do
not limit the information that can be obtained from the
input, (2) have many distinct intrinsic structures, and (3) are
not exhausted by their symbolic descriptions, such as “has-
legs,” “square,” “circle,” and so forth. In short, alternative
stimuli evoke a representation of their structure in a raw,
analog form, in a form allowing for a stimulus reinterpreta-
tion if new categorizations require such a reinterpretation.
In our view, two types of category learning should be
distinguished. Fixed space category learning occurs when
new categorizations are representable with the available
feature set. Flexible space category learning occurs when
new categorizations are not representable with the avail-
able features. Whether fixed or augmented learning occurs
depends on the requirements of a particular categorization
task. That is, it depends on the featural contrasts and
similarities between the new category to be represented
and the individual’s concepts in memory. Fixed feature
approaches face one of two problems when they are con-
fronted with tasks that require new features. If the fixed
features are fairly high level and directly useful for categori-
zations (such as Biederman’s geons), then they will have
insufficient flexibility to represent all objects that may be
relevant for a new task. If the fixed features are small,
subsymbolic fragments (such as pixels), then regularities at
the level of functional features, regularities that are re-
quired to predict categorizations, will not be captured by
these primitives.
Flexible features and the perceptual learning they allow
have important similarities to, differences from, and impli-
cations for various fields of cognitive science. Perceptual
unitization similarly implies that recoding proximal stimuli
with new features affects the perceptual appearance of the
distal object. However, unitization assumes that stimuli are
initially analyzed into components before being unitized,
whereas evidence suggests that stimuli are not unequivo-
cally discretized into their smallest structures (or, for that
matter, into a single, preferred scale). Functional con-
straints influence the scale of discretization. The field of
constructive induction in artificial intelligence is concerned
with creating new object descriptions to assist in categoriza-
tion. In many cases, the new descriptions are simple sym-
bolic transformations of existing symbolic descriptions.
Instead, we have stressed the need to create object features
from relatively raw, unprocessed, perceptual representa-
tions and to create new features by incorporating percep-
tual rather than purely formal constraints. Developmental
biases (both theory based and perceptual) that could con-
strain feature extraction were also reviewed. We argue that
neither the shape bias nor a priori theories are sufficiently
constraining to predict the actual perceptual features that
are discovered in objects. These features are also provided
by the structuring role of learned categories. Formal analo-
gies with the principles we discuss are found in statistical
techniques of dimensionality reduction and their network
implementations. These techniques also attempt to reduce
Commentary/Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:1 17
what is initially a high-dimensional categorization space to a
lower-dimensional space representing important features.
Supervised learning is closer to the principles we discuss,
insofar as it explicitly provides feedback to constrain the
search for categorization features. However, it must be
properly constrained to be practically feasible. We believe
properly constrained dimensionality-reduction techniques
(techniques constrained by perceptual and categorical fac-
tors) come closest to the principles we discuss.
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Abstract: Eigenfeatures are created by the principal component ap-
proach (PCA) used on objects described by a low-level code (i.e., pixels,
Gabor jets). We suggest that eigenfeatures act like the flexible features
described by Schyns et al. They are particularly suited for face processing
and give rise to class-specific effects such as the other-race effect. The PCA
approach can be modified to accommodate top-down constraints.
How can the gender, race, or identity of a face be inferred from a
digitized picture? We can imagine that the “flexible features”
Figure 1 (Abdi et al.). An illustration of the other-race effect. New White faces, (i.e., not learned by the model), denoted by “o,” and
new Japanese faces, denoted by “1,” are projected on eigenfaces obtained with White faces only. The between-faces similarity is larger
for other-race faces (i.e., Japanese) than for own-race faces.
proposed by Schyns et al. to perform this type of task correspond
to some intermediate-level features that are progressively extrac-
ted from the exemplars of the relevant categories. The problem,
however, is to find mechanisms responsible for extracting such
features. We propose that for categorization tasks involving high
similarity object classes such as faces, the principal component
analysis (PCA) model is a good candidate. The applicability of this
model to face processing, first suggested in the late 1980s (Abdi
1988; Sirovich & Kirby 1987; Turk & Pentland 1991), is still
current (Hancock et al. 1996; O’Toole et al. 1997).
The PCA approach represents faces by their projections on a
set of orthogonal features (principal components, eigenvectors,
“eigenfaces”) epitomizing the statistical structure of the set of
faces from which they are extracted. These orthogonal features are
ordered according to the amount of variance (or eigenvalue) they
explain, and are often referred to as “macro-features” (Anderson
& Mozer 1981) or eigenfeatures in contrast to the high-level
features traditionally used to describe a face (e.g., nose, eyes,
mouth). Eigenfeatures are flexible in that they evolve with the
faces encountered (Valentin et al. 1996) and depend on the set of
faces from which they are extracted (O’Toole et al. 1991).
Eigenfeatures, because they are optimal for the set of faces
from which they are extracted, are less efficient for representing
faces from a different population and thus generate class-specific
effects such as the other-race effect. As an illustration, Figure 1
displays the projection of 160 White faces and 160 Japanese faces
on the first four eigenvectors derived from White faces (none of
the faces has been used to compute the eigenvectors). The
Japanese faces are more similar to each other than the White faces
are. This shows that White eigenfeatures give rise to the other-race
effect when used for categorizing Japanese faces.
Eigenfeatures can be used to perform higher-level categoriza-
tion tasks such as face categorization or identification. For exam-
ple, Abdi et al. (1995) showed that a neural network, trained to
classify faces according to their gender, generalizes its learning to
new faces better when the faces are represented by eigenfeatures
than by arrays of pixel intensities. This superiority of the eigen-
features over pixel representations suggests that eigenfeatures are
semantically relevant.
Semantic relevance has also been demonstrated by O’Toole et
al. (1993) and Valentin and Abdi (1996). They showed that differ-
ent eigenfeatures capture different kind of information. As illus-
trated by Figure 2, eigenfeatures with large eigenvalues contain
information relative to the orientation (e.g., full-face, profile) in
addition to the categorical assignment (e.g., gender, race) of the
faces. These eigenfeatures are robust and can be estimated from a
small set of faces (Valentin et al., in press). In contrast, eigenfea-
tures with small eigenvalues contain face identity information.
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Figure 2 (Abdi et al.). First three (top panel) and last three (bottom panel) eigenfeatures of a set of 40 female faces each represented
by 10 views sampling the rotation of the head from full-face to profile with 10-degree steps (from Valentin 1996).
A potential problem for the PCA approach, as noted by Schyns
et al., is that feature extraction operates independently of higher
level cognitive processes. Using top-down information to con-
strain the eigenvector representation may offer a solution to this
problem. For example, Abdi et al. (1996) have recently derived a
generalization of the PCA model that incorporates a priori con-
straints both at the level of pixel representations and of faces.
Using this generalized PCA model, Abdi et al. (1997) showed that
constraints on the pixels improve the gender categorization per-
formance of PCA models. The pixels were weighted according to
their information content, an idea that is consonant with the
proposal by Schyns et al.
In conclusion, eigenfeatures may play the role of the “flexible
features” hypothesized by Schyns et al. even though some other
mechanisms certainly coexist. A future line of development for
PCA models is to incorporate an entry code that is more realistic
perceptually or cognitively than pixels such as the output of Gabor
filters, or wavelets.
Feature see, feature do
Philip J. Benson
University Laboratory of Physiology, Oxford OX1 3PT, England, United
Kingdom. philip.benson@physiol.ox.ac.uk www.physiol.ox.ac.uk/,pjb
Abstract: Physiological evidence predicts a model of concept categorisa-
tion that evolves through direct interaction with object feature selection.
The requirement stated by Schyns et al. for feature plasticity is supported,
but important caveats raise a question about the level at which feature
identification can occur. Visual attribute selection for feature creation is
likely to be directed by top-down and attentional processes.
Assuming that primary visual cortex (V1) is necessary for object
recognition strongly suggests that the geniculostriate pathway is
fundamental in bootstrapping the dimensionality reduction pro-
cess. This is my basis for expanding on the Schyns et al. proposal
and their model for representation and categorisation of objects in
association cortex.
Ablation of V1 does not disconnect other significant extrastriate
areas from all aspects of the visual “stream,” areas such as V3a,
V5/MT, or regions of the ventral temporal system. These areas
continue to communicate “residual” signals via subcortical net-
works. This explains unconscious visual processing in humans
(e.g., “blindsight,” reviewed in Stoerig & Cowey 1997). On the
other hand, a destriate monkey behaved as if it did not recognise
objects in its environment despite good visual acuity (Humphrey
& Wieskrantz 1971).
Data from simulations and anatomical projections from the
lateral geniculate nuclei to, and laminar architecture within, V1
provide an early feature base using oriented Gabor patches
(Olshausen & Field 1996) and, with extension, spatial invariance
can be achieved. To date, no other forms of object features or their
method of extraction have been described. Bidirectional projec-
tions from V1 to the inferior temporal area may pass through
surprisingly few stations (V1, V2, V4, posterior and anterior
temporal cortex), each incorporating many-to-one feedforward
connectivity and successive increases in receptive field size. Each
self-organising station consists of overlapping inputs, with the
spatial scope of the competing local fields determined by inhibi-
tory interneurons. Each output stage is nonlinear and sigmoidal,
leading to inherited binding of the percept’s feature repertoire,
category similarity, and membership (if known). Visual feature
dimension reduction is thus achieved physiologically. One more
issue must be considered before the model can be extended.
One must regard the apparent specificity of single cells in
association cortex with some caution, but analysis of the informa-
tion transmitted in firing patterns indicates that competing over-
lapping ensembles over a distance of up to 2 mm represent a
distributed coding of, for example, objects and faces. The removal
of ventrolateral frontal cortex impairs discrimination learning; this
area is reciprocally connected to inferotemporal association cor-
tex. Nearest-neighbour connectivity with adjacent cortex around
the principal sulcus indicates that the ventrolateral frontal area
may channel high-order feature and object information relevant to
working spatial memory. Such interacting high-level ensembles
make for a predictive model of categorisation and interactive
feature isolation as follows:
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Figure 1 (Benson). The separability of three conceptual object
feature spaces can be computed using information theory (cross
sections through the convex hyperhulls are illustrated). A high-
dimensional trace through a hull is directly comparable to at-
tractor basins or perceptual magnets; attractor minima are one or
more integrated features. Categorical perception paradigms (see
discussions in Harnad 1987) indicate the concept boundary, and
thus the sigmoidal identification functions (shown) and recogni-
tion functions are generated and modelled by hull intersection.
Successful recruitment of distinctive features modifies the shape
of the hulls to subserve encoding. Feature repertoires modelled in
this way are predictive of the relative power of component fea-
tures. They also contain the concept structures necessary to
quantify stimulus similarity and energy (how different an exem-
plar is from its class prototype [Benson 1995a], giving rise to
expected discrimination thresholds (signal detection and criterion
setting [Triesman et al. 1995]).
For every relevant (detected) feature of a homogeneous class,
experience dictates either continuous or discrete measurement.
In the former, this leads naturally to a feature vector that includes
population sample variance information (variance may be asym-
metric about the mean). The identification of a discrete feature
immediately enhances categorisability. The union of the sum of all
feature vectors represents the range of possible outcomes of the
objects’ instantiation and thus, mathematically, a convex high-
dimensional hull. Informally, a cross section through this hyper-
hull is a two-dimensional blob from which one may obtain a
flavour of multidimensional complexity. The hyperhull model
captures object encoding (memory) and decoding (perception) by
ensembles.
Categorisation conflicts from overlapping hulls are resolved by
reanalysing low-level feature integration and is immediately ap-
parent in the distortion of the hull. Final separation of overlapping
hulls signals the utility and validity of the selected feature; repeat-
edly remembering the hull strengthens the association between
the feature repertoire and the category instance and structure.
Because the hyperhull embodies object feature variability, “dis-
tinctiveness” is inherent to it. Developmental evidence has shown
that feature configuration plays an important role in adult life. This
is why manipulating veridical and prototypical stimuli is so impor-
tant in understanding perceptual development (Benson 1995a;
1995b).
Work in progress in our laboratory suggests that the proximal
encoding hypothesized to occur in V1 may be complemented by
weak projections of subcortical origin from extrastriate to tempo-
ral cortex. Thus, although recognition may not be overtly appar-
ent, the performance of a degraded system of feature extraction is
desirable and necessary.
Two final comments: (1) How can one model a feature-filled
representation of the environment in which one is not aware of
higher-order signals, yet one can make accurate responses to them
(cf. Crick & Koch 1995)? (2) How could feature plasticity operate
in such a system (if at all)? After a critical conditioning period,
feature detectors in primary visual cortex are established. Because
performance in visual discrimination tasks is driven in a top-down
manner by visual experience (Ahissar & Hochstein 1997), this may
mean that V4 is a possible candidate for mediating the kinds of
featural plasticity described in the target article.
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A creationist myth: Pragmatic combination
not feature creation
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Abstract: Schyns et al. argue that flexibility in categorisation implies
“feature creation.” We argue that this notion is flawed, that flexibility can
be explained by combinations over fixed feature sets, and that feature
creation would in any case fail to explain categorisation. We suggest that
flexibility in categorisation is due to pragmatic factors influencing feature
combination, rendering feature creation unnecessary.
If the striking view of features by Schyns et al. is correct, then
widely held views of the concepts must be reconsidered. However,
the authors have not demonstrated that “feature creation” is
necessary to explain the flexibility of concepts. Moreover, feature
creation itself may not be a coherent notion. Instead, we believe
that the flexibility of concepts is better explained by pragmatic
factors guiding the combinatorial arrangements of a fixed set of
semantic attributes.
Schyns et al. argue that fixed feature sets limit the representa-
tional (and classificatory) capacity of a conceptual system. They
incorrectly claim, however, that “any functionally important differ-
ence between objects must be representable as differences in
their building blocks” (sect. 1.1, para. 3). This ignores the modes of
combination of those building blocks and, were the claim correct,
combinations of features would be unable to represent important
differences not already encoded in the fixed set. This claim is
similar to the (false) assumption that all distinctions expressible in
the sentences of a natural language are already lexically encoded.
Consequently, feature creation is only required in explaining
conceptual flexibility if important distinctions are neither expres-
sible by the fixed feature set, nor by any possible combination of
those features. Schyns et al. fail to address the latter possibility.
Enhancing the expressiveness of a fixed feature set raises an
induction problem (cf. Fodor 1980): how can appropriate novel
distinctions be generated? Fodor argues that systems cannot
increase their logical power (acquire wholly new features) by
means of learning: the system’s vocabulary and mechanisms must
already be able to express the “new” feature, and so that feature
has not been “created.” This is exemplified by the focus by Schyns
et al. on new features being “created” by interpolation between
existing values on dimensions: intermediate values are implied by
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the notion of a dimension and hence are not really “created.”1
However, even though “created” features might thus better be
construed as combinations over existing features, there are an
infinite number of such combinations – a problem of induction
remains.
Despite the fact that this is a critical problem, Schyns et al. fail to
address it properly. They state that “categorizations, rather than
being based on existing perceptual features, determine the fea-
tures that enter the representation of objects” (sect. 1.2.4, para. 1).
Their position appears circular, because they use feature creation
to explain categorisation, but claim that categorisation itself deter-
mines feature creation.
Nonetheless, conceptual flexibility needs explication by con-
straints on acceptable inductions (i.e., combinations of features),2
and we suggest that this can be achieved by pragmatic factors that
guide the appropriate combination of fixed features. Flexibility
can be explained via subjects’ sensitivity to relations between sets
of fixed features. Rather than “creating” new features, subjects
utilise feature dependencies or correlations, and treat these as if
they were autonomous features. Sensitivity to such relations is
constrained by the purposes of classification and wider cognitive
or communicative purposes, and will therefore be dependent on
context and task (Franks & Braisby, 1997, submitted).
Hence, the classifications supported by a fixed set of conceptual
(or semantic) features can be augmented by pragmatically moti-
vated operations on that set. Whether categorisation exploits
semantically or pragmatically derived attributes will therefore
depend on the task, context, and the kind of object involved.
Natural kind and related concepts, having an elaborate semantic
structure, may give rise to less pragmatically guided categorisation
than vague or social categories, which have a less determinate
semantic structure (see Braisby et al. 1996; Braisby & Franks,
1997, submitted).
Pragmatic factors also explain findings that Schyns et al. take to
undermine fixed features. Schyns & Rodet (1997) show that the
order in which single feature categories are learned determines
whether feature conjunctions are treated as conjunctions or as
unitary features. However, different orderings have different
pragmatic properties: learning conjunctive categories after
simpler ones invites subjects to utilise the importance of attributes
from previous categorisations, which is not allowed when conjunc-
tive categories are learned before simpler ones. Thus, categorisa-
tion differences need not entail feature creation, because one
order may pragmatically “lead” subjects to combine features. A
reconstruction of other aspects of the account by Schyns et al. is
also suggested by the pragmatic alternative. Their suggestions that
task differences and an individual’s past history underlie concept
flexibility have direct explications in terms of the pragmatics of the
act of classification.
In conclusion, Schyns et al. rightly bring to the foreground the
importance of flexibility in categorisation, but they err in drawing
inappropriate morals for concept representation. As long as exist-
ing features can enter into novel combinations, “creationism”
remains a myth.
NOTES
1. This simplistic notion does not account for many theoretical features
that cannot be thought of as values on dimensions.
2. Such combinatorial operations need not be limited to the simple
feature summations that have often been taken to define compositionality
(e.g., Hampton 1987). In fact, nonmonotonic operations (e.g., feature
negation, modification, and coercion) and operations that permit feature
emergence can all be compositional, provided that their outcomes are
predictable (see Franks 1995; Frege 1892; Partee 1984).
The development of new functional features
by instruction: The case of medical
education
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Abstract: Medical education provides many examples of the development
of functional features, but as a response to deliberate instruction. These
features require so much specificity and context sensitivity that they seem
likely to require the development of new categories of appearances rather
than just reweighting old features. A suggested implication is that feature
development may help to explain the problematic noticing of features in
diagnosis.
The development of new functional features, a theme ably advo-
cated by Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut, is essential to the develop-
ment of adult expertise. Medical education provides a particularly
compelling example of this process. New students face an array of
diagnostic rules that refer to unfamiliar features. Some of these
features could initially be regarded as compounds of familiar
categories (e.g., butterfly rash). However, all of them, including
the apparent compounds, pose a new learning problem. Students
are being asked to learn a category of appearances that signal a
feature that is functional in making a diagnosis. As an extreme
example, in diagnosing lupus erythematosus, a diagnostician is
looking for a rash that is butterfly shaped in that it spreads across
the nose and fans out on both cheeks, not a rash from applying an
allergenic butterfly decal to the face. The rash can be quite
variable in appearance, but there are clearly some things it cannot
look like. All features named in the rules have a range and form of
manifestation that should become familiar and that should be
distinguished from appearances so weird as to make the appro-
priateness of labeling it a functional feature questionable.
This specificity of features has another implication. These
functional features become context-specific categories and are not
in general interchangeable between diseases, even when the
features have the same name. “It has vesicles,” applied to a case of
contact dermatitis, means the type of vesicles that are characteris-
tic of contact dermatitis, not of herpes simplex. In response to a
challenge, dermatologists can immediately explicate the differ-
ences and indicate that they were aware of the differences without
specifying them. This is analogous to using the same label for two
legs on a human and two legs on a bird. Few of us who used the
phrase “you have two legs” (in the sense of “get it yourself”) would
be unaware that the legs in question are human legs, even though
that specificity was not mentioned. Anyone who was unaware
would be in desperate trouble for some of life’s other challenges. It
is this combination of the concurrent need for specificity and for
generalization that makes the generation of functional features a
core process that cannot be handled as a simple reweighting of
fixed features. This, of course, is Schyns et al.’s main point.
Unlike everyday object categories, the verbal formulations of
features in medicine are functional and well practiced. Initial
instruction is partly verbal, and extensive verbal interaction con-
tinues throughout a medical career. However, as mentioned, the
verbal labels are not in any sense exhaustive. A conjecture we
could make is that the vocabulary actually used is a compromise
between a level of generality that makes communication feasible,
such as sentences of less than a thousand words, but sufficiently
specific that it points adequately to the referent. In this sense, the
technical vocabulary is a signal for the student to begin learning, an
authorization for new features as well as the authorization for a
new category described by Schyns et al.
Everything to this point illustrates Schyns et al.’s main points.
However, it might be worth adding another aspect to their discus-
sion of flexible, learned features. With a process of learning, so
many overlapping and context-specific functional features may be
developed that under some circumstances, recognizing their oc-
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currence may be problematic. Familiar examples in the context of
specific recognition are certain figures used in perceptual re-
search. These figures characteristically have some degradation of
information: broken contours (Street figures), heavy shadows
(Mooney figures), blurring (Bruner & Potter’s gradual bringing
into focus), or removal of pixels ( Jacoby et al. 1989). (See Kennedy
1993 for an interesting discussion.) People’s common experience
is that they are initially hard to see, but once seen, they cannot be
“unseen.” That is, once having had the Dalmatian dog pointed out
in a blotchy picture, that interpretation of the same figure emerges
effortlessly even when it is presented much later in another
context. The fact that it is exactly the same figure (in all of the
demonstrations of which I am aware) could mean that seeing an
ear or a tail in the figure is so specific that it would be hard to think
of these as cases of functional feature extraction.
The same type of phenomenon can be observed in classifying
new cases in medicine. Norman et al. (submitted) showed both
experts and medical students head and shoulder photographs of
patients, each of which showed a key feature that should suggest
the correct diagnosis. Three quarters of these pictures were taken
from textbook illustrations of the disorder, and all were judged to
provide clear examples of the features in question. These experi-
ments provide two lines of evidence that noticing these supposedly
obvious features is difficult and is strongly influenced by contex-
tual factors. Both experts and students gained 20% in diagnostic
accuracy by having the key, clearly visible features verbally de-
scribed for them. Both experts and students reported seeing from
15% to 30% more of these features when the correct diagnosis was
suggested to them. With the students, we ran controls to show that
this facilitation was an increase in sensitivity rather than just
response bias. The informal report by experts and students alike
was that they had simply not noticed features that seemed clear
when they were pointed out. This difficulty of noticing could
provide the need for an underlying “coselection” of features and
diagnoses much like that hypothesized for the word-superiority
effect. In any event, it is hard to understand the missing of
“obvious” features if they come from anything like a fixed, high-
level feature set. If the fixed features are instead low-level and
subsymbolic, then the necessity for a process of high-level feature
construction is substantial and cannot be ignored in studies of
categorization. This is the dilemma posed for fixed feature theo-
ries by Schyns et al.
Fixed versus flexible features in dissociable
neural processing subsystems
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Abstract: Implementational-level evidence of dissociable neural sub-
systems is a critical element that is missing from the analysis in the Schyns
et al. target article. The question of whether fixed or flexible features are
used in visual form recognition may have different answers for different
subsystems; the evidence that features typically are created during cate-
gory learning may apply most directly to a specific visual form subsystem.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut argue that higher-level cognitive
processes greatly influence the lower-level features that are used
during object recognition. Moreover, features may be created
during the course of learning new categories. We applaud the
computational-level reasoning behind this theory, but we suggest
that implementational-level evidence for dissociable neural sub-
systems is a critical missing element. In particular, the argument
that flexible space category learning plays an important role in
object recognition may apply to one relevant visual form sub-
system of the brain, but not to another.
One important goal in human vision is to recognize specific
categories of visual form. For example, we can differentially
remember the visual forms “BEAR,” “bear,” and “bear,” despite
the fact that they belong to the same abstract category of form
(e.g., try creating a visual image of each). What sort of feature
would be useful for specific category recognition? Presumably,
information that is close to the holistic structures of input forms is
needed to distinguish specific categories. For example, nearly all
the information in “bear” is needed to distinguish it from “bear.”
Note that such large, holistic features would be useful for distin-
guishing “BEAR,” “bear,” and “bear,” but would not be useful for
marking their commonalities, as needed to achieve a different goal
in human vision (see below).
It is highly unlikely that complex, holistic features are fixed; the
computational expense of storing all such features for all specific
categories that one might learn would be enormous. Also, in line
with the reasoning in section 2.3.1 of Schyns et al., it is highly
unlikely that very small unstructured primitives (e.g., pixels) are
coupled with powerful combination methods to account for the
learning of these holistic features. Thus, we conclude that holistic
features may be learned and stored as flexible features.
Indeed, recent evidence from a study of visual priming supports
this conclusion (Marsolek et al. 1996). Participants first read
centrally presented word pairs (one word above the other in each
pair) and then completed word stems presented beneath context
words in the left or right visual field. Stem-completion priming
that was specific to a letter-case match between prime words and
test stems was found only when the context word was the same one
that had previously appeared above the primed completion word
and when the test items were presented directly to the right
hemisphere (briefly in the left visual field). Priming that was not
letter-case specific did not depend on context or on the hemi-
sphere of direct stimulus presentation. Moreover, this pattern of
results was not obtained when the test task was word-stem cued
recall, so explicit memory did not account for the interesting
results. Two important conclusions may be drawn: first, letter-case
specific priming was dependent on right-hemisphere test presen-
tations, thus a subsystem that stores the visually distinctive infor-
mation needed to differentiate lower- and uppercase versions of
the same word may operate more effectively in the right hemi-
sphere than in the left. Second, letter-case specific priming was
dependent on visual context; hence this specific visual-form sub-
system may not store a word pair as a collection of individual
features, but rather, as a single holistic feature. Interestingly, the
ability to store holistic features may have been what enabled a
specific subsystem to store the novel information (i.e., the new
association between two words) effectively.
Another important goal in human vision is to recognize abstract
categories of form. For example, when reading words for meaning,
it is useful to classify different specific inputs, such as “BEAR,”
“bear,” and “bear,” as belonging to the same category. Consider
the features that would be useful for abstract visual form recogni-
tion. Presumably, the information that remains relatively invariant
across input forms that belong to the same abstract category
should be stored, but other information in the inputs should not.
This relatively invariant information is usually present in the parts
of any one input form. For example, such information in “BEAR,”
“bear,” and “bear” should include some parts (e.g., a three-
pronged vertex halfway up a vertical line on the left side) that are
common to those forms but should not include other parts (e.g., a
three-pronged vertex in the upper-left) that are not. Indeed,
evidence from a study of visual categorization indicates that such
relatively invariant information is stored efficiently by an abstract
visual form subsystem that operates more effectively in the left
hemisphere than in the right (Marsolek 1995). This abstract
subsystem may rely on parts-based internal representations that
contradict the holistic internal representations needed in a spe-
cific visual form subsystem (Marsolek & Burgund, in press).
Unlike specific category recognition, it is unclear whether fixed
or flexible features are used to accomplish abstract category
recognition. Much of the empirical evidence of feature creation
summarized by Schyns et al. appears to be due to processing in a
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specific visual-form subsystem. For example, in the very clever
Martian cells study (sect. 2.2), participants learned either hxy, x, yj
or hx, y,j feature vocabularies, depending on whether they learned
XY before or after learning X and Y, respectively. The xy feature
learned by the group that processed XY before X and Y appears to
have been a holistic representation that did not code x and y as
separate and conjoined features, much like the holistic representa-
tions that should be useful for specific visual form recognition in
one of the two relevant visual form subsystems.
Furthermore, the “alternative” materials that are more likely to
give rise to flexible feature creation compared with more “tradi-
tional” materials (Table 1), according to Schyns et al., tend to be
unfamiliar categories that may be represented effectively without
obvious part decompositions. These are just the sort of stimuli that
a specific visual form subsystem would be very effective at learn-
ing, at least initially. Thus, alternative materials may elicit feature
creation more readily than traditional materials because they are
more likely to be processed in a specific subsystem. In contrast,
stimuli that are readily decomposable into familiar parts may be
processed more effectively in an abstract subsystem. If so, it
remains unclear whether fixed or flexible features are used to
accomplish abstract category recognition.
Hence, the debate over fixed versus flexible features in visual
form recognition may apply differently to different subsystems.
Implementational evidence of dissociable subsystems may be
crucial for a complete resolution to the issues that Schyns et al. raise.
The other hard problem: How to bridge the
gap between symbolic and subsymbolic
cognition
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Abstract: The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is
incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest
that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut about fixed-
features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connec-
tionism. Their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learn-
ing, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however:
how to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut’s target article touches on deep and
fundamental issues in cognitive science, and it is in this way that
their claims are relevant to several domains beyond categorization,
including consciousness (Cleeremans, in press; Perruchet, in
press), development (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith 1993), and implicit
learning – the process by which we can learn without intending to
do so and without awareness of the resulting knowledge. In this
commentary, I argue that the constructivist view of cognition
advanced by Schyns et al. is consistent with new perspectives on
implicit learning. The common theme is that the classical frame-
work is under attack in both the categorization and implicit
learning fields. The classical framework is grounded in the idea
that cognition is about manipulating (symbolic) representations
(Newell & Simon 1972). It is at the core of many models of
performance in a wide variety of domains, and also constitutes the
underlying theoretical framework of most experimental work in
cognitive science.
The key classical notion is that cognition involves “manipulat-
ing” representations. This assumption entails that (1) at least some
primitive representations preexist (before the onset of a learning
or a categorization episode, or before the onset of development);
(2) that these representations are essentially static and fixed; and
(3) that they exist independently of the processor that manipu-
lates them. This makes it very natural to imagine that features, as
representations that have diagnostic value, somehow exist inde-
pendent of their use in a given context. In contrast, Schyns et al.
propose that features do not exist before they are needed and get
created. Features thus have a purely functional existence deter-
mined by their relevance in a specific task context as well as by the
learner’s previous experience.
The same dissatisfaction with the traditional metaphor of mind
is now emerging in implicit learning research. In contrast to typical
categorization tasks, implicit learning tasks usually involve pre-
cisely the kind of complex stimuli that Schyns et al. wish to see
used more often in their own domain. Beyond stimulus complex-
ity, however, the most important difference is that participants in
implicit learning tasks are never explicitly instructed to encode the
regularities contained in the material. This, however, does not
prevent them from becoming sensitive to this information, al-
though only in an indirect, implicit way. For example, people
exposed to sequentially structured sequences of stimuli presented
in the context of a choice reaction time task become progressively
more sensitive to the rules used to generate the sequences (as
suggested by their faster responses to structured as opposed to
unstructured material) despite the fact that (1) the task does not
require them to develop this sensitivity, (2) the instructions do not
mention the existence of a rule system, and (3) their performance
in comparable direct tests of their knowledge of the rule system
remains very limited (Jime´nez et al. 1996).
Similar patterns of results have been repeatedly obtained with
other implicit learning tasks, such as artificial grammar learning
(Reber 1993) or system control (Berry & Dienes 1993). In contrast
to typical concept learning and categorization tasks, implicit learn-
ing tasks never require participants to develop fully explicit sym-
bolic representations of the relevant information. Participants
must acquire “features,” however, because their performance
indicates successful (but indirect) discrimination between differ-
ent categories of stimuli. The fact that they can do so without
having developed the corresponding explicit, verbalizable, sym-
bolic knowledge that is made mandatory by the demand charac-
teristics of categorization tasks suggests that implicit learning tasks
can probably be thought of as involving the initial stages of
categorization, that is, precisely the kind of feature creation
processes described as centrally important by Schyns et al.
I have argued elsewhere (Cleeremans 1994a; in press) that the
connectionist framework probably provides us with the best meta-
phor for thinking about how such implicit knowledge can come to
influence performance without having the properties of symbolic
representation. Connectionist models indeed excel at represent-
ing complex stimuli as graded, continuous patterns that can
preserve much of the variability contained in the input while at the
same time providing enough structure to satisfy the demands of
the task (Cleeremans 1993; 1994b). Furthermore, connectionist
models make it clear how such knowledge can develop based on
subsymbolic processing and representational principles.
To summarize, the target article makes it clear that theories of
categorization based on the traditional computational metaphor of
mind (roughly, processes that manipulate representations) are
fundamentally flawed. A growing dissatisfaction with the computa-
tional metaphor is also emerging in consciousness and implicit
learning research, and for essentially the same reasons: the relative
inflexibility of symbolic representation, the artificial character of a
nevertheless deeply ingrained distinction between processes and
representations, and the weaknesses of classical systems in account-
ing for change and for the emergence of new forms. There is little
doubt that connectionism and other similar dynamic (Port & van
Gelder 1995) approaches offer many fundamental insights into how
one may start to address these limitations of classical symbolic
systems. The problem with Schyns et al.’s approach, however, is that
they like many others fail to offer any specific discussion of “the
other hard problem” that is common to the categorization, implicit
learning, consciousness, and development fields: how to bridge the
gap that separates subsymbolic and symbolic cognition. In this
respect, representational redescription, as proposed by Clark and
Karmiloff-Smith (1993), is an interesting suggestion in that it leaves
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open the possibility that multiple recodings (possibly cast at
different levels of complexity) of the same input remain available
for further processing, a property that is undoubtedly central to
flexibility in any learning system.
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Flexible feature creation: Child’s play?
Gedeon Dea´k
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Abstract: Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut’s argument is evaluated from a
developmental perspective. Theoretically, feature creation is not neces-
sarily problematic; this view derives from the assumption of innate content
(primitive feature sets). Alternative assumptions (e.g., Piaget’s theory) are
possible. Preschool children readily search for novel features in response
to task demands. This is compatible with functionalist approaches, but not
the rationalist ones criticized by the authors.
What is innate? Alternative views. Schyns, Goldstone &
Thibaut are to be commended for attempting to address a critical
problem: if the symbol-grounding problem is solved by primitive
feature sets, how can we account for (sporadic) flexible and
creative induction based on nonprimitive features? If primitives
are used productively, what are the production rules? More
radically, when and how do people create new features? The
difficulty of the problem is underscored by Fodor’s (1975) reduc-
tio that all complex concepts are innate. Although the Schyns’s et
al. approach is more sober, primitive constituents are regarded as a
necessary evil (sect. 1.1, para. 4). Are primitive vocabularies
necessary? Can the problem be solved without innate content (see
Braine 1994)?
The symbol grounding problem is inherently developmental,
and developmental analysis yields an alternative formulation:
Piaget was aware of the problem, and did not believe in primitive
content (i.e., features or concepts) but rather in primitive action
patterns. Specifically, a set of innate reflexes evolve into controlled
action schemes (later internalized as mental schemes). By analogy
to Gibson’s differentiation hypothesis (Gibson & Gibson 1955),
the infant’s ever-finer differentiation of the physical world is
reflected in differentiated action responses. Primitives are not
content, but structure and process – specifically, perceptual learn-
ing and motor learning routines. My point is not to advocate
Piaget’s theory, but to remind us that what is innate might not be
primitive feature sets. Whether or not primitive features are
assumed, however, feature creation remains to be specified.
The growth of flexibility. Schyns et al. link feature creation to
flexibility, a welcome observation. Flexibility is most clearly con-
strued from a functionalist position, by questioning how subjects
elect specific features appropriate for different tasks. Subjects
might select either previously conceived aspects or novel aspects
of the stimulus array. If the latter is typically more effortful and
uncertain than the former, there will be a trade-off: feature search
will occur only when existing features are ill-suited to a problem.
Schyns et al. consider how stimulus characteristics affect feature
creation, but they do not address how task and context facilitate or
inhibit feature creation. For example, Bransford et al. (1989)
suggest that conceptual highlighting of contrasting features might
promote feature creation. Dea´k and Bauer (1996) found that
preschoolers search for subtle (and presumably novel) features in
certain task contexts, given sufficiently complex stimulus items
(this qualification is consistent with Schyns et al.’s argument about
stimulus characteristics; see sect. 2.5).
In terms of development, Schyns et al. imply that apprehension
of novel features poses particular difficulties for young children
(sect. 3.3.2, para. 3–4). However, learning novel feature contrasts
is so critical for young children, it would be surprising if they were
deficient in it. Schyns et al. seem to know this, and conclude
correctly that current popular approaches (i.e., innate theories;
perceptual biases) are not enough to specify how children create
or select relevant features from an array. Theoretical shortcomings
aside (see Dea´k 1995; in preparation), both popular approaches
are empirically wanting. Consider the view that children’s feature
selection is governed by innate perceptual biases: Dea´k (1995)
qualifies or disconfirms the count noun/shape bias proposed by
Landau et al. (1988). A comprehensive review of the literature
reveals that preschool children are not generally biased to weigh
some features over others. Rather, they select stimulus features
associated with a particular induction problem (Dea´k 1995). That
is, preschool children are genuinely flexible in shifting attention to
features (or combination of features) as task demands change.
Moreover, it appears that feature selection and feature creation
are closely related, and well-established, by age 3. I will briefly
describe data (which inform Schyns et al.’s general position)
consistent with this argument.
Dea´k (1995) found that 3- to 6-year-olds successively attend to
different combinations of features in response to different induc-
tion tasks: when told that an unfamiliar, complex object “has a
toggle,” 3- to 6-year-olds extend that fact to another object with the
same unfamiliar part. When told that the former object is “made of
mylar,” children extend that fact to a different object made of the
same (unfamiliar) material. How is this relevant to the position
stated by Schyns et al., besides being inconsistent with the percep-
tual bias approach? First, in response to “. . . has a . . .” facts,
children apparently search for an unfamiliar part of the object,
then seek another object with the same part. Parts were novel, and
the objects were complex, with many varying features. Thus,
children apprehend and reason about novel features in spite of
irrelevant varying information (contrary to Schyns et al., sect.
3.3.2). Second, responses to “. . . made of . . .” facts demonstrate
that preschoolers reliably make generalizations about novel kinds
of material. This is striking partly because 3-year-olds are believed
to lack a coherent concept of material kind (Dickinson 1989).
Thus, children “created” a new material feature, although by
conventional accounts no feature space existed to be subdivided!
This illustrates how task constraints might permit young children
to induce novel features or feature combinations. Clues to the
nature of the task – for example, the phrases “has a” and “made of”
– effectively limit the hypothesis space preschoolers consider.
In sum, assuming that “what is innate” is either nascent theories
or rigid perceptual biases (i.e., innate content qua primitive
features) provides no account of either flexible feature selection or
feature creation. A functionalist framework, in contrast, assumes
that children have procedures for matching (or learning to match)
known or novel features with exigencies of the task at hand. The
emergence and nature of these procedures remain to be under-
stood.
Flexible categorization requires the creation
of relational features
Peter F. Dominey
Vision et Motricite, Inserm U94 and Institut des Sciences Cognitives CNRS
UPR 9075, 69373 Lyon, France. dominey@lyon151.inserm.fr
Abstract: Flexible categorization clearly requires an adaptive component,
but at what level of representation? We have investigated categorization in
sequence learning that requires the extraction of abstract rules, but no
modification of sensory primitives. This motivates the need to make
explicit the distinction between sensory-level “atomic” features as opposed
to concept-level “abstract” features, and the proposal that flexible catego-
rization probably relies on learning at the abstract feature level.
Commentary/Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
24 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:1
It is clear that a fixed and finite feature set cannot anticipate all
possible categorizations. Schyns et al. thus set out to establish a
framework in which the feature set can be augmented with new
features. Part of the burden of proof on the authors is to demon-
strate a case in which new feature creation can clearly be dissoci-
ated from the weighting or combination of existing features (sect.
2.6). In this regard, we study a form of categorization of dynamic
objects – sequences – in which the defining features for categori-
zation are configurational relations between elements or features,
independent of specific features themselves. I develop this point
as an example of a case in which the creation of novel features
cannot be a simple combination of existing features. I note also
that in this and the subsequent points, the dynamic object results
generalize to static objects.
We have recently described a dissociation between cognitive
processes for learning surface structure and abstract structure of
sensorimotor sequences. Surface structure is simply the serial
order of the elements in the sequence, whereas abstract structure
is defined in terms of positional relations between elements that
repeat in a sequence. Thus, the two sequences ABCBAC and
DEFEDF share the same abstract structure (123213) but have
different surface structures, and are thus isomorphic. We have
demonstrated in a serial reaction time task that although surface
structure can be learned under implicit conditions, abstract struc-
ture can only be learned under explicit conditions (Dominey et al.
1995; 1997; in press). A hallmark of abstract structure learning is
the capacity to transfer knowledge of the abstract structure to new,
isomorphic sequences. Specifically, when subjects trained with
sequences such as ABCBAC are exposed to a new isomorphic
sequence DEFEDF, they can transfer knowledge of the shared
abstract structure 123213. This transfer yields significant perfor-
mance benefits for the elements in the new isomorphic sequence
that are predictable by the abstract structure. Thus, by means of
their training, these subjects have gained category knowledge that
allows them to “categorize” sequences as either belonging to the
isomorphic set or not. We thus have a condition in which previous
experience significantly modifies the immediate appearance of
dynamic objects or sequences.
The question remains: Has a new feature been created? A
response can be provided from simulation studies of abstract
structure learning. In these studies, a neural network model is
capable of learning and transferring abstract structure between
isomorphic sequences (Dominey 1995). In the model, the set of
sensory-perceptual inputs or atomic features was fixed. Flexibility
came from an adaptive capacity to represent arbitrary relations
between atomic features. This type of learning allows it to be
recognized that ABCBAC and DEFEDF share a common ab-
stract structure of internal repetition.
In saying that features are both elementary stimulus properties
yet little different from concepts, Schyns et al. may have blurred a
useful distinction between levels of representation. I thus suggest
a slight nuance: “Atomic” features correspond to low-level (sen-
sory) primitives, and “relational” or “abstract” features are defined
in terms of configurational relations between atomic features, as in
the abstract structure learning already described. In this frame-
work, relational feature creation does not involve the extraction of
a new feature dimension explicitly represented in the stimulus at
the atomic or perceptual level, but instead entails the extraction of
a relation between such features, independent of the feature
instances themselves. Such a capability is clearly a key element in a
flexible categorization scheme.
Flexible features, connectionism, and
computational learning theory
Georg Dorffner
Department of Medical Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence, University of
Vienna, A-1010 Vienna, Austria.
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Abstract: This commentary is an elaboration on Schyns, Goldstone &
Thibaut’s proposal for flexible features in categorization in the light of
three areas not explicitly discussed by the authors: connectionist models of
categorization, computational learning theory, and constructivist theories
of the mind. In general, the authors’ proposal is strongly supported, paving
the way for model extensions and for interesting novel cognitive research.
Nor is the authors’ proposal incompatible with theories positing some
fixed set of features.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut’s proposal is remarkable and impor-
tant in many ways. It is remarkable because it touches on issues
that have come up in other domains of cognitive science but have
received surprisingly little attention in the literature about catego-
rization. It is thus worth investigating Schyns et al.’s view on
features in the context of two areas they have not explicitly
discussed: connectionist models of categorization and the theory
of learnability.
Connectionist models of categorization can be divided into at
least two strands: models based on backpropagation in MLPs
(multilayer perceptrons) (Harnad 1987; Rumelhart et al. 1986),
and models based on more localized responses in radial-basis
function networks (Kruschke 1991) and variations of competitive
learning (Dorffner et al. 1996; Grossberg & Stone 1986). MLPs
are a variant of neural networks that apply a weighting scheme to
features, whereas the other kinds of model compute a distance
measure between a prototype (the weight vector) and an input
pattern.
With respect to the former, it is interesting to note that hidden
units in multilayer perceptrons can be interpreted in exactly the
way as Schyns et al. suggest. To arrive at a complex categorization,
hidden units develop higher-order combinations of input features
that are influenced by the categorization task itself. Put differently,
hidden units can be regarded as higher-level features on which
subsequent categorization is based (compare Bishop 1995,
pp. 226ff ). These fulfill Schyns et al.’s requirements, especially the
fact that they develop with the help of feedback from the categori-
zation task.
Models using localized responses appear to be more limited in
light of the proposal by Schyns et al. Existing models indeed work
on a fixed set of input features and apply one level of weighting
through the distance measure. Thus, Schyns et al. show the need
for a substantial extension. One way to approach hierarchical
categorization is to add one or several levels of categories between
the input and the final category. In other words, categories cannot
be the result of only weighting input features; more complex
features themselves can be generated by a categorization process.
We have recently argued along similar lines, even though our
model is not fully implemented (Dorffner 1997). Our approach
agrees with Schyns et al. that “there is little difference between
concepts and features” (sect. 4, para. 1). Important in such an
approach would be top-down feedback from higher-level categori-
zation to feature-level categorization. This could be implemented
in the framework of the adaptive resonance theory of Grossberg
(1976) through the recuritment of new feature categories.
Computational learning theory (Valiant 1984) can shed more
light on Schyns et al. theory. It is safe to assume that for categoriza-
tion there must exist a level where features are fixed, the level of
peripheral sensory features (e.g., retinal activations). According to
computational learning theory, given n such fixed features, if a
learner is able to represent all 22n dichotomies (assuming that
features are binary and the system is learning to distinguish only
two categories) then learning is impossible. Thus, substantial bias
is necessary to constrain learning, as Schyns et al. acknowledge in
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their discussion (sect. 3.3). They suggest that the top-down feed-
back during categorization can provide such a bias in constraining
the features that are constructed. This view has interesting impli-
cations in suggesting that the environment providing the feedback
with respect to categories itself supplies considerable bias. In
other words, a large proportion of the 22n theoretically possible
dichotomies are ruled out by the fact that the environment does
not provide feedback for them to be useful. Environmental con-
straints are also suggested by the work of Elman et al. (1996) on
innateness.
Such bias still seems too small to make the learning problem
tractable, so additional constraints on possible features must be
innate. In this sense, Schyns et al.’s theory is compatible with most
of the literature positing fixed feature sets (e.g., the papers
discussed in sect. 2.3). If learning (in this case, categorization) is to
be tractable, a mixture of (a) fixed, (b) preconditioned but adap-
tive, and (c) fully adaptive features are needed. Future research
will have to determine the relative proportions.
The proposal of Schyns et al. is an important and necessary
amendment to many cognitive models and theories, pointing to
important extensions on the one hand and paving the way for
fascinating new research on the other.
Things are what they seem
Shimon Edelman
School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, Falmer,
Brighton BN1 9QH, United Kingdom. shimone@cogs.susx.ac.uk
Abstract: The learnability of features and their dependence on task and
context do not rule out the possibility that primitives used for constructing
new features are as small as pixels, nor that they are as large as object parts,
or even entire objects. In fact, the simplest approach to feature acquisition
may be to treat objects not as if they are composed of unknown primitives
according to unknown rules, but rather as if they are what they seem:
patterns of atomic features, standing in various similarity relationships to
other objects, which serve as holistic features.
I sympathize with the notion of feature learnability, for which
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut marshal unimpeachable arguments,
and which they support by an impressive range of experimental
evidence. I would like to take issue, however, with the analysis of
the possible approaches to the implementation of learnable fea-
tures, offered by Schyns et al. in section 2.3. That section contains
three statements that affect crucially the theoretical orientation of
the rest of the article; I discuss each of these in turn, then suggest
an alternative view of flexible features, along with some practical
conclusions.
Putative computational limitations of unstructured primitives.
In section 2.4.1, Schyns et al. claim that “it is not practically
feasible (although it is logically possible) to extract relevant catego-
rization features from pixel-based (or similarly unstructured)
representations of the input.” Most approaches to dimensionality
reduction (discussed later, in section 3.4.2) indeed cannot handle
the extraction of nonlinear or otherwise complicated category
structure from raw images. At least one recent method, however,
does show promise in this respect, by combining a nonlinear
trainable mechanism for function approximation (such as a multi-
layer perceptron network) with the imposition of category-related
constraints during learning (Intrator & Edelman 1997). According
to this method, the target manifold (the subspace that contains the
data points and is embedded in the multidimensional space of raw
features) is captured by teaching the network (1) to represent
between-categories variation, corresponding to the directions
tangent to the manifold, and (2) to ignore within-category varia-
tion, corresponding to the directions orthogonal to the manifold.
This makes it possible to extract a topologically faithful replica of a
two-dimensional nonlinear subspace occupied by a class of objects
(human heads), from a feature space of a thousand or so dimen-
sions.
Putative representational limitations of structured primitives.
In section 2.4.2, Schyns et al. state that “any large scale, highly
structured set of primitives is bound to be too coarse to detect (and
internally represent) all of the distinctions that might be required
by different categories of objects.” To support this statement,
Schyns et al. give the example of the purported “clumsiness” of a
set of bar-like features in representing curved-line shapes such as
ellipses. Our intuition, however, is a poor guide in this matter, and
is misled by an appeal to the notion of clumsiness, which serves
here as what D. C. Dennett calls an “intuition pump.” To dispel the
false intuitions, one may observe (Edelman 1995) that overlapping
graded-profile “feature detectors” similar to the receptive fields
found in early vision can support directly the categorization of
seemingly unlikely stimuli. For example, circularly symmetric
Gaussian receptive fields can support discrimination of Verniers
formed by straight lines, at a hyperacuity level (Poggio et al. 1992).
Analogous mechanism may be at work at a much higher level: as
shown in Edelman and Duvdevani-Bar (1997), everyday objects
can be represented (and recognized and categorized) by their
holistic similarities1 to a number of reference shapes of compara-
ble structural complexity.
Feature extraction as a metatheoretic enterprise. My third
point of contention is Schyns et al.’s view that “the task of the
subject creating new functional features for categorization is not
substantially different from the task of the scientist creating a
componential theory of recognition” (sect. 2.4.3, emphasis added).
The problem here lies in the tacit assumption that feature extrac-
tion must be patterned on the reductionist notion of the need to
take something apart to be able to understand it. To avoid a lengthy
digression into the philosophy of reductionism in science, I merely
point out that in certain situations the only understanding that
seems to be available is cast in terms of a very complex, frequently
probabilistic, mapping between observables. Likewise, in the
dimensionality reduction example cited above, the features turn
out to be complex patterns of weights gleaned from a network
following its training; there is nothing to guarantee the possibility
of making sense of such features in image-wise “componential”
terms.
Summary. There is a way to maintain a flexible attitude to-
ward features that does not involve the need to create a “com-
ponential theory” of recognition for every given task. First, re-
cent results in visual modeling suggest that it is possible to learn
the appearances of entire objects and to use the resulting mem-
ory traces subsequently as holistic features. Second, advanced
methods for dimensionality reduction can extract useful (yet in
a traditional mereological sense unanalyzed) features directly
from image data. These can augment appearance-based holistic
features, which uphold the notion that, in terms of representa-
tion, things are by and large what they seem – a possibility that
is rather economical, albeit not too appealing to a radical reduc-
tionist.
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NOTE
1. That is, similarities computed over entire “unanalyzed” objects, and
not over their descriptions in terms of, for example, spatially distinct parts.
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New-feature learning: How common is it?
Robert M. Frencha and Mark Weaverb
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Abstract: The fixed-feature viewpoint Schyns et al. are opposing is not a
widely held theoretical position but rather a working assumption of
cognitive psychologists – and thus a straw man. We accept their demon-
stration of new-feature acquisition, but question its ubiquity in category
learning. We suggest that new-feature learning (at least in adults) is rarer
and more difficult than the authors suggest.
Schyns et al. are in the main justified in their skepticism about
conventional approaches to category learning – to work with
conveniently small numbers of fixed, high-level features is to make
a set of simplifying assumptions that have the potential of missing
much of the complexity of the category learning process. However,
we find that they oppose a straw man and that their conclusions go
beyond the supporting evidence. Despite this, the work Schyns et
al. present has important implications that they themselves have
only begun to explore, and it provides valuable insights into the
learning of new categories through the acquisition of the feature
sets.
To begin where the target article does, Schyns et al. contrast
their position to a fixed-feature alternative they describe as “an
influential approach.” The problem with this is that they are not
clear about the difference between fixed features as a theoretical
position and fixed features as a working assumption. As a theoreti-
cal position, a “fixed-feature stance” is clearly a straw man.
Features must, of course, come from somewhere, and because it is
surpassingly unlikely that we are born with all the features we will
ever need (like the eggs in baby girls’ ovaries), one must presume
that features are, in fact, learned. However, there is no evidence
that the “fixed-feature stance” has been seriously put forward as a
theoretical position. It is, rather, a (widespread) working assump-
tion. Is this assumption valid? Schyns et al. argue that it is not.
However, even if we accept their claim that they have demon-
strated the acquisition of new features during category learning –
which we do – it does not follow that the acquisition of new
features is a typical part of category learning. In fact, it is reason-
able to expect that, just as adult speakers of English have in place
all the phonemes they will ever need to represent English words
(even the many thousands outside their current vocabularies),
they also have in place all the primitive features needed for
learning new categories in many domains. What is more, the
exceptional character of the stimuli in the authors’ “Martian cells”
and “Martian rocks” experiments is a tacit acknowledgment of
how hard it is to force subjects outside their existing areas of
“featural competence.” Thus, we argue that the widespread as-
sumption of fixed features in category learning experiments is
supported in the general case of adult category learning.
One of the most promising but elusive points in the target article
involves the distinction between “primitive” and high-level, “func-
tional” features. On the one hand, the authors point out that
almost any feature is composed of lower-level features – at least
until one gets all the way down, for example, to the edge detectors
in low-level visual cortex. This makes the distinction between
“primitive” and “functional” features difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain. On the other hand, the authors hand much of their
argument on the distinction: “If a primitive set of features can
capture all the regularities and categorizations accommodated by
the functional features . . . then the hypothesis that feature cre-
ation is needed to allow a system to represent object properties it
was previously incapable of cannot be maintained.”
One way out of this apparent contradiction is to think of both
“primitive” and “structured” features as hierarchically organized
building blocks from which new categories and concepts can be
constructed. As we have argued, because many categories will be
able to share the same general-purpose building blocks (e.g.,
something like Biederman’s (1987) geons), category learning can
often proceed by assembling existing building blocks. In other
cases (as with the “Martian rocks” and “Martian cells,” we sus-
pect), new building blocks are needed, but they are few in number
and may hence be acquired as a side effect of category learning
without significantly impeding the process. At the other extreme –
something Schyns et al. have not acknowledged – are situations
where appropriate features are generally missing. In addition to
the case of infants confronting a bewildering world, one might add
those cases in which adult learners attempt to master new and
unfamiliar domains of knowledge. Examples of this kind of feature
learning might include the experience of a native English speaker
learning to hear the tonal phonemes of Mandarin Chinese, or a
neophyte mushroom gatherer learning to discriminate edible and
poisonous varieties). Feature (and, therefore, category) learning
in such cases is often slow, difficult, and even painful.
Finally, we suggest that, ironically, Schyns et al. may have
focused their demonstration of new-feature learning precisely
where it is most difficult to observe – namely, with readily
perceived, concrete objects. Both evolutionary constraints (favor-
ing concrete categories) and universally shared experience with
objects in the world suggest that by the time of adulthood, most of
the primitives that humans need to handle concrete categories will
already have been learned – which is why we argue that a fixed-
feature approach for the learning of concrete categories is a
reasonable working assumption. On the other hand, as categories
grow more abstract (as in chess playing, mathematics, classical
music, architecture, aeronautics, etc.) – and therefore less univer-
sal and directly related to needs of survival in the physical world –
one might expect a far greater degree of new-feature creation.
Thus, the slow building of expertise in abstract domains may
present a better opportunity for studying the interaction between
feature acquisition and category learning.
In conclusion, we feel that Schyns et al. have needlessly pre-
sented their argument in contrast to a straw man opponent.
Although the widespread working assumption of fixed features in
category learning is justified, we agree that the acquisition of new
features is an important topic that has to date received scant
attention in both empirical research and category learning theory.
The target article represents a useful start in both of these areas.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported in part by Belgian PAI grant no. P4/19.
Building block dilemmas
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Abstract: Feature-based theories of concept formation face two di-
lemmas. First, for many natural concepts, it is hard to see how the concepts
of the features could be developmentally more basic. Second, concept
formation must be guided by “abstraction heuristics,” but these can be
neither universal principles of rational thought nor natural conventions.
When we ask how we can tell that something is a bird by just
looking, it is natural to suppose that we do it by recognizing the
features of birds that tend to distinguish them from other kinds of
things. This commonsense theory of object recognition suggests a
theory of concept formation: children form their general concepts
of observable types by learning which observable features of
things tend to characterize the types. If this is right, then surely the
concepts of the features must be developmentally more basic than
the concepts whose genesis we aim to explain. Maybe they are
even innate.
Any such theory of conceptual development faces an obvious
dilemma. If we confine ourselves to concepts that might be
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developmentally more basic, we might list such concepts as small,
mobile, and blue – maybe even causes – maybe even endures
unseen. However, it is hard to see how birds might be distin-
guished from other kinds of things only by means of concepts such
as these. If, on the other hand, we list the features that tend to
characterize specifically birds, we might list such features as flying,
being feathered, and resting on tree branches, but it is doubtful
whether the concept feathers, the concept flight, and so on, are
developmentally more basic than the concept bird. No doubt
children can in some sense see flight and feathers before they
possess the general concept bird, but we cannot explain the
formation of general concepts in terms of sensory contact alone
without appealing to some kind of mental act by which that which
is perceived is grasped.
One response to this dilemma is to grab the first horn and try to
identify a repertoire of developmentally basic concepts adequate
for drawing the necessary distinctions. Biederman’s geon theory
(1987), for example, can be viewed as such a response. The other
response is to grab the second horn and argue that the concepts of
the features need not be developmentally more basic. This is how
we should view the proposal of Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut. The
trouble is that Schyns et al. do not explain how novel feature
concepts might be formed. They explain that new features are
created when a categorization task requires them (sect. 2.4) and
that new ones may be required because categorization is more
efficient when only a small number of features are relevant (sect.
3.4.1), but they have nothing to say about how truly new feature
concepts may be created. Dimensionality reduction (sect. 3.4.2) is
no answer, because that is just a way of defining new features in
terms of old. This is ground for criticism bad, because if we had an
explanation of the genesis of feature concepts, then we might find
that we could explain in the same way the genesis of those
concepts whose genesis was supposed to be explained in terms of
feature concepts. That seems likely given that “there is little
principled distinction” between feature concepts and other con-
cepts (sect. 2.8, last para.).
Even if this dilemma can be evaded, a further dilemma arises as
well. As Schyns et al. acknowledge (sect. 1.2.3), one thing a theory
of conceptual development has to explain is how children learn to
apply category words to roughly the same sorts of things as others
who have learned the language. After limited exposure to uses of
the word “chair,” children will eventually reach a point where they
will recognize, without being told, that a certain three-legged chair
is a “chair,” that an ottoman is not, and that a bar stool is a difficult
case. No two people abstract their general concept chair from
exactly the same class of instances, and yet people tend to agree in
their applications of the word “chair.” If concepts are indeed the
product of abstraction, then the explanation has to be that there
are certain shared principles of abstraction. These may be general
rules that are applied in the course of abstraction, or they may be
conceivable only as aspects of the mind’s innate physical architec-
ture. Schyns et al. refer to “biases” (sect. 3.3), but a more general
term is desirable. I call them abstraction heuristics.
The further dilemma concerns the status of these abstraction
heuristics as principles of thought. One possibility is that they are
universal principles of rational thought, shared by every possible
thinking thing to the extent that it is rational. Against this, one can
imagine systems of concepts that seem, by our lights, unnatural
and gerrymandered, but in which the elements fit together in a
way that supports inductive and other sorts of reasoning. The other
possibility is that abstraction heuristics are merely natural conven-
tions, like mating rituals in birds. Human beings might share them
only because otherwise we could not learn to coordinate our
activities by means of language. Because Martians would likewise
learn their languages only because they shared abstraction heuris-
tics with one another, we could not understand their language in
the same way if we did not happen to share their abstraction
heuristics. Not only could we never learn to speak the Martian
language, which is not surprising, but arguably we could never
even have a good theory of how the Martians managed to cooper-
ate with one another by means of it. The doubt about this is
whether we really want to say that facts, such as how a team of
Martians builds a rocket, are necessarily invisible to us.
The conclusion I draw from these dilemmas is that it is a mistake
to think of concept formation as a process of assembling a
structure of feature concepts. A better strategy, in my opinion,
would be to recognize a rich capacity for nonconceptual thought,
and then to explain language learning as a product of this noncon-
ceptual thought, and finally equate concept formation with mas-
tering a word (see Gauker 1994).
Self-organizing features and categories
through attentive resonance
Stephen Grossberg
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston University, Boston,
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Abstract: Because “people create features to subserve the representation
and categorization of objects” (abstract) Schyns et al. “provide an account
of feature learning in which the components of a representation have close
ties to the categorization history of the organism” (sect. 1.1). This com-
mentary surveys self-organizing neural models that clarify this process.
These models suggest how “top-down information should constrain the
search for relevant dimensions/features of categorization” (sect. 3.4.2).
Adaptive resonance theory (ART) models illustrate some of the
themes of Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut. An ART model of visual
object recognition takes its inputs from prestriate boundary
groupings and surface representations, and categorizes them in
temporal and prefrontal cortices (Carpenter & Grossberg 1991;
1993; Grossberg 1994; Grossberg & Merrill 1996; Grossberg et
al. 1994). When a supervised ART, or ARTMAP, model responds,
for instance, to a boundary grouping, it learns to bind together
features of the grouping via a bottom-up adaptive filter that
activates a category representing this new combination of features.
This bundle represents a new “emergent feature,” or prototype,
that is characteristic of the category.
The active category sends top-down signals back toward the
boundary grouping. These top-down signals also encode the
prototype, which is matched against whatever boundary grouping
is present, and thereby generates a focus of attention. If the match
is good enough, the system learns to incorporate a novel boundary
grouping into the learned category prototype. Such learning
implicitly incorporates all the information ever experienced by the
learning subject, because the category that is chosen depends on
all the available prototypes, and the change in each prototype
depends on all groupings previously experienced by that category.
In this way, a new “emergent feature” is learned within each
category, and this prototype dynamically reorganizes cell re-
sponses, through top-down attentional focusing, in an experience-
and context-dependent way. New “features” can be learned in
this way, and can influence the perceptual stages that create color
afterimages and figure/ground segregation (Francis & Grossberg
1996; Grossberg 1994).
Such features can be learned to classify textures or textured
scenes to which the system is exposed (Grossberg & Williamson
1996) by discovering predictive combinations of either boundary
and surface properties for classification, or fuzzy rules (Carpenter
& Grossberg 1991) such as “any height between 70 and 80 cm”
(sect. 3.2). This interplay between bottom-up and top-down learn-
ing and attention emphasizes the “intrinsic futility of searching for
the boundary between perception and conception” (sect. 2.5).
Superimposed on this process is another level of categorization
that binds multiple categories into a final prediction, much as
multiple parts contribute to an object whole, or multiple visual
fonts predict the verbal name of a letter. Thus, the lower-level
categories can be viewed as new features that contribute to the
larger category. This higher category level can selectively bind
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together, or fuse, certain combinations of new features in one
context (e.g., spatial frequencies or boundary/surface combina-
tions), and different combinations in others (Asfour et al. 1993).
Such learning attempts to generate the largest categories con-
sistent with environmental feedback, thereby conserving memory
resources, much the way stimulus dimensions that are originally
processed together by children are later differentiated. A process
called vigilance control dynamically alters the system’s sensitivity
to environmental features based on its predictive success in
increasingly complex environments (Carpenter & Grossberg
1991; 1993). When fast learning is allowed, “different histories of
categorization generate different feature spaces to encode simi-
larities and contrasts between objects” (sect. 2.2, para. 4) even
though all the feature spaces tend to generate similar recognition
accuracy if the environment is sufficiently broadly sampled (Car-
penter & Grossberg 1991).
ART models do not require predetermined “geons.” Biederman
(1987) invoked geons to explain data from studies that delete line
segments from objects. They can be explained instead in terms of
amodal completion of missing boundary segments before they are
categorized (Grossberg 1987, sect. 20). ART also allows the self-
organized learning of invariant three-dimensional object catego-
ries from two-dimensional-view categories (Bradski & Grossberg
1995), as in the multiple-views approach, using a “boundary-based
scheme” (Biederman 1987, p. 11) that avoids elastic three-
dimensional templates by preprocessing emergent boundary
groupings using invariance filtering and optimal coarse coding
before they are categorized.
New features can also emerge through preattentive perceptual
learning, by using the adaptive horizontal interactions and bottom-
up and top-down adaptive filters that occur as early as LGN
(lateral geniculate nucleus) and cortical area V1 (Grossberg 1995;
Grossberg et al. 1997). ART models suggest that similar types of
top-down learning and attention regulate the emergence of new
features on multiple levels of thalamocortical processing, from
specific thalamic nuclei, like LGN, to prefrontal cortex.
Real-world categories don’t allow uniform
feature spaces – not just across categories
but within categories also
Ulrike Hahn and Nick Chater
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV7 4AL,
United Kingdom. u.hahn@warwick.ac.uk
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Abstract: The Schyns et al. target article demonstrates that different
classifications entail different representations, implying “flexible space
learning.” We argue that flexibility is required even at the within-category
level.
We welcome this timely emphasis on the need for “flexible spaces”
in categorization. In this commentary, we ask how far the points
made must be taken. The target article stresses that new features
are required by new categorizations and that assuming a single,
fixed, object representation suited for all possible classifications is
unrealistic. Our work on similarity-based categorization (Hahn
1996; Hahn & Chater, in press) has stressed that fixed, uniform
representations are inappropriate even within a category. Where
Schyns et al. emphasize that, for example, a single fixed-length
vector for object representation is insufficient across categories,
our aim has been to show how a single fixed-length vector
representation is overly restrictive even for a single category. That
“uniform feature spaces” are insufficient even within a category
becomes apparent with the analysis of real-world materials such as
legal cases (Hahn 1996), but more real-world categories suffice
equally: imagine encountering a particular chair, one with a back
rest and four legs; the next exemplar encountered might have
armrests too – a new “dimension” that comes into play only at this
point, yet another chair might have a swivel base instead of four
legs, and so on. The “feature space” for the category emerges only
gradually as more and more examples are encountered. The
crucial point, however, is that for many categories, if not most, it is
never definitively fixed. New, previously unanticipated variations
can arise all the time. The problem is not simply that of encounter-
ing a sufficient number of exemplars to allow determination of the
space of possibilities, because this space generally is not bounded
(at least from the agent perspective). This follows from consider-
ing a key difficulty for rule-based systems, that rules – whether
attempting to govern everyday, commonsense knowledge or spe-
cialist domains such as law – almost always admit of exceptions
(Hahn & Vogel 1997; Oaksford & Chater 1991; Reiter 1980).
These exceptions, which are both unforeseeable and too nu-
merous to allow enumeration in advance, require the ability to
perform nonmonotonic or default reasoning in rule-based con-
texts. But that potentially relevant features are not exhaustively
known in advance does not just affect rules and rules alone. They
are equally unavailable for any mode of organizing conceptual
knowledge. Thus, realistic models of categorization must allow
representation and evaluation of “novel” features.
That this is not just a pedantic point that can be ignored in
practice is documented by work in machine learning and artificial
intelligence. The problem is well known in the context of rule-
based systems (Reiter 1980), but instance-based approaches to
classification in machine learning have also recognized the need to
confront the problem of “novel attributes” (Aha 1992). The aim of
this research is to build classification systems that work with
practical problems, not ambitious cognitive models. Cognitive
modeling should treat the issue all the more seriously.
There is a serious problem, then, for any account of categoriza-
tion that assumes fixed representations, whether this strait-jacket
of uniform representation stems from practical considerations
about representation and learning procedures (e.g., backpropaga-
tion networks) or stems from the very nature of theory (e.g., spatial
models of similarity).
Our own approach to similarity and categorization is based on
the notion of transformation between objects, a general concept
that encompasses similarity as “feature-overlap” or as distance in
similarity-space as a special, restrictive case (Chater & Hahn 1997;
Hahn & Chater 1997). Similarity between objects is assumed to
depend on the ease of transformation of the representation of one
object into representations of the other. Psychology has seen
transformational accounts of similarity advanced in the past
(Franks & Bransford 1971; Imai 1977). Our account of “represen-
tational distortion” provides a foundation in terms of the notion of
Information Distance from the branch of algorithmic complexity
theory known as Kolmogorov complexity (Li & Vitanyi 1993).
Crucial for the present context is the concept that similarity
assessment no longer conceives of objects as residing in a feature
space, but instead in transformation space. Features are only of
interest as the objects of transformations; in this sense, the account
is independent of particular features. As a consequence, there is
no need for the same set of features to be present throughout.
Also, the same features can be the object of different transforma-
tions as these arise from the particular pair of stimuli under
consideration. The search for transformations itself influences the
features found; consequently, the same basic features can give rise
to different stimulus descriptions as a function of the particular
comparison.
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A framework for structural constraints
on feature creation
Scott A. Huettel and Gregory R. Lockhead
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27708. huettel@psych.duke.edu
Abstract: We address two major limitations of Schyns et al. First, we
clarify their concept of “features” by postulating several levels for process-
ing. The composition of the feature set at each level determines the set at
the next higher level, following simple structural guidelines. Second, we
show that our proposed framework reconciles feature-creation and fixed-
feature approaches.
Cognitive psychology frequently suffers from a longing for reduc-
tion. Researchers approach problems with a desire to atomize
complex behaviors, seeking basic units underlying a resultant
process. Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut deny that such reduction-
ism is possible, at least in categorization processes. They claim that
this goal – to establish a fixed set of basic units governing all of
categorization and object recognition – cannot be realized; people
create new features as needed, and if possible, to meet the
functional demands of the task.
For Schyns et al., a feature is “any elementary property of a
distal stimulus that is an element of cognition, an atom of psycho-
logical processing” (sect. 1). This definition implies that there are
well-defined basic units of psychological processing, which is the
very position they wish to refute! We propose another interpreta-
tion: that there are several levels of psychological processing, each
with its own basic units. Largely consistent with Schyns et al., we
discuss a classification task in which these multiple levels may be
discerned. Consider Figure 1, where the participant’s goal is to
articulate a simple rule that distinguishes the members of the left
column from those in the right. Simple structures, such as geomet-
ric shapes, colors, and positions, are readily apparent. These units
of basic structure are analogous to the primitive features discussed
by the authors and represent a first level of psychological process-
ing. A second level of processing corresponds to properties of a
given exemplar of a category; the upper-left item has the property
of “occlusion.” We state that each such property is a candidate
feature, because it presents a possible rule for categorical division.
Third, and finally for such tasks, properties of the entire set of
stimuli, categorization features, define the rule by which the
classes are distinguished. For the stimulus set in Figure 1, white
occluding vs. black occluding may be a basis for categorization.
From this perspective, feature creation has a well-defined
meaning: something becomes available for psychological process-
ing that was not present before. Schyns et al. seem to argue that a
feature creation process will be invoked whenever the previously
selected set of features is inadequate for the task. Here, features
available at one level provide information to the next. When
primitive features lead to a candidate feature which, in turn, is
accepted as a categorization feature, feature creation is unneces-
sary. In contrast, when the initially generated lower-level features
do not lead to useful features at the next higher level, the system
returns to an earlier level of processing and changes the set of
features to be submitted to the subsequent level. By this view,
feature creation does not necessarily occur and should not be
restricted to categorization-level features; lower-level feature sets
may be changed as a result of higher-level processes.
Schyns et al. present evidence that feature creation does occur,
and their Table 1 lists characteristics that encourage feature
creation, but why this happens in some settings but not others is
less evident in their analysis. The Martian cell provides a suitable
example: the stimuli used have all the attributes of their suggested
alternative materials. If experimental subjects were challenged to
sort stimuli of this type in a free classification task, they would do
so in a manner indicative of feature creation. Imagine if this
stimulus set were changed in one way: if half the stimuli were
colored blue and half were colored white. Now, subjects might sort
these stimuli without recourse to the properties generated by a
Figure 1 (Huettel & Lockhead). A sample classification prob-
lem (details in text). Adapted from Bongard (1970).
feature creation process, due to the ease of sorting along the
simple color dimension. Thus, two stimulus sets, with nearly all of
the same characteristics, may provide conflicting evidence for
fixed-feature and flexible-feature approaches.
A resolution of this apparent conflict may be found in discus-
sions of the role of context in the identification of stimulus
dimensions (Garner 1962; 1974; Pomerantz & Lockhead 1991,
especially pp. 1–14). If there is no detectable, systematic variation
along a stimulus dimension, then that dimension may not be
processed further. For example, the simple shapes in Figure 1 vary
greatly in size, but that variation is not systematic, and so size is not
immediately perceived by the subject as a candidate feature for
classification. Similarly, all the items are presented on a colorless
ground that could theoretically be perceived. However, without
any variation of the ground, the dimension of “ground color” is
effectively nonexistent. Dimensions with detectable, systematic
variation across members of the set generate features to be
processed, whereas dimensions that do not vary are not processed
further.
This dropping out or nonselection of features based on charac-
teristics of the total stimulus set pares down the number of
features at one level that may be analyzed at the next level. For the
Martian cell example, coloring some of the items blue enables the
subject to detect easily that systematic variation in the stimulus set.
Without such coloring (or some other highly distinctive change),
the problem of detecting variations and testing them as candidates
toward categorization features reemerges. Furthermore, were
there color variations that did not contribute functionally to
classification, so these variations will hamper detection of less
apparent, but functionally discriminating, features.
This analysis of multiple levels reconciles the fixed-feature
process often indicated by traditional materials and tasks with
the flexible-feature perspective suggested by less-common ap-
proaches. In many studies, the information that is readily available
at one level is adequate for processing at the next. This occurs
when variation in the stimulus set is systematic and detectable,
allowing the organism to step smartly through the levels without
recourse to feature creation. However, when features at one level
do not provide useful information at the next level, as when a
candidate feature does not distinguish between categories, the
organism must revise the set of features taken from the earlier
level, creating new elements for processing.
In many real-world situations, not all information concerning
the functional categories may be available. Subjects must then use
existing internal representations (e.g., inferred subsets), expectan-
cies (e.g., sources of attention), and surely much more, to help in
classifying. Thus, the classification process is dynamic: what occurs
depends on the structure of the stimulus set and on the observer’s
expectations.
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Finding the Pope in the pizza: Abstract
invariants and cognitive constraints on
perceptual learning
John E. Hummel and Philip J. Kellman
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Abstract: Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut argue that categorization experi-
ence results in the learning of new perceptual features that are not
derivable from the learner’s existing feature set. We explore the meaning
and implications of this “nonderivability” claim and relate it to the question
of whether perceptual invariants are learnable, and if so, what might be
entailed in learning them.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut argue that visual features governing
object classifications can be created by categorization experience.
This is an important idea (if not a completely novel one; see, e.g.,
Biederman & Schiffrar 1987), but the key unanswered question is
where the new features come from.
Schyns et al. argue extensively that the features created during
category learning are “not present in, or derivable from, the
[existing] feature set (sect. 1.1, para. 4).” It is easy to understand
why they would want to make this claim (henceforth, the non-
derivability claim): if the features acquired during category learn-
ing are just concatenations (intersections and unions, or worse –
simple weighted sums) of features that existed before category
learning, then the phenomenon of “category-based feature learn-
ing” might be construed as a simple matter of “selection” or
“weighting.” Although Schyns et al. treat nonderivability as a
stepping stone to the broader claim that category learning con-
strains feature perception, the issue of nonderivability is arguably
the more important issue. Among other things, it relates to the
notion of abstract invariants, which are important in shape per-
ception and object recognition (Biederman 1987). Insight into
whether and how invariants can be learned from experience would
make a substantial contribution to our understanding of object
perception, recognition, and categorization.
Clearer understanding of nonderivability is necessary in tack-
ling this question. There are at least three senses in which some
new feature might be nonderivable from the population of previ-
ously existing features in the system (although it is unclear which
Schyns et al. intend). The most literal interpretation is that the new
feature is not derivable (computable) at all from the existing
features. This version of the claim is absurd: any feature that is
detected by the visual system must be computed from some finite
set of operations performed on the representations given by early
visual processes.
The second and third interpretations of nonderivability are
more interesting because they characterize, respectively, two
different ways of detecting features in any computational system.
The second interpretation is that the new feature is not a simple
weighted sum (i.e., linear combination) of existing features. This
interpretation is suggested by the discussion of XOR, a famous
example of a function that cannot be computed by a linear system.
On this version of the claim, the perceptual/categorization system
can be viewed as analogous to a large, multilayered neural network
whose units have nonlinear activation functions (such as a standard
backpropagation net). New features in one layer of the system
would be composed in a nonlinear way (e.g., as a weighted sum
subjected to a threshold) from existing features. This approach to
feature detection and learning is standard fare in artificial neural
networks. On this interpretation of the nonderivability claim,
Schyns et al.’s theory is (essentially) that category learning (e.g., in
“higher” layers of the network) serves to guide feature learning (in
lower layers). This would be interesting, but not earth-shattering.
The third – and most interesting – interpretation of non-
derivability is that the newly discovered feature is an abstract
invariant, which, although computable from, is not truly definable
in the vocabulary of existing features. For example, no logical
concatenation – conjunctive, disjunctive, or otherwise – of local
retinal activations defines the invariant square. It is acordingly a
mystery how the visual system discovers such invariants in the
outputs of local features (such as edges). Where invariants are
concerned, it is not the case that “novel visual features are
certainly reducible to their retinal encodings” (sect. 2.7). The
argument is similar to those arising in discussions of scientific
reductionism (Putnam 1975). Put simply, squareness is both more
and less than any finite set of retinal activation patterns. It is more
because some new activation pattern might also be a square, and it
is less because many of the attributes of retinal activation patterns
have nothing to do with their squareness. “Square” is an abstract
invariant. If this is what Schyns et al. mean by nonderivable, then
their claim is that category learning directs the discovery of
invariants, as Gibson (1969) suggested some time ago. To our
knowledge, no one has demonstrated how such invariants are
discovered. The question of how (and whether) nonderivables
such as invariants can be learned is a computational/algorithmic
one that demands a far more specific theory than the one pre-
sented in the target article.
Toward that end, it is important to appreciate that discoverable
new features do not include all logically possible ones, as Schyns et
al. seem to suggest. Rather, human cognition is organized (con-
strained) for the discovery and synthesis of overlapping patterns in
space and time. For example, we are better at detecting and
learning about spatial (and temporal) relationships among parts
that are close together rather than widely separated, and we are
much more sensitive to some kinds of shape attributes than others
(compare locating first-derivative discontinuities in contours [cor-
ners] vs. third-derivative discontinuities). Some well-defined attri-
butes are unlearnable or even undetectable ( Julesz 1981). Many
of the answers to the mystery of where new features come from
will probably emerge from identifying constraints on the vocabu-
lary of spatial and temporal properties and relations that make up
the human endowment for perception and perceptual learning.
Can features be created on the fly?
Koen Lamberts
University of Birmingham, Birmingham BI5 2TT, England, United Kingdom.
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Abstract: It is argued that feature creation may not only depend on
categorical distinctions that are made during category learning, but also on
the choice set during subsequent categorization.
Schyns et al. argue convincingly that higher-level cognitive pro-
cesses influence the lower-level features that are created and used.
I largely agree with their analysis and with its conclusions. Al-
though the influence of learning on low-level processes has been
studied for a long time, it is good to see a systematic and rigorous
exploration of the effects of category learning on feature creation.
In this commentary, I will discuss one issue that has not been
addressed in the target article.
My argument concerns the role of choice sets in category
learning and categorization. Which features are functionally opti-
mal will ultimately depend on two elements: (1) the categorical
distinctions that need to be made during category learning, and
(2) the set of category alternatives that are considered during
subsequent categorization. Schyns et al. address only the first of
these two elements, but I will argue that the second may be equally
important if we want to understand how higher-level processes
affect low-level feature creation.
Category learning in daily life differs in many respects from
category learning in the typical laboratory experiment. In many
category-learning experiments, there are only a few mutually
exclusive alternative categories available. However, in daily life,
the set of alternatives is usually much larger and often implicit.
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Moreover, objects can belong to many categories at the same time.
For instance, when a child learns what a “fish” is, it learns to assign
objects to one particular category, at the exclusion of a potentially
very large set of alternatives: a fish is not furniture, nor is it a cat or
a tree. However, a fish is also a living creature, it can become food,
and it can swim. Category learning usually involves acquiring the
ability to assign objects to more than one category among a very
large number of alternatives. Schyns et al. argue convincingly that
this process will be helped tremendously by flexible feature
creation.
However, this may be only part of the story of flexible features.
In real-life categorization, there can be discrepancies between
choice sets during category learning and choice sets in subsequent
categorization. Often, the choice set in categorization is limited by
the task at hand or the processing context. Which features are
optimal in a given context depends on the choice set that is
available. Different features will be optimal in deciding whether a
given object is an apple or a pear, for example, than in deciding if it
is an apple or a tennis ball. It seems reasonable to assume that
decisions are often made between category alternatives that were
never before considered together. One might expect a truly
adaptive system to have the ability to tailor feature uses to such
specific contextual demands, without extensive additional learn-
ing. The question then becomes whether features can be created
on the fly to address categorization needs in different contexts.
This is essentially an empirical question that should be addressed
in the future. It has been shown that categorization context can
affect the distribution of attention across existing features (Lam-
berts & Chong 1997), but it is unclear whether truly new features
can be created to serve short-term task demands. If categorization
context can determine feature creation in such a flexible manner
(and I believe this is a distinct possibility), fixed-feature theories of
categorization and identification would be in even greater diffi-
culty than the work of Schyns et al. suggests. Such additional
flexibility would also imply that features created as a result of
extensive category learning may be highly volatile, and not applica-
ble in choice contexts that differ from those in training.
New features for old: Creation or derivation?
Cyril R. Latimer
Department of Psychology, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
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Abstract: Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut oppose the notion of fixed feature
analysis, suggesting the possibility of flexible feature creation in object
recognition and categorisation. Such proposals cannot be assessed until
clear definitions of the objects in question and their decompositions are
formulated. Flexibility may come from the decompositions of objects
rather than from feature creation.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut raise the important and venerable
issue of the way the perceptual world is analysed by our senses and
the relativity of the terms “whole” and “part.” What are the
perceptual primitives and are they immutable, or are they flexible
and created to suit particular contexts? Central to their arguments
is their opposition of fixed-space versus flexible-space category
learning and fixed features such as “geons” or pixels versus flexible
features. The difficulty with the latter dichotomy is that fixed high-
level geons may not be flexible enough to capture the representa-
tion necessary for a new task, whereas regularities at the level of
functional features may not be captured by or derivable from a
high-resolution, pixel decomposition of category members. One
difficulty the authors face if their theory of flexible feature creation
is to be testable is that before any feature, part, or dimension can
be pronounced old, newly created, derivable, or underivable, they
themselves must specify some initial set of inflexible primitives.
Wholes, parts and derivable/underivable properties. The diffi-
culty in discussing wholes and their parts was alluded to in a
seminal paper on the analysis of gestalt concepts by Rescher and
Oppenheim (1955). Those authors pointed out that because
wholes and their parts may have an indefinite number of descrip-
tions and decompositions, there can be no talk about any whole
and its parts until the whole in question is defined precisely and in
enough detail. Moreover, the decomposition of the whole into
parts must also be described precisely, along with details about the
putative parts and their attributes. If some nonspatial or dimen-
sional decomposition of a whole is adopted, then the dimensions
and their ranges of values and so on must be precisely defined.
Only then can there be coherent discussion of whether specified
properties of a whole are old, new, derivable, or underivable from
the specified parts of the whole and their attributes.
For example, Schyns et al. cite the example of “symmetry” as an
instance of the “functionally important object regularities . . .
[that] are often not captured by simple pixel-based features” (sect.
2.4.1.). Whether the property of symmetry is captured or derivable
from a pixel-based decomposition depends entirely on how the
decomposition and its attributes are defined. For some decom-
positions (e.g., Gibson’s 1969 graphemic analysis, which does not
specify the locations of parts within characters), symmetry will not
be derivable directly from the parts. For other decompositions
(Latimer et al. 1994; Sejnowski et al. 1986), symmetry will be
derivable.
Theory-dependent derivability. The situation is further compli-
cated because derivability depends not only on the decomposition
and attributes chosen but also on the choice of background theory.
Some theories, by virtue of their assumptions, will allow higher-
order holistic properties to be derived, whereas other theories will
not. Consider, for example, how features like “curvature” are
encoded by the visual system. In a theory in which curvature is
underivable, curvature is somehow extracted directly by curvature
detectors in the visual system and is not derived from the products
of local analysis (Riggs 1973; 1974). In a theory in which it is
derivable, large curved lines may be registered by cells whose
optimum stimulus is a straight line. Thus, an arc may be derived
from the outputs of short line detectors located so that they are
tangents to the larger arc. As it happens, the weight of evidence
supports this theory (Blakemore & Over 1974; Crassini & Over
1975).
Conceptual and empirical implications. Schyns et al. admit that
it will be very difficult to determine whether experimental partici-
pants are creating, deriving, or simply reweighing object features.
Leaving aside this empirical issue for the moment, the conceptual
implications of the foregoing remarks for Schyns et al.’s notion of
feature creation are clear. In any investigation of whole/part
perception, it is first necessary to specify in sufficient detail (1) the
properties of the wholes to be recognised or categorised, (2) the
chosen decomposition of the wholes and their attributes, plus (3) a
detailed description of any relevant background theory. Only then
will it be possible to determine by logical analysis and simulation
whether or not properties are derivable. Objects with features
shown to be new and underivable in simulations could be tested on
experimental participants, but the difficulty, I suspect, will lie in
finding such underivable features. In the myriad possible sets of
objects, decompositions, attributes, and associated background
theories, where are such features to be found? For every decom-
position that does not allow a particular property to be derived, it
may be possible to find another that does.
New features or new decompositions? Instead of reweighing,
deriving, or creating new features, perhaps the brain adopts new
and better decompositions that allow diagnostic features to be
derived. For example, Pasnak (1971) found that although a three-
by-three decomposition proved to be predictive of the time course
and errors in same/different judgments about complex geometric
forms, the same decomposition did not explain the results of
experiments with simpler forms. Thus, the flexibility proposed by
Schyns et al. may lie in the brain’s ability to adopt efficient and
context-sensitive decompositions rather than having to create or
derive features from a fixed decomposition? In any event, the
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conceptual and experimental analysis of part/whole perception
must confront the conceptual and definitional issues described
here. The importance and strength of Schyns et al.’s contribution
lie in highlighting the currency of these conceptual matters in both
object recognition and categorisation.
Feature learning, multiresolution analysis,
and symbol grounding
Karl F. MacDorman
Department of Mechanical Engineering, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka
560, Japan. karl.macdorman@cl.cam.ac.uk www.cl.cam.ac.uk/,kfm11
Abstract: Cognitive theories based on a fixed feature set suffer from frame
and symbol grounding problems. Flexible features and other empirically
acquired constraints (e.g., analog-to-analog mappings) provide a frame-
work for letting extrinsic relations influence symbol manipulation. By
offering a biologically plausible basis for feature learning, nonorthogonal
multiresolution analysis and dimensionality reduction, informed by func-
tional constraints, may contribute to a solution to the symbol grounding
problem.
Schyns et al. present compelling arguments (sect. 2.8) and evi-
dence for the ability to learn diagnostic features. It is accordingly
useful to begin by considering why fixed features have proven so
popular. Perhaps most important, fixed features provide a straight-
forward basis for framing cognitive theories (sect. 1.1). Fixed
features and combination rules enable a symbol system to simulate
key aspects of human thinking such as its systematicness, produc-
tivity, and semantic coherence. Fixed features also simplify the
mechanics of deduction and abstract planning by separating the
symbol system from the details of sensorimotor control.
Trouble arises because, in current systems, symbol manipula-
tion turns on properties intrinsic to the system (i.e., syntactic
constraints and the physical properties of the implementation
media). However, even proponents of symbol systems (Fodor
1994) now admit that extrinsic relations influence intentional
contents – in particular, the causal relation between a thought’s
content and what it represents. To ignore this fact leads to the
symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990).
Standard artificial intelligence solutions fail because (1) outside
of simple domains, a programmer cannot anticipate all necessary
elementary features and, hence, cannot set up a priori feature
detectors; (2) to represent all sensorimotor information symbol-
ically creates unreasonable computational demands ( Janlert
1996); and (3) analog information needs to bear on abstract
reasoning. Otherwise, symbol systems lack empirical constraints
and (having only formal constraints) can define a limitless number
of “kooky” concepts (Fodor 1987). This excess of freedom contrib-
utes to the frame problem. Its solution requires finding a repre-
sentational form that obviates the need to reason about stabilities
(Janlert 1996). However, our best hope for that is precisely the
bottom-up perceptual and functional constraints lacked by cur-
rent symbol systems (Harnad 1993). This is one reason why we
may need representational forms that fall along an analog-
categorical continuum (Harnad 1987).
By letting extrinsic relations (as mediated by the body) influ-
ence internal symbol manipulation, feature learning offers a more
sound foundation for cognitive theories. Feedback from failed
sensorimotor predictions could form the basis for learning analog-
to-categorical mappings (MacDorman 1997a; 1997b). These
could in turn ground symbols and rules. Sensorimotor predictions
correlate the sensory and internal consequences of motor activity.
When they are violated, orienting reactions ensue that guide
attention toward the source of error. These predictions underlie
the ability to distinguish object affordances. For this reason, they
must integrate information from multiple modalities. This pro-
vides a framework for more passive or abstract feature learning.
Active sensorimotor predictions constitute an individual’s current
world-model.
More specific issues are discussed in the following sections.
Viewpoint. There is good reason to doubt the existence of a
unique task-independent view-based representation of an object
(sect. 2.1). One alternative is to learn a viewpoint-independent
representation of an object by developing predictions concern-
ing how bodily movements transform the object’s (viewpoint-
dependent) sensory projections (MacDorman 1997a; 1997b).
Using these, it is possible to shift from a viewer-centered to an
object-centered frame of reference, because predictions concern-
ing how self-induced movements cause sensory transformations
can be used to compensate for those movements. [See also,
Edelman “Representation is Representation of Similarities” BBS
21(3) 1998.]
Nonorthogonality. As Schyns et al. point out, the categorization
process can profitably inform the dimensionality reduction of its
input (sect. 3.4.2). Although this approach makes a featural in-
terpretation of principal components easier, one drawback is the
high cost of each recalculation of the eigenvectors used by the
Karhunen-Loe`ve transform. Another drawback is that biological
sensorimotor systems use nonorthogonal coordinates. Orthogo-
nality would exact a high cost both genetically and in terms of
neural development. It leaves visual processing susceptible to
changes in receptive field profiles. If the brain used orthogonal
coordinates, neural death could easily render some patterns im-
perceptible and others indistinguishable.
Multiresolution analysis. Results in character and face recogni-
tion research from using wavelets to pursue input signals at various
scales support Schyns et al.’s conclusion that larger features need
not be composed from smaller ones (sect. 3.1). Daugman (1980)
proposed that a parametrized family of two-dimensional Gabor
filters (nonorthogonal wavelets) offers a suitable model of the
anisotropic receptive field profiles of single neurons in several
areas of the primary visual cortex. The two-dimensional Gabor
filters are able to account for the selective tuning of simple
cells for characteristic scale, localization, orientation, and quadra-
ture phase relationships. Daugman (1985) has shown using chi-
squared tests that this family of elementary functions fits the
profiles of 97% of simple cells in the cat visual cortex. Within-
category invariance (with between-category invariance filtered
out) learned from the output of Gabor filters may underpin
flexible features (MacDorman 1997b).
Schyns et al.’s use of alternative materials is laudable. Virtual
reality may soon permit us to pursue a truly bottom-up multimo-
dal investigation of feature learning. Subjects possessed of
“bodies” with utterly different kinematics, sensors, and actuators
will move in alien perceptual worlds, and we will get to study them.
Formal models and feature creation
Thomas J. Palmeri
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240.
palmerit@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu
www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/psychology/cogsci/palmeri/home.html
Abstract: Formal models provide detailed accounts of fundamental
aspects of categorization, yet are potentially incomplete in not providing
accounts of how new features might be created. Although the notion of
feature creation is enticing, how this complex process might operate is not
specified. Moreover, arguments favoring feature creation accounts that
are founded on the implausibility of feature weighting accounts are not
convincing.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut provide some compelling argu-
ments in favor of flexible feature creation as opposed to the fixed
feature spaces assumed by many theories of categorization and
object recognition. I agree that although assuming fixed feature
spaces should not be problematic for categorizing and recognizing
fairly simple experimental stimuli, such as forms of canonical
shapes and colors, flexible features may be necessary for categoriz-
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ing and recognizing more complex stimuli, such as faces or
radiological images. Although I find many of the ideas presented
in the target article enticing, this commentary will instead focus on
some misconceptions, mischaracterizations, and omissions as they
pertain to categorization.
Formal models and simple stimuli. Researchers interested in
developing formal computational models of categorization have
often used stimuli that “wear their features on their sleeves.” As a
result, they have largely overlooked the role of emergent features
in category learning. Why? Is it because formal modelers believe
that all stimuli are composed of such manifestly present features?
Certainly some might hold this theoretical viewpoint. However,
many modelers use stimuli such a simple shapes, colors, or tones
precisely because emergent dimensions do not form, not because
they believe that emergent dimensions are inconsequential. In
experiments using such stimuli, high levels of control over features
are necessary to evaluate detailed aspects of some proposed
models.
It is certainly true that “feature creation” has been ignored by
most formal models of categorization. This is largely because the
mechanisms involved are not very well understood and pertinent
empirical work is lacking. This target article should provide some
impetus for researchers to take these issues seriously in future
work. It must be emphasized, however, that a tremendous amount
has been learned about detailed aspects of categorization using
simple stimuli (e.g., see Ashby 1992; Estes 1994; Nosofsky 1992).
Although it is difficult to believe that Schyns et al. would deny this,
they unfortunately minimize the insights that have been gained
through formal approaches when they claim that the “lion’s share”
of the work in much of real-life category learning is in feature
creation. Because they present relatively limited empirical evi-
dence and little concrete theoretical development, I simply am not
convinced that most of the “work” in category learning, by what-
ever metric this might be assessed, is done by feature creation.
Although specifying how appropriate feature spaces might be
created is without question an important unresolved issue, speci-
fying representations is insufficient for a complete account of
categorization. Feature creation is but one (albeit largely ignored)
aspect of categorization. Even if new features are created (by some
presently unspecified mechanism), issues of how these features
are used to make a categorization decision must still be addressed:
How are the features of a presented object compared with
information stored in memory? What information about a cate-
gory is stored in memory? What kind of categorization decision
process is used? Formal models have provided some answers to
these important questions.1 I would be surprised if the insights
gained using simple stimuli were found to be of little value when
“alternative materials” are used.2
Implausibility arguments and constraints on feature creation.
One of the greatest challenges to a feature creation account is to
distinguish it from a feature weighting account. Although I find
many of the arguments Schyns et al. raise against a feature
weighting account sensible, too often their appeals are grounded
in “implausibility.” Feature creation is necessary if “the required
number of prespecified features would otherwise be implausibly
large” (sect. 1.2), and positing a feature weighting account would
require “positing an implausibly large number of dimensions or
features” (sect. 1.2.2, para. 3). “Implausibility” is a fairly weak
foundation for theoretical arguments, especially when the basis for
such an assessment is left unspecified.
Exemplar-based models of categorization were once deemed
implausible. Given a pervasive computer metaphor for the mind,
memory capacity was limited and processing was serial, ruling out
the possibility of storing and retrieving specific category instances.
Abstractionist theories of categorization hence dominated the
field. It is now well recognized, however, that processing in the
brain is highly parallel and storage capacity is vast. Although
plausibility arguments are still raised, exemplar-based theories of
categorization, object recognition, and other cognitive processes
are now some of the most successful in the field.
Schyns et al.’s appeals to “implausibility” are not very convinc-
ing. In the case of feature weighting, we have a fairly simple
selective attention mechanism operating over a potentially large
feature space.3 It is not that difficult to imagine how such a
mechanism might operate (e.g., Kruschke 1992). In the case of
feature creation, we have a complex mechanism operating to
create a simple feature space. How this mechanism might work is
unknown. However, it must be powerful enough to create effi-
cient, specially tailored representations that distinguish between
object categories. Although the kinds of features that can be
created must be constrained by perceptual processes, the nature
of these constraints is unspecified.
Which account is more plausible depends on one’s metric of
complexity. Whereas Schyns et al. see the sheer size of the feature
space as a limitation of a feature weighting account, I see the sheer
complexity of feature creation as a potential limitation of a feature
creation account. In my view, until a testable model of feature
creation is specified in some detail, the plausibility of such an
intelligent feature creation agent must remain suspect instead.
NOTES
1. As for one successful formal model, Schyns et al. mischaracterize
RULEX (Nosofsky et al. 1994) when they claim it assumes that people
learn categories “by discovering complex rules that integrate several
distinct stimulus features” (sect. 2.8, para. 5). Rather, RULEX assumes
that people form simple rules along one, or possibly two, psychological
dimensions and then remember exceptions to those rules. In fact, RULEX
could be a useful decision mechanism to supplement the purported
feature creation process – unless a single necessary and sufficient created
feature signals category membership, exceptions are a likely possibility.
2. Schyns et al. omitted any discussion of the vast categorization
literature using random dot patterns (e.g., Homa 1984; Posner & Keele
1968; Shin & Nosofsky 1992) – clear examples of “alternative materials.” It
is true that multidimensional scaling methods are often necessary to derive
the psychological dimensions of these patterns. Yet, when these derived
configurations are assumed, formal models have provided excellent ac-
counts of categorization performance (e.g., Shin & Nosofsky 1992; Palmeri
& Nosofsky, submitted). I agree that origins of the psychological dimen-
sions are left unspecified by current models. However, specifying these
origins does not provide a theory of categorization in itself.
3. Schyns et al. mischaracterize feature weighting accounts in general
as a form of curve fitting (sect. 2.5). In fact, Kruschke (1992) has developed
a connectionist model that learns to attend to diagnostic dimensions, and
Nosofsky (1984) has cast feature weighting in terms of optimality consider-
ations.
Feature creation as a byproduct
of attentional processing
Pierre Perruchet and Annie Vinter
LEAD, Faculte´ des Sciences, Universite´ de Bourgogne, 21000 Dijon,
France. perruche@u-borugogne.fr; vinter@u-bourgogne.fr
Abstract: Attributing the creation of new features to categorization
requirements implies that the exemplars displayed are correctly assigned
to their category. This constraint limits the scope of Schyns et al.’s proposal
to supervised learning. We present data suggesting that this constraint is
unwarranted and we argue that feature creation is better thought of as a
byproduct of the attentional, on-line processing of incoming information.
In traditional category learning studies, new categories emerge
from new combinations of a fixed repertoire of elementary fea-
tures. Schyns et al. show cogently that low-level features can
themselves change with experience, thus altering the immediate
appearance of objects. We fully agree with this perspective, which
amplifies the impact of learning to the deepest roots of perception
and categorization, thus converging with other sources of evidence
that the role of learning in cognition has been underestimated
(e.g., Bates & Elman 1996, with regard to language).
We believe, however, that one aspect of the Schyns et al.
proposal may ultimately limit its implications. They claim repeat-
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edly that feature creation depends on categorization require-
ments, and that people create features to subserve the representa-
tion and categorization of objects. We have no special quarrel with
this proposal insofar as it intends to describe the ultimate function
of features in adaptive behavior. However, the authors mean
something much stronger, namely, that the categorization require-
ment is the actual driving force in extracting distinctive features.
The difference is crucial, as it appears when comparing the hardly
disputable claim that mating occurs in the service of species
survival, and the contention that individual sexual behavior is
initiated and shaped by this ultimate function. Conceiving catego-
rization requirement as the actual causal agent for feature creation
undermines the Schyns et al. model.
The restriction to supervised learning. The problem is that the
tightly functionalist stance by Schyns et al. limits the relevance of
their model to situations in which participants are informed about
the nature of the categories. Indeed, in the componential view of
cognition to which Schyns et al. seem to subscribe, categories are
themselves defined by their distinctive features. It would obvi-
ously be circular to simultaneously ground category formation in
feature knowledge and feature creation in category knowledge. To
avoid circularity, the claim that features are learned insofar as they
are needed to achieve categorization requires that displayed
exemplars be correctly assigned to their categories by an external
informer. Although Schyns et al. allude briefly to the beneficial
effects of preexposure without external feedback (sect. 1.2.1; see
also the preliminary experiments by Schyns & Rodet 1997), they
are aware of this constraint. To quote them, “the individual knows
what the categories are from external feedback” (sect. 2.2).
Because feature creation, according to Schyns et al., implies
concurrent category knowledge, extending the scope of learning
to features paradoxically prevents genuine category discovery. We
are then faced with the following alternative: either new categories
are formed by combining known features, the conventional view,
or new features can be created from the knowledge of fixed
categories, as claimed by Schyns et al. Disappointingly, both sides
of this alternative rule out the possibility that people faced with a
new environment can learn both features and categories by
themselves. We subscribe to the view that new features can be
created, but we intend to show that the process is functionally
independent of categorization requirements. Our proposal is that
feature creation makes it possible to form new categories instead
of requiring information about categories.
Evidence for feature creation in unsupervised learning. The
observation that people may be able to parse complex material
according to its relevant parts in unsupervised learning without
any surface cues or external information about the deep structure
of the material has occasionally been reported in various areas of
research (e.g., see Saffran et al. 1997). However, most of the
evidence comes from the so-called implicit learning studies. In
these studies, subjects are typically faced with complexly struc-
tured material, such as a set of letter strings, the order of which is
defined by a finite-state grammar. There is evidence that the
subjective encoding units of such a complex display, which are
initially randomly determined or driven by possibly irrelevant
surface features, become increasingly congruent with the deep
structure of the material (Perruchet & Gallego 1997; Servan-
Schreiber & Anderson 1990). As in the situations described by
Schyns et al., learning is responsible for the formation of the
building blocks of cognition, instead of dealing with only the
storage, processing, and retrieval of preshaped representations. (It
may be pointed out that one deals with subjective units in the
implicit learning context, whereas Schyns et al. deal with features.
This difference may be terminological, insofar as most of the
experimental support cited in the Schyns et al. target article
discussed the segmentation of objects into parts in the same way
that in implicit learning experiments the training material is
segmented into perceptual units.)
The crucial difference between the data provided by Schyns et
al. and the results just described lies in the fact that in the latter
case, the building blocks of cognition are shaped without any
external information about the categorical structure of the mate-
rial.
To account for this finding, we have proposed a model that relies
on simple and ubiquitous attentional and memory processes
(Perruchet & Vinter 1997; Perruchet et al. 1997). The initial
perceptual units composing the momentary focus of attention are
determined at random, or result from various bottom-up influ-
ences such as those described by Schyns et al. (sect. 2.5). Some of
these perceptual units presumably match the structurally relevant
parts of the material, whereas others result from irrelevant frag-
mentation. The key point is that a given part tends to be repeated
only when it is structurally relevant, as a mandatory consequence
of the rule-governed structure of the material. This entails that
irrelevant units, because they reoccur infrequently, will be forgot-
ten, whereas the initial selection of meaningful units will be
progressively reinforced by repetition. With repeated exposure,
subjective units become strong enough to shape perceptual pro-
cesses and alter the immediate appearance of objects. Thus, in this
model, the formation of cognitive units matching the meaningful
part of the material is a byproduct of the attentional, on-line
processing of incoming information.
After their initial exposure to the letter strings in artificial
grammar learning, subjects are able to discriminate new gram-
matical and ungrammatical strings. This shows that feature cre-
ation, at least when viewed as a structurally relevant parsing of the
environment, can be one basis for the formation of new categories,
instead of being grounded in externally induced category knowl-
edge. Our proposal does not entail that categorization require-
ments are never causal factors in feature creation, as claimed by
Schyns et al. However, this form of processing may be limited to
the cases in which people are explicitly asked to solve problems or
to engage in analytic forms of thought.
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Context-dependent feature discovery is
evidence that the coordination of function
is a basic cognitive capacity
W. A. Phillips
Center for Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience, University of Stirling,
FK9 4LA, Scotland, United Kingdom. wap1@forth.stir.ac.uk
www psych.stir.ac.uk/,wap/
Abstract: Schyns et al. make a strong case for context-dependent feature
discovery. The features computed from specialized and diverse data-sets
help to coordinate their activity by adapting so as to emphasize what is
related across sets. Their perspective can be strengthened and extended
by formal arguments for the contextual guidance of learning and process-
ing and by neurobiological and psychological evidence of structures and
processes that implement this guidance.
The specialization of function has long been central to our under-
standing of cognition. It is now becoming clear how this is
complemented by the coordination of function. Argument and
evidence that contextual guidance is a fundamental capability of
cortex and cognition are reviewed by Phillips and Singer (1997),
where the goal of discovering features that are predictably related
to the context in which they occur is formally specified, imple-
mented as a learning algorithm, and shown to be supported by
known anatomical structures and physiological processes. The
slim psychological case for context-dependent feature discovery
presented in that review (sect. 5.6 & 5.7) is now greatly strength-
ened by Schyns et al. and particularly by their psychological
evidence of learned features (target article, sect. 1.2). In addition
to providing computational and neural support for the processes
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they propose, our perspective can: (1) help clarify their distinction
between object concepts and other levels of description; (2)
extend the possible sources of guidance to include within-level
interactions as well as top-down influences; (3) extend the range of
variables discovered to include those that are continuous as well as
those that are categorical; and (4) help emphasize the role of
discovered relations between the discovered variables in organiz-
ing perception.
Object concepts are distinguished by what distinguishes ob-
jects, not by nonfixedness, and soon. Although this may sound
tautological, it is not, because what distinguishes objects is spe-
cified in relation to the environmental input by the classes of
objects that are met, and in relation to the internal cognitive
operations of object perception by the sets of stimuli to which
discriminative object recognition responses generalize. Schyns et
al. struggle throughout with the problem of distinguishing “object
concepts” from “perception” and from “relatively raw data.” Given
their emphasis on learned object features, fixedness versus nonfix-
edness seems to be implied as one criterion, but other criteria are
also suggested, for example, strategic versus nonstrategic, and the
amount of prior processing required. Most of these are unconvinc-
ing. Primary sensory maps are both adaptable and affected by
attention. These difficulties are unnecessary because the curse of
dimensionality ensures that object concepts cannot be based
directly on the sensory maps. Mediating variables are therefore
necessary, and the formal argument by Schyns et al. to this effect
(sect. 3.4) can be relied on. Their confidence in this argument may
be increased by noting that there is also clear empirical evidence
for just such a massive reduction in the information available in
going from sensory storage to short-term visual memory. This
selective mapping has exactly the properties required by the
analysis by Schyns et al., including a loss of positional sensitivity,
and thus an increase in positional generalization (Phillips 1974).
Continuous variables may also have to be discovered. The
bias toward categorical variables seems to me an unnecessary
restriction. When selecting a fruit to eat, it is as useful to predict its
sweetness as to categorize it as an apple or a pear. An intrinsic bias
toward categorical variables may prevent our discovering those
that are useful but continuous. This problem can be solved by
replacing the bias toward categorization with the bias toward
discovering whatever variables are related to the contextual infor-
mation available (Phillips & Singer 1997).
Information to guide feature discovery need not be restricted
to top-down sources. I see no need to restrict the information that
guides feature discovery to that provided by “top-down” sources,
which are in any case not well specified. Taste information could
guide the discovery of visual cues to sweetness even if the taste
descriptors were computed automatically by a few stages of fixed
processing. What matters is not that the guiding information
comes from some high-level strategic controller but that it arose
from an input that is distinct from and is (at the level concerned)
kept distinct from the input whose analysis it guides.
Relations between the features must also be discovered and
used. Schyns et al. imply this but provide no explicit account of
how feature discovery can be combined with the discovery of the
relations between those features. They do discuss their use in
organizing part–whole relations in perception, however, and their
arguments to this effect are supported by evidence of the role of
learned contextual interactions in grouping via synchronization
(Singer 1995). This raises an important and as yet unresolved
problem, however, which is to reconcile the emphasis on object
concepts as feature lists with the evidence for object concepts as
structural descriptions. Although Schyns et al. leave this and other
mysteries of object perception unresolved, the evidence of and
arguments for an open set of discovered features are very likely to
be a crucial part of the story.
Emergence of object representations in
young infants: Corroborating findings and a
challenge for the feature creation approach
Paul C. Quinn
Department of Psychology, Washington & Jefferson College, Washington,
PA 15301. pquinn@vms.cis.pitt.edu
Abstract: Arguments for feature creation receive support from studies of
young infants forming category representations from perceptual experi-
ence. A challenge for Schyns et al. will be to determine how a feature
creation system might interface with a perceptual system that appears
constrained to follow organizational principles that specify how edge
segments should be grouped into functional units of coherent object
representations.
Schyns et al. argue for a perceptual-conceptual system that is
anchored by representations of object categories. These represen-
tations emerge as features are perceptually learned from visual
input during the developmental course of object recognition and
categorization. The major purposes of this commentary are to
(1) review evidence on the development of category representa-
tions by young infants that provides additional support for Schyns
et al. and (2) highlight one major theoretical and empirical
challenge for the feature-creation approach.
Young infants are an important subject population for Schyns et
al. By studying young infants, investigators gain insight into the
initial beginnings of a feature-creation system. Young infant sub-
jects minimize the problem of uncontrolled levels of perceptual
experience and conceptual knowledge that are present in attempts
to study feature creation by adults. Empirical investigations of
object recognition and category formation conducted with young
infants also provide a better understanding of the relative roles of
low-level perceptual structures versus high-level conceptual theo-
ries in the early development of object parsing. The more that
young infants can extract structure from “meaningless” patterns,
the greater the role of perceptual mechanisms in discovering
functional units of processing from surface appearance.
One idea embedded in the Schyns et al. framework is that
features that come to define categories are extracted during the
task of category learning. It follows that in different categorization
tasks, different features will be extracted, and hence different
category representations will be formed. One parameter of inter-
est is whether a category is learned in isolation or in the context of
contrasting categories. Schyns et al. predict that feature extraction
may change as a category goes from being presented in isolation to
being presented in the context of other categories. In particular,
during single-category acquisition, an observer would be expected
to register features that were common to exemplars of the target
category. In contrast, during multiple-category acquisition, an
observer should register those features that were common to
exemplars from the target category, and that also served to
distinguish the target category from contrast categories.
Consistent with these predictions is the performance of 3- to
4-month-olds, who develop more robust and more tightly tuned
representations for form category information when presented
with dot-pattern squares and triangles together than when pre-
sented with either category singly (Quinn 1987). Also relevant are
findings that 3- and 4-month-olds form a category representation
of domestic cats that includes female lions when familiarized with
pictorial instances of domestic cats (Eimas & Quinn 1994). How-
ever, the infants form a category representation for domestic cats
that excludes female lions after a complex familiarization proce-
dure that presents pairs of cats and pairs that include a cat and a
female lion (Eimas et al. 1994). Apparently information (presum-
ably featural) about how exemplars are alike and how they differ
from exemplars of other categories may contribute to the forma-
tion of differentiated category representations that are more
nearly at the basic level in their exclusiveness. Such evidence
provides support for the idea that the specific features extracted
from stimuli are dependent on the nature of the categorization
Commentary/Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
36 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:1
task presented to human observers from the very beginnings of
development. Moreover, considering the age group tested and the
type of stimuli used (static pictures of exemplars), at least some of
the feature creation that Schyns et al. argue for is likely to be an
inherent characteristic of the manner in which our cognitive
systems learn information from perceptual experience.
A remaining challenge for Schyns et al. is to determine whether
a system of feature creation replaces, reorganizes, exists in paral-
lel, or works interactively with any system of object recognition
that might be in place before the onset of environmental experi-
ence (e.g., Biederman 1987). For example, Gestalt psychologists
have long contended that our perceptual systems come pre-
constructed to follow certain principles (e.g., closure, common
movement, good continuation, proximity, similarity) that specify
how surface fragments of a visual scene should be spontaneously
grouped into more complex structures (i.e., units of processing)
that serve as the basis for object recognition (Helson 1933).
Recent evidence indicates that young infants adhere to at least
some of these principles when organizing visual pattern informa-
tion (Quinn et al., in press; Quinn et al. 1993).
To determine the interplay between adherence to Gestalt
organizational principles and flexible feature creation, experi-
ments like those conducted by Pevtzow and Goldstone (1994)
should be performed with young infants. Will features that are
specified as functional by Gestalt principles be “overlooked” by
young infants if alternative means of object parsing are “sug-
gested” by presenting a category of objects in which the features
uniting the objects are “nonnatural” in the Gestalt sense? Such
experiments should prove valuable in understanding the initial
power of a flexible feature-creation system and whether it can
override perceptual parsing principles that a system may come
preequipped with.
To summarize, the arguments by Schyns et al. for feature
creation are consistent with data on young infants forming cate-
gory representations from perceptual experience. An important
task for Schyns et al. will be to determine how a feature creation
system might interface with a perceptual system that appears
constrained to follow principles that specify how edge segments
should be organized to form functional units of coherent object
representations.
Parts of visual shape as primitives
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Abstract: Converging psychophysical evidence suggests that the human
visual system parses shapes into component parts for the purposes of
object recognition. We examine the Schyns et al. claim of “creation” of
features in light of recent work on part-based representations of visual
shape, particularly the perceptual rules that human vision uses to parse
shapes.
Schyns et al.’s target article presents theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence for the idea that, to characterize human
concept learning, one must allow for the “creation” of new fea-
tures. We believe that this thesis is important, both in the context
of adult categorization and in its early development. Recent
studies have emphasized the flexibility of human categorization
(see Medin & Coley, in press, for a review) and the importance of
considering task requirements in determining how people com-
pute similarity relationships between objects. There is no doubt
that adults are supremely flexible, using a variety of principles to
formulate new categories. A consideration of how categories are
learned by young children, however, forces at least an equal focus
on those categorizations that are learned early, easily, and with
little formal tutoring – those that are natural. Although we believe
that the work of Schyns et al. is crucially important in discovering
the range of flexibility in both early and mature categorization, we
also believe that certain kinds of part-based categories may pro-
vide initial constraints on which learning can build.
We examine here the claim of “creation” of features in the
context of part-based representations of visual shape. The issue of
shape representation is extremely relevant to categorization (espe-
cially in the context of naming), and it is one to which Schyns et al.
return a number of times in their article. Indeed, there is now
extensive work on how shape representations are recruited during
word learning in children (Landau 1994; Landau et al. 1988).
Converging experimental evidence with adults shows that human
vision does parse shapes into parts (Biederman 1987; Braunstein
et al. 1989), that it does so quickly (Hoffman & Singh 1997), and
perhaps preattentively (Driver & Baylis 1995). Part-based repre-
sentations may be the initial natural units on which later learning
rests.
How does human vision parse shapes into parts? Many part-
based schemes of shape representation use a predefined set of
shape primitives – for example, Biederman’s (1987) geons, or
Marr’s (1982) generalized cylinders. According to these ap-
proaches, human vision parses shapes into parts by looking for
these primitives in images. As Schyns et al. point out, however, this
greatly restricts the scope of shapes that can be recognized,
because part shapes that are not in the predefined set of primitives
cannot be represented adequately. The minima rule (Hoffman &
Richards 1984), on the other hand, makes no prior assumptions
about the shapes that human vision will encounter. Instead, it uses
a general computational scheme, based on the geometry of shapes
alone, to find the boundaries between parts on any given shape.
On a silhouette, the minima rule gives negative minima of curva-
ture on the contour of the silhouette as boundary points. And on a
three-dimensional shape, the minima rule gives loci of negative
minima of the principal curvatures on the surface of the shape as
boundary curves.
How does the functionality principle of Schyns et al. relate to
the minima rule? The authors cite compelling experimental re-
sults (e.g., from Schyns & Murphy 1994; Schyns & Rodet 1997)
showing that subjects with different categorization histories in-
deed parse shapes differently: depending on the categorization
tasks that subjects have had to perform, they divide the same
shapes differently into (task-relevant) features. One should note,
however, that neither of the parsings produced actually contra-
dicts the minima rule. (Such a contradiction is hinted at in para. 3
of sect. 1.2.2 of the target article, and in Schyns & Murphy 1994.)
The parts delineated by the subjects on the Martian rocks, for
example, are in fact bounded by loci of negative minima of the
principal curvatures (and not, for example, by parabolic curves or
loci of positive maxima). Subjects seem to differ in their parsings
only to the extent that some of them delineate as two parts what
others consider a single part – because such a distinction was
important to the cateogorization task they performed.
The preceding argument does not undermine the role of the
functionality principle, however. For example, it would be incor-
rect to say that the functionality principle defines perceptual units
simply by taking task-relevant compositions of parts defined by the
minima rule. This would be incorrect, because the minima rule
does not define parts. It defines only part boundaries. It con-
strains, but does not define, part cuts. So, clearly, there have to be
constraints, above and beyond the minima rule, that determine
subjects’ parsings of shapes.
Of course, there are many perceptual constraints beyond the
minima rule that affect one’s parsing preference. For example, the
parsing produced by drawing horizontal cuts looks extremely
unnatural in Figure 1a, but not in Figure 1b. Thus, relative cut-
length and good-continuation are examples of perceptual con-
straints on part cuts. Singh et al. (1996) have recently extended the
Commentary/Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:1 37
Figure 1 (Singh & Landau). Perceptual constraints beyond the
minima rule affect one’s parsing preference. The parsing pro-
duced by horizontal cuts looks unnatural in (a), but not in (b).
minima rule to the part-cut rule by incorporating more global
properties of shapes into it. Furthermore, Hoffman and Singh
(1997) have proposed a theory of part salience that lists various
geometrical factors that make some parts more salient than others.
In experimental tests of this theory, they found that their salience
factors can affect the choice of figure and ground in very rapid (50
msec) presentations.
All of these factors, however, still leave room for the func-
tionality principle to operate – although it is certainly more
constrained than Schyns et al.’s example of the silhouette with 20
bumps might suggest (sect. 2.5, para. 5). The functionality princi-
ple still has room to operate because: (1) all of these factors put
together still do not define a unique parsing in all cases; (2) these
factors do not define a hierarchy of parts – in which large parts are
seen as having further part-structures; and (3) some factors in the
part-cut rule are more “flexible” than others. For example, in
experiments with cross-shaped and elbow-shaped stimuli, Seyra-
nian et al. (1997) found that although subjects consistently pre-
ferred shorter part cuts to longer ones, they were divided on how
they used the “area” factor: some subjects preferred cuts that
produced smaller parts, whereas others preferred cuts that pro-
duced larger parts. Studying the interactions between top-down
constraints imposed by the functionality principle and such factors
as salience and the part-cut rule is an extremely interesting
empirical direction to pursue. Understanding the developmental
interactions among these may be critical to explaining how the
perceptual system comes to support categorization, and vice versa.
In sum, the case of part-based representations of visual shape
suggests that one need not choose between the two extreme
alternatives: one in which perceptual processes give rise to fixed
features, which may then be combined in various ways to give
high-level conceptual features; and the other in which high-level
conceptual features are created completely anew in response to
categorization demands. Instead, one may simply think of percep-
tual processes as imposing various constraints on the organization
of the incoming data. Some of these constraints are extremely
strong and rigid – perhaps innate – whereas others are more
flexible and may be structured by differences in learning history.
In many cases (certainly the kinds of cases that Schyns et al. are
studying), all these constraints put together do not determine a
unique perceptual organization. This leaves plenty of room for
categorization and other task requirements to mold the formation
of “features.” As a result, different task requirements can lead to
the formation of different features, and this certainly gives them a
character of “newness.”
Parts, features, and expertise
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Abstract: Research in expert categorization is consistent with the Schyns
et al. claim that functional features are determined by constraints imposed
by the learning history of the categorizer and the demands of the
categorization task. However, the expertise work also suggests that a
distinction should be drawn between the categorizer’s perceptions of the
constituent parts of the object and its functional features. Although experts
and novices may parse a domain-specific object into the same parts, their
featural interpretations of those parts may differ significantly.
In their target article, Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut emphasize
that different features can be extracted from the same stimulus
object, depending on the categorization, the history of the per-
ceiver, and pragmatic demands of the category task. This commen-
tary addresses the influence of learning and task constraints on
categorization by examining the feature strategies of novices and
experts. Although novices and experts may not differ in the way
they parse the parts of a domain-specific object, their featural
interpretations of those parts may vary significantly.
Consider the following situation: while hiking in the woods, a
novice and an expert bird watcher spot a feathered creature on the
side of a tree. The novice identifies the feathered object as a
“woodpecker,” whereas the expert birder identifies the same
object more specifically as a “hairy woodpecker.” For the novice,
the target category “woodpecker” need only be distinguished from
other competing, genus-level categories (e.g., sparrow, hawk). On
the other hand, bird expertise demands that birds be categorized
more specifically at the species level (e.g., “downy woodpecker,”
“red-bellied woodpecker”). Thus, the pragmatics of bird expertise
force the bird expert to develop more specific contrast categories
than the novice. If experts and novices organize their contrast
categories differently, the two groups should also differ in their
functional features (i.e., features that promote within-category
similarity and between-category distinctions). The novice seeks to
find the functional features that distinguish between birds at the
genus level, whereas the expert is sensitive to features that
discriminate between woodpeckers at the species level.
How does one test experimentally the effects of learning and
experience on the extraction of functional features? Schyns and
Murphy (1994) used a part segmentation task in which subjects
were asked to decompose categorized objects into their constitu-
ent parts. The main finding was that subjects segmented objects
into different parts depending on their categorization histories.
Although there is usually a good correspondence between the
perceived parts of an object and their category diagnosticity in
laboratory studies, the relationship between parts and features is
not always so clearcut in real-world categorization.
For example, the natural shape properties (e.g., points of
discontinuity, local minima) of a bird might lead both the expert
and novice to parse the object into the identical constituent
elements (e.g., head, legs, and beak). Although the expert and
novice might agree on the constituent parts that compose an
object, they do not agree on the features that describe those parts.
Previous research (Tanaka & Taylor 1991) has shown that although
experts list the same number of parts for objects in their domain of
expertise as novices, they describe those parts in more differenti-
ated terms or what has been called “modified parts” (Tversky &
Hemenway 1984). For example, whereas a novice might describe
the beak of a hairy woodpecker as “pointed” to distinguish this part
from the beak of a sparrow and robin, the expert will describe the
same part as “elongated and pointed.” Implicit in the expert’s
description is information about how a hairy woodpecker’s beak
differs from the beaks of its more specific contrast categories of
woodpeckers (e.g., downy woodpeckers). Thus, identical parts
may have different feature representations, depending on the
contrast categories used.
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Face recognition provides another example of how the percep-
tual parts of an object do not correspond to its functional features.
The practical demands of everyday face recognition require that
faces be categorized at very specific levels of abstraction. Indeed,
face recognition involves the most specific kind of categorization –
unique identity – in which the category label (i.e., proper name)
designates an individual face. Because most people can identify
faces at the level of unique identity quickly and accurately, it has
been suggested that virtually all humans qualify as face experts
(Carey 1992).
What are the functional features that distinguish faces at the
level of unique identity? According to some fixed-feature theories,
such as Biederman’s Recognition-by-Components model (1987),
all faces are equivalent with respect to their part and configural
properties (i.e., all faces contain two eyes located above the nose,
which is found above the mouth). Discrimination between faces at
the unique identity level must therefore be based on a fine-
grained analysis of part and configural information. There is
evidence, however, that this analysis does not entail the decom-
position of the face into a set of independent diagnostic parts. For
example, Tanaka and Sengco (in press) have shown that disrupting
the configural information of one face part disrupts the recogni-
tion of another face part. This evidence supports the holistic
approach to face recognition in which the functional features are
not the individual face parts, but the whole face that emerges from
those parts.
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the ability to quickly
categorize objects at specific levels of abstraction is a trait that
distinguishes an expert from a novice. Shifts in categorization level
suggest that the expert is using functional features that are differ-
ent from those of the novice to mark within-category similarities
and between-category distinctions. Thus, the expertise work is
consistent with the proposal by Schyns et al. that the featural
properties of stimuli are not fixed, but are malleable to accommo-
date the goals of the categorization task. The study of expertise also
extends the notion of a feature beyond the specification of a
perceptual part. In the case of the bird expertise, the same part
provides different featural information for the expert and the
novice. In the case of face expertise, the many parts of a face may
compose only one functional feature. Together, these studies
indicate that one should be cautious when attempting to equate
the perceptual parts of an object with their functional features.
Do features arise out of nothing?
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Abstract: This commentary questions the validity of the claim that new
features can be constructed out of nothing during categorization. A
minimal set of fixed features based on what human beings are able to
detect is sufficient for categorization.
Objects have features. All physically distinct objects in the world
can in principle be distinguished from other objects on the basis of
their features. Successful categorization depends on finding reli-
able invariant features so that the members of any category can be
distinguished from nonmembers in a context of confusable alter-
natives. There are two main feature-based theories of categoriza-
tion. The difference between them hinges on the answer to the
question, “Where do those features come from?” According to the
first theory (which we will call feature creation theory, or FCT), as
proposed by Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut, features are created
under the influence of higher-level cognitive processes. According
to the second theory (fixed feature theory, or FFT), we already
have a repertoire of fixed features that is provided by our percep-
tual systems (Biederman 1987; Bruner et al. 1956; Gibson 1991;
Palmer 1977). Which theory is correct depends entirely on the
validity of the claim that new perceptually constrained features
can be constructed, a claim I will refute here.
What people can perceive is limited. For example, we are
unable to see light at frequencies lower than 360 nm or higher than
760 nm; we cannot hear sounds of frequencies above 20,000 Hz
(Coren & Ward 1989). The human perceptual system has a
specific architecture and function, both of which have evolved
over millions of years. These systems are equipped with specific
detectors and neural wiring (Barlow 1979; Fujita et al. 1992; Gross
et al. 1972; Hubel & Wiesel 1965; Kobatake & Tanaka 1994;
Livingstone & Hubel 1988; Maffei 1978; Salzman et al. 1990;
Snippe & Koenderink 1992). What we can detect determines our
minimal basic set of primitive features (e.g., line segments, angles,
colors). Every other feature is composed of the fixed set of
primitives. Feature construction is guided by repeated presenta-
tion of a stimulus. For example, an “A” encountered for the very
first time may just look like a three-line scribble, but with every
other presentation, the letter A becomes a feature itself and as
such it will become much easier to detect in a page full of scribbles.
I am not of course claiming that “responding to a feature” – in
the sense of a biophysical difference in receptor activity with one
stimulus and another – is the same as detecting the feature. It is
possible that finding the invariant feature among a chorus of low-
level detectors is where the real cognitive work begins. We need to
select – from all the features to which we are sensitive – the right
ones for a particular categorization task. Our brain cannot create
features out of nothing: it must be selected from the sensory
elements of which vision, hearing, and touch are composed. Our
perceptual systems evolved to detect what needs to be detected,
that is, nature gives us the primitives. The action may not be at this
level of primitives, but that is the reason our cognitive and
perceptual abilities include the power to combine and recombine
(but not to create) features.
If there is a set of primitive features, what does it look like?
According to Schyns et al., a set of primitives that could ground
categorization must satisfy at least three conditions: (1) primitives
must exist before experience with the objects they represent,
(2) they must be sufficient to represent the entire set of represent-
able objects, and (3) they must be able to bootstrap complex
recognition systems. If primitive features exist before perception
starts, then they must in some sense be present in the brain from
birth. If they must further be able to represent what can be
represented, then the only way to find those primitives is to look at
what the perceptual systems do with sensory information. I have
already noted that the perceptional range is constrained (unaided
by instruments), and that our perceptual systems evolved to
embody specific detectors. If the function of one of these detec-
tors is to fire when a vertical line is present, then a vertical line is
presumably one of the primitives.
How primitive can a primitive be? Schyns and Rodet (1996)
argue that fine-grained primitives such as pixels cannot be suffi-
cient for categorization even with powerful rules of combina-
tion. I agree that the presence of such a low-level primitive as a
pixel would make little sense, given the existence of a vertical line
detector. Nature has already discovered that a two-dimensional
proximal image on the retina is best analyzed using colors, line
segments, and curvature. There could of course be a primitive
for the presence of one black dot, but the perceptual system is
likely to use its more complex primitives as often as possible,
because they allow quicker responses and analyses. The idea
that primitives can be complex features such as curves, corners,
or edges has been proposed by, among others, Garner (1974)
and Biederman (1987). An argument against their view is that
recognition systems that use complex primitives are blind to
structures that are not represented as primitives and are not
composed of simpler primitives (Schyns et al.). This criticism
only holds if the set of primitives is not enough to represent the
entire set of representable objects and if it does not include less
complex primitives such as small black dots.
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The process of feature detection itself is crucial here. One can
ask how the features in a retinal image are to be found (Yulle &
Ullman 1990). The idea is that the system first checks whether its
more complex primitives are present in the image and only resorts
to more basic and finer grained primitives if this fails. The system
is trying in both cases to construct or combine new functional
features to speed up recognition in future encounters with similar
objects. So although a new functional feature would be composed
of several primitive ones, and hence would not increase the
system’s representational capacity, it could still increase its effi-
ciency. Having the new feature “A” might not allow us to represent
more, because it is composed of more primitive line features such
as “/,” “-,” and “\,” but it does increase the speed with which we can
recognize the letter in incoming sensory information.
To illustrate that a fixed feature set is not so rigid, one can argue
that the experiment of Schyns and Rodet (1997) described in the
Schyns et al. target article as supporting FCT, can be explained
using FFT. The reasoning here was that subjects should categorize
X-Y cells as XY members if they perceive and represent XY as a
conjunction of two individuated features. It was shown that the
X → Y → XY group performed this categorization and that the
other group classified X-Y as either X or Y. Schyns and Rodet
(1997) suggest that this result challenges FFT’s main claim that
category learning consists only of weighting the features of a fixed
set. However, this argument holds only if FFT claims that a fixed
set of features really contains all the possible features present; it
does not hold if a fixed feature set means a minimal fixed set of
primitives out of which all other features can be composed. The
features x, y, and xy can be composed of a minimal primitive set,
and the order in which the features are constructed and their
categories are learned could lead to an orthogonal classification of
X-Y. Hence, this experiment does refute “strong” FFT, but it does
not seem to rule out “weak” FFT.
Is it absolutely impossible to create features? No: there is and
should be a way out. Evolution takes care of cases in which the
environment might change in such a way that some primitive
features lose their utility and other primitives are needed. For
example, suppose the sun changed in such a way that light
consisted only of wavelengths above 500 nm. The color blue would
no longer exist and the “blue” receptor cone would lose its
function. Future generations might then evolve a new version of
these receptors that is responsive to a different kind of light.
Who needs created features?
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Abstract: Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut present reasonable arguments for
feature creation in category learning. We argue, however, that they do not
provide unequivocal evidence either for the necessity or for the occur-
rence of feature creation. In an effort to sharpen the debate, we take the
stand that a fixed feature approach is to be preferred in the absence of
compelling evidence.
The notion that categorization requirements influence perception
is not a new one. A few decades ago, Whorf proposed that the
language in a culture creates categories that guide our perception
of the world (see Hunt & Agnol 1991, for a discussion). If this is
true, then the question arises: What forms of learning are used in
this process?
The findings reported by Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut do not
directly resolve the issue of whether new features are created
during learning. Instead, they could be explained by a finite set of
fixed features that are hardwired in different modular systems
(e.g., particular sensory modalities, spatiality, motor skills, lan-
guage, deeper components of cognition). Through experience,
these fixed sets of features are noticed, enacted, differentiated,
weighted, and combined through chunking (Anderson 1990;
Newell & Rosenbloom 1981). Moreover, the fixed-feature ap-
proach offers more tractable models that are grounded in the
theories associated with each modular system.
Schyns et al. argue that an individual’s history of categorization
produces different sets of features. In the experiment by Schyns
and Rodet (1997), two groups learned categories in a different
order and were shown to extract different feature sets. An alterna-
tive account of the finding is that a fixed set of features was
weighted differently by the two groups. Furthermore, it does not
follow from their results that different categorization histories
permanently produce different feature sets. Instead, it is conceiv-
able that if the same categories were presented to both groups
over and over again, both groups would (by means of differentia-
tion and feature weighting) end up with the same feature set.
Evidence of feature creation would be stronger if it could be
shown that the groups would keep different feature sets even after
repeated exposure to the same categories and exemplars.
Schyns et al. correctly point out that the traditional experimen-
tal material in concept learning experiments biases the results
toward finding fixed feature sets. However, the alternative mate-
rial suggested by the authors might produce a bias in the opposite
direction. That is, in the categories that prevail in “everyday life,”
the requisite site feature discriminations are rarely as fine as those
required in their proposed material.
Categories outside expert domains are typically vague with
respect to the membership of some exemplars. This vagueness is
partially explained by the resolution level of the salient features
at this “novice” level: they are less precise than those used for
expert categories. Malt (1995) discusses studies that suggest that
“discriminations finer than those required for categorization at
the generic level, although possible, are not salient in the ab-
sence of greater than average attention” (1995, p. 124). To make
finer, more precise distinctions and subcategories (i.e., in expert
domains), the attention window has to be shifted or zoomed in
to more precise features; these features already exist and are
automatically being used by the perceptual system. These fine-
grained features are also processed through vague categories,
but they are not attended to because they are processed in an
automatized fashion. The difference between the categories of
the novice and the precise categories of the expert is compatible
with the view that humans ordinarily operate on the basis of a
limited, economic set of fixed features. We believe that the
stimulus material proposed by Schyns et al. is representative of
categorization in expert domains.
Malt has a compelling discussion of anthropological studies that
examine how much categorization is influenced by cognition
versus utility in a culture versus the environmental structure. She
argues that expert categorization requires an attentional shift to a
different level of feature abstraction because very similar objects
have to be distinguished. Finer-grained distinctive features be-
come salient in this process and receive more weight. For exam-
ple, categorization of Martian cells requires discrimination at a
very precise feature resolution. Schyns et al. argue that category
learning in this expert domain requires feature creation. In con-
trast, we argue that expert category learning could still be based on
a set of fixed features. These features are theoretically grounded
by the constraints of the world, sensory organs, neurophysiology,
evolution, and higher-level cognition.
There are at least two ways in which fixed features can suffice
for the acquisition of categories. First, a set of fine low-level
features are chunked to flexibly accommodate the new categories.
Second, the relevant features that are discriminating between
categories are represented as “fuzzy” high-level features that are
correlated with a subset of the fixed features. Hence, we are not
convinced that feature creation is a necessary process. Instead,
fixed features may be sufficient to represent a wide range of object
categories, for both novices and experts.
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Abstract: Does feature evolution stop once we have acquired sufficient
features to perform a recognition task? With extended practice, novices
may develop a more sophisticated feature space that allows them to
perform more accurately or quickly. Our work on perceptual expertise
indicates that feature learning and reorganization can continue even after
an initial set of features is available to represent a novel class of objects.
Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut argue that new features will evolve
when an object class cannot be represented using previously
developed features. We are sympathetic to the authors’ point of
view that the human object recognition/categorization system is
plastic, without a fixed feature vocabulary, but does feature evolu-
tion necessarily stop once we have acquired sufficient features to
perform a given recognition task? A novice birdwatcher may
quickly develop a collection of features for distinguishing different
species of hawks, but this feature set may not be ideal. With
extended practice, novices may be able to develop a more sophisti-
cated feature space that allows them to perform more accurately
and/or quickly. Our work on perceptual expertise (Gauthier &
Tarr 1997; Gauthier et al. 1997b) provides support for the idea that
feature learning and reorganization can continue even after an
initial set of features is available to represent a novel class of
objects.
The stimuli we have used, “Greebles” (Fig. 1a), are easily de-
composable into constituent parts. Moreover, participants unfa-
miliar with Greebles (novices) can learn to identify individuals
without difficulty, indicating that people in our participant pool
(undergraduates) either already have the features necessary to
categorize Greebles, or can develop the requisite features almost
immediately. According to Schyns et al., these conditions should
lead to “fixed-space” learning: distinctions between different
Greebles should continue to be made using the features partici-
pants use during their initial encounters with the objects.
However, when participants were trained for many hours on
Greeble recognition (Gauthier et al. 1997b), we found that their
response times on a Greeble-naming task continued to go down
even after they reached near-perfect accuracy levels (Fig. 1b).
Furthermore, correlational analyses of the response time data
showed that the Greebles participants found easiest to recognize
at the beginning of training (when they were novices) were not
necessarily the easiest to recognize once they became experts.
These findings indicate that perceptual learning, and possibly
feature differentiation, continues even when features sufficient to
recognize the Greebles have already been acquired.
Once the training regimen was completed, these “Greeble
experts” learned to name new Greebles faster than novices did,
and more important, showed qualitative differences, compared
with novices, on tests such as the Tanaka and Sengco (in press)
old/new configuration task. In this test, participants are asked to
identify one portion of a known Greeble that is presented either in
the normal (old) Greeble part-configuration or in a transformed
(new) configuration, for example, with the top, side-attached parts
rotated 15 degrees around the vertical axis toward the front.
Experts, but not novices, were significantly impaired at recogniz-
ing parts in new configurations (Gauthier & Tarr 1997; Gauthier et
al. 1997b), again indicating that experts had developed quali-
tatively different ways of representing Greebles even though “nov-
Figure 1 (Williams et al.). (a) Three Greebles from our studies
of perceptual expertise. All Greebles share the same part struc-
ture, but each one has uniquely shaped appendage parts. (b)
Training results from a Greeble expertise experiment. The plot
shows accuracy and response times for a series of tests (performed
over the course of 10 one-hour training sessions) in which partici-
pants had to name up to 20 individual Greebles (from Gauthier et
al. 1997b).
ice features” could have provided a sufficient basis for Greeble
identification.
These and other results from our studies suggest that the simple
featural contrasts that may be used by perceivers when they first
learn to discriminate between members of an object class may not
be used by the same perceivers once they become highly familiar
with the class. Although broadly consistent with the feature-
creation framework of Schyns et al., our findings challenge the
proposition that the feature space ever becomes fixed. In other
words, an expert’s feature space may become reorganized in
response to environmental pressures to perform a categorization
task more efficiently. Perhaps every encounter with an object of a
class leads to a small amount of feature-space reorganization. Such
a mechanism would not only lead to constant improvements in
performance (as long as such improvements are possible), but it
would also do away with the need to “decide” when a given learning
task requires fixed-space and when flexible-space learning.
If our hypothesis is correct, then at least two important ques-
tions need to be answered. First, what are the environmental
pressures that cause an expert’s feature space to become reor-
ganized? In our studies, participants were explicitly instructed to
perform as quickly as possible; similarly, our birdwatcher would be
under similar time pressure, as he may get only a fleeting glimpse
at a to-be-identified hawk. A natural history museum curator, on
the other hand, would have ample time to examine birds for his
exhibits, but would want to be exceedingly accurate. Yet another
form of expertise might be exhibited by a falconer, who needs to
identify the best way to handle individual hawks. We hypothesize
that these situations would all lead to different feature spaces,
even though the visual stimuli would be the same in each case.
A second issue is how feature reorganization might be accom-
plished. Preliminary data from a longitudinal fMRI (functional
magnetic resonance interferometry) study (Gauthier et al. 1997a)
indicates that a particular area in ventral temporal cortex may
become increasingly important over the course of training for
Greeble recognition. Neurons in this area thus appear to be
particularly well adapted for processing and encoding features
that support the fine metric discriminations needed for fast and
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accurate identification at the individual level, but extensive train-
ing seems to be necessary to tune these neurons to the particular
types of features found in a given object class.
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Abstract: The origin of features from nonfeatural information is a
problem that should concern all theories of object categorization
and recognition, not just the flexible feature approach. In contrast
to the idea that new features must originate from combinations of
simpler fixed features, we argue that holistic features can be
created from a direct imprinting on the visual medium. Further-
more, featural descriptions can emerge from processes that by
themselves do not operate on feature detectors. Once acquired,
features can be decomposed into component features if required
by other categorizations. We therefore argue that it is not neces-
sary to separate holistic and componential approaches to repre-
sentations, because the latter is a development of the former. The
requirements for representational flexibility outstrip the perfor-
mance of any existing computational models, but specific mecha-
nisms of feature creation are discussed and evaluated. Challenges
for feature creation mechanisms are discussed together with the
constraints (perceptual, statistical, functional, and task) they will
need to satisfy.
R1. Introduction
Objects form categories because they share a number of
features and differ on other features from contrasting
categories. One essential function of a feature, therefore, is
to subserve the categorization and representation of ob-
jects. The target article inquired into the origin of features.
Either people come equipped with a complete, fixed fea-
ture repertoire that accounts for all present and future
categorizations, or they sometimes create flexible features
to subserve new categorizations. The target article exam-
ined the implications of the latter view: that flexible fea-
tures (1) are not necessarily derivable from a fixed set of
primitives, (2) can augment the representational power of
the feature repertoire, and (3) can change the way an input
is perceived.
R2. Componential and holistic object
representations
From the outset, it is important to emphasize that the
flexible feature stance adheres to the reductionist enter-
prise of cognitive psychology according to which complex
object representations should be reducible to combinations
of their building blocks. One of the major reasons why
objects are described in terms of features (instead of pixels)
is because of the information compression and the resulting
gains in efficient encoding that features confer on the
system. We do not contest a reductionist approach, as
Huettel & Lockhead suggest; rather, we challenge the
possibility that all object representations can be reduced to
a fixed set of building blocks. We are compositionalists in
that we assume that features, once created, become the
building blocks of future object encodings and representa-
tions. However, a flexible feature repertoire must be main-
tained because there will always be differences between
objects that a fixed repertoire will not represent. Braisby &
Franks argue that combinations of fixed blocks could very
well represent these differences. To this we reply that if the
representational granularity of fixed blocks is above the
granularity of the pixel (or any similarly unstructured primi-
tive), combinations of these blocks could not represent an
object difference that the representational resolution of the
fixed blocks does not capture. We will argue later that pixels
are not representations of forms, as features are, but are a
medium for the representation of forms.
According to the main alternative to the compositional
view, objects are represented holistically, without a prior
decomposition into their components. Edelman, for exam-
ple, discusses a system that learns the appearance of entire
objects and uses their memory traces as holistic features. In
a related vein, Burgund & Marsolek suggest that specific
brain systems could be dedicated to the extraction of
holistic features that represent familiar objects. Holistic
representations have two main advantages over componen-
tial ones: (1) They preserve the input in an unprocessed
form, and (2) they represent the input efficiently by com-
pressing multiple sources of information into a single fea-
ture. Holistic and componential representations can coexist
in the flexible feature framework. It is therefore an “aug-
mented” compositionalism.
As already discussed in section 1 of the target article,
compositions of flexible features retain all of the strengths
of the classical “mental chemistry” of the fixed feature
approach: many object descriptions can be generated from
a set of elements and a set of combination rules; feature
combinations allow for structured hierarchical representa-
tions. Similarity relations between different objects can be
expressed in terms of their features and their combination
rules.
In the target article (sect. 2.8, para. 6), we argued for the
addition of feature decomposition mechanisms to supple-
ment the classical mechanisms of feature composition.
Feature decomposition is a mechanism that breaks down a
holistic feature into two or more holistic subfeatures when
one of them is required to represent a new subcategory (see
Schyns & Murphy 1994, experiment 2). The importance of
feature creation together with decomposition should not be
underestimated in componential theories. Created holistic
features share the two properties of holistic representations
listed above: they preserve the raw properties of the input
because their decomposition into subunits is contingent on
the task that requires the decomposition and created holis-
tic features are representationally compact because decom-
posing into subcomponents is not always required. Thus,
flexible features do not impose the usual dichotomy (other
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than phenomenological) between holistic and componen-
tial representations. Holistic and componential representa-
tions can coexist within the scheme because the latter is a
further development of the former.
In sum, our proposal for flexible features adheres to a
reductionist approach to cognition: Flexible features and
combination rules form the basis of object analyses, repre-
sentations, and categorizations. Throughout development,
new holistic features that preserve the raw properties of the
input are created to represent new categorizations. Task-
driven decompositions of these features give rise to subfea-
tures, which remain holistic themselves until another
categorization requires their decomposition into sub-
subfeatures. Schyns and Murphy (1994) argued that the
decomposition principle could account for the emergence
of conceptual hierarchies throughout development: de-
composition determines the holistic-to-componential link,
and chunking drives the componential-to-holistic link. We
expand on chunking in the following section.
R3. What does “new feature” mean?
This section discusses different ways in which a feature can
be new. First, we review the production of newness through
the chunking of simpler components and then discuss how
newness can also emerge from a process that directly
imprints on a continuous, a priori unsegmented medium (a
feature creation process). We then outline how new proper-
ties could emerge from imprinting.
R3.1. Chunking
Chunking and perceptual unitization were discussed in the
target article (sect. 3.1) as processes that could synthesize
new features from a set of more elementary components.
Chunking therefore implies that the input is segmented
into features before being chunked, in much the way a
capital T may initially be discretized into a vertical and
horizontal bar before being chunked into a holistic “T.”
Phenomenologically, the perception of the chunk does not
entail the perception of its components. A chunk is there-
fore a new, isolable, and independent information packet of
psychological processing that has the properties of holistic
representations: The recognition of a chunk will not neces-
sarily prime the recognition of its components, and vice
versa. Response times to the chunk will be faster than
predicted by response times to the components (Goldstone
et al., in press), and similarity relationships will not neces-
sarily be perceived between the chunk and its parts.
Good examples of chunking producing new features
have recently been described in the category of expertise
literature. For example, Tanaka discusses faces that are
initially analyzed into their consituent parts (e.g., nose,
mouth, eyes, and ears) before being chunked into con-
figural, holistic representations with the progressive acqui-
sition of expertise in face categorization. Similarly, Wil-
liams et al. propose that extensive experience with objects
designed to be geometrically as homogeneous as faces (the
“Greebles”) induces the creation of new features. In the
discussed experiments, tests on the nature of the features
gave support for holistic representations. These results
suggest that extensive experience with objects that look
alike initially can, by chunking already existing features,
induce a synthesis of new configural encodings that in-
creases the contrast between the objects. The main prop-
erty of these features is that they are initially derived from,
but ultimately do not reduce to, component parts.
R3.2. Feature creation: Form-from-medium
rather than form-from-form
We wish to distinguish the form of feature newness in-
volved in chunking (which we call form-from-form) from
another kind (form-from-medium), which produces fea-
tures directly from a medium, not from other features. By
analogy, imagine a Martian whose visual medium (the
output of its transducers) is very much like dough. On the
first day of its existence, the outside world imprints a teddy
bear into the dough. Of course, this object and its parts are
unknown to the Martian, who cannot compose a new
representation of the modelled teddy bear from an already-
existing representation of its component parts. Feature
creation is a process that can make a direct imprint on the
visual medium: it can “cut around” the teddy bear’s silhou-
ette and represent the entire object as a new holistic
feature. Note that this cutting process only separates the
entire bear from the medium. At this stage of conceptual
development, our Martian represents the bear as a unitary,
holistic feature and its decomposition into subcomponents
is unspecified.
The dough analogy illustrates that forms (i.e., features)
can arise from the absence of form (i.e., a medium) with
proper “cutting principles” (i.e., generic perceptual con-
straints). Although form-from-form dominates composi-
tional approaches (see Dominey and Tijsseling), we be-
lieve that form can also arise from a high-dimensional
medium and adequate perceptual constraints. We must
start with a rejection of the idea that pixels, or retinal
outputs are already fixed features (as suggested by Dorff-
ner and Dominey). We believe that the proper relation-
ship between pixels and features should mirror the relation-
ship between dough and form: the former is the medium
for the expression of the latter. In other words, individual
pixels do not represent forms, but together, millions of
pixels serve as a high-dimensional medium for multiple
expressions of form. For example, Edelman’s system can
make a direct imprint on pixels, which serve as a medium.
However, perceptually constrained imprinting will already
involve a massive reduction of dimensionality from the
medium (see sect. 3.4.2 of the target article). This is
developed further in the next section.
R3.3. Emergence of new properties
Hummel & Kellman ask how new abstract properties
(e.g., squareness) could ever emerge from feature creation
if they are not derivable from the properties of lower level
features. Although this is a particularly difficult issue, a
partial answer can be developed by considering perceptual
constraints and the imprinting process. We argued earlier
that chunking could produce configural features (e.g., face
configurations, see also Tanaka; Williams et al.) that do
not reduce to the simple additions of their components
(e.g., face parts). This is an example of the nonlinear
recoding that Hummel & Kellman discuss, but they quite
rightly separate emergent abstract properties from non-
linear recoding.
A less obvious form of property emergence could arise
from the massive dimensionality reduction that accom-
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panies imprinting. Remember that imprinting extracts fea-
tures from the visual medium directly in response to task
constraints. We also argued in the target article (see 3.4.2.),
however, that perceptual constraints should play a critical
part in this reduction. Properly constrained dynamical
systems can have interesting emergent behaviors that are
similar to those we have in mind. For example, Shashua and
Ullman (1988) describe a process that is tuned to extract
shapes with silhouettes that satisfy constraints as to their
length and smoothness. The extraction is a dynamic relax-
ation process that preserves only smooth and long contours
while erasing discontinuous and short contours (as noisy
contours tend to be). Although the system has no detectors
for specific silhouettes (i.e., no fixed features for these
shapes), its internal constraints implicitly define a gradient
of “perceptual” sensitivity to different silhouette classes.
For example, and to simplify a little, the system would be
more sensitive to a square than to a circle of the same area
if its constraints favored long straight contours. Ullman
(1984) also provides examples of simple visual processes
that can act like detectors for specific object properties
(e.g., their closedness), without directly representing these
properties in the system. By analogy to these processes, the
dynamics of dimensionality reduction could be biased to
first produce shapes that are closed, have good continua-
tion, are smooth, or satisfy the constraints described in
Singh & Landau, Quinn, MacDorman and Benson.
Shapes that would fit well with the system’s perceptual
constraints (e.g., symmetric, closed shapes with simple
geometries) would be perceptually more salient, relatively
easier to extract from the medium to form new features,
and more likely to give rise to emergent, nonderivable
perceptions.
In sum, we believe that the emergence of nonderivable
properties could be grounded (at least in part) on the
perceptual constraints that guide the dynamical process of
dimensionality reduction. Although this does not preempt
the question of property emergence, it might provide a first
step toward its understanding.
In the context of self-organizing machines, Cariani
(1993) discusses a very interesting example of forms arising
from interactions of external signals, a medium, and spe-
cific constraints: the Pask device (Pask 1960). The Pask
device was designed in the 1950s as a system that could
create its own primitive features. It consists of an array of
platinum electrodes, receiving signals from the outside
world, that are partially immersed in an aqueous solution of
metallic salts (e.g., ferrous sulfate). This unstructured me-
dium has the capacity to grow new structures. Passing
current through the electrodes literally grows dendritic
metallic threads between them. The growth of the den-
dritic structure can be controlled by choosing the elec-
trodes between which the current will pass. It is worth
noting that this aqueous solution has no a priori structure,
but new structures having emergent properties could be
created in response to external inputs. Such a device could
physically implement the computations of a Perceptron in
an analog medium – the conductances between electrodes
in the array would correspond to the connection strengths
of a perceptron (Cariani 1993). However, because the
dendritic tree itself could evolve, the system could change
its entire computing architecture – that is, not just its
weights, but also its pattern of physical connections. In fact,
Cariani (1993) reports that within half a day, ferrous threads
could be grown to become sensitive to a sound or a
magnetic field. With more time, the device could discrimi-
nate 2 frequencies (50 vs. 100 cycles per second).
This example brings together the ideas of form-from-
medium and of emergent properties from a system’s dy-
namics, as discussed earlier. Given a medium and specific
constraints (here, ferrous sulfate, electricity, and the growth
of dendritic structures), new forms (dendritic structures)
can evolve that confer on the system emergent properties
(the categorization of sounds) that are not reducible to
preexisting properties. Pask’s (Pask 1960; Carlani 1993)
device does not originally have frequency detectors, only
processes that can build other processes that detect fre-
quency differences.
R3.4. What is a feature like?
The discussion so far has shown that chunking, imprinting,
and emergent perceptual properties are different forms of
feature newness. These distinctions made implicit assump-
tions about that nature of features that we now highlight.
Features are isolable information packets. As a result of
this first property, features represent compressed informa-
tion from the input to which the system is sensitive. This
information can be parts (as suggested by Tanaka and
Singh & Landau), but it is not limited to parts. Colored
blobs, textual elements, and many other information
packets can qualify as features as long as the system’s
psychological response to the packet reveals that it is a
discrete, holistic entity in psychological processing.
Features are independently perceived. Unlike feature
conjunctions, isolable features are perceived without the
perception of each component preceding perception of the
conjunct. Independently perceived features can evolve
from a chunking process that produces configural features,
from an imprinting process that creates a new form from
the visual medium, or from dimensionality reduction itself.
Behavioral measurements can be gathered to assess the
perceptual independence of features with respect to their
components (e.g., Schyns & Rodet 1997). Behavioral data
are better than the type of logical analysis advocated by
Latimer at distinguishing the wholes from the parts in
psychological processing. One difficulty with logical analy-
sis is that it does not address the issue of the perceptual
independence of the whole with respect to its parts. This is
particularly important in our framework because, as already
discussed in the context of feature decomposition, a holistic
feature at time t of conceptual development might not have
specified components. These will only be determined at
time t 1 1, when a new categorization forces a specific
decomposition. The indeterminacy of parts with respect to
their wholes might even preclude a logical analysis that
does not integrate the individual’s history of categorization.
Features provide a perceptual organization of the input.
Isolable features provide a stable analysis of the ever-
changing sensory output for subsequent processing such as
similarity assessment, categorization, reasoning, and adap-
tive action. In this sense, isolable features perceptually
organize the input (see also Singh & Landau). This fea-
tural organization bridges the gap between the physical
world and cognition.
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R4. How much flexibility?
Commentators challenged our view of flexibility in two
opposite ways. Some thought that our flexible features are
too flexible (French & Weaver; Palmeri; Tijsseling;
Wiemer-Hastings & Graesser) because a system can do
most or all of its tasks with preexisting features. Other
commentators agreed that learning systems would at least
need the flexibility we discussed, and perhaps even more
(Brooks; Dea´k; Hahn & Chater; Quinn; Tanaka; Wil-
liams et al.).
R4.1. Does feature creation require more flexibility?
R4.1.1. Continuous versus discrete feature learning in
time. One possible interpretation of our proposal is that
features created to solve a categorization subsequently
crystallize and become fixed. Several commentators ob-
jected to this, saying that we should instill more flexibility in
the feature repertoire (Hahn & Chater; Tanaka; Wil-
liams et al.) because feature creation and adaptation is a
never-ending process. We agree that the feature repertoire
should evolve continuously in response to the flux of new
categorizations facing the organism. One could even sug-
gest that every encounter with the objects of a class could
lead to a small amount of feature-space reorganization
(Williams et al.; Hahn & Chater). The issue of continuous
variability raises an important problem that was not dis-
cussed in the target article: How does the system store
information about feature variations? One possibility is that
each time the system sees an object, it replaces its old
feature representation with new features. However, such a
system is susceptible to catastrophic forgetting. Successive
exposures to rare instances of a feature could lead to a
transformation of the feature that would no longer match
common instances. Another possibility for representing
variations is to apply template matching to features and
store each transformation as a distinct feature exemplar in
memory. However, given all the potential variations in
illumination conditions, position, and occlusion that fea-
tures can undergo, exemplar-based systems would rapidly
be overwhelmed with the millions of feature exemplars
they would need to store and organize. We therefore favor
an abstract representation (for parts, for example, think of a
parametrized elastic template) that would adjust very
slowly to local feature transformations to preserve a desir-
able inertia in the continuous adaptation to changes. The
next section discusses how this might occur.
R4.1.2. Feature transformations in the context
of a category
Feature transformations introduce the idea that the system
should tailor its features to the contingencies of the learning
episode (Hahn & Chater; Lamberts; Williams et al.).
Hahn & Chater suggest that we should frame our features
in a transformation space because different categorizations
of an object set never imply the same subset of features.
Pushing the argument forward, stable features might not be
necessary at all.
We agree that transformations of a feature within a
category are useful for learning the possible variations of
the created feature. Schyns and Murphy (1994, experiment
4) report an experiment in which subjects were shown one
category of 2D objects composed of two parts. One part
transformed randomly across instances and the other trans-
formed systematically. The systematic variations were vary-
ing degrees of protrusion and extrusion of a blob of the part.
In such an experiment, subjects must create part features to
represent the category. Because only one of the two parts
varied systematically, subjects could create a feature only
for that part. This is of course possible to the extent that the
transformations of the part across instances do not make it
appear to be different parts, rather than different transfor-
mations of the same part. The outcome was that subjects
represented part transformations with two distinct parts:
one for all the extrusions, one for the protrusions. Thus,
even though the context of the category served to represent
the part and its transformations, there was a strong percep-
tual limitation on the transformations a single part could
“tolerate” and still be judged similar: parts had to share the
same qualitative protrusions and extrusions (technically,
signs of curvature) across instances.
Not all encodings of feature transformations need to be
permanent, however. Lamberts suggests that there are
transient changes in specific context. Repetitions of tran-
sient changes should be a good indicator that they become
more permanent. This is reminiscent of a neural network
system with transient weights that can adjust rapidly to
changing contingencies while long-term weights maintain
the integrity of the computing architecture. Such mecha-
nisms are compatible with the idea of flexible but stable
features.
R4.2. Feature creation: Pervasive principle
or limited applications?
One argument against flexible feature creation is that the
hypothesized principles were only demonstrated in very
restricted situations of categorization. The materials that
show evidence of feature creation are qualitatively different
from the objects people typically categorize. Hence, the
fine discriminations these materials require go far beyond
those required in everyday recognition (Wiemer-Hastings
& Graesser). Similarly, French & Weaver argue that the
feature creation we advocate is limited to the acquisition of
expert categories. Therefore, we argue for more flexibility
than is really necessary for everyday categorizations.
On the contrary, we believe that everyday categorizations
require very subtle discriminations. Instances of these
discriminations occur when people identify faces, distin-
guish a Jonagold apple from a Cox, differentiate a poodle
from a basset hound, or recognize their own car amongst
many others. These cases of everyday recognition involve
objects that require discriminations at a very high resolu-
tion. Of course, these are also fine-grained categorizations,
but there is no principled reason why feature creation
should be limited to the “subordinate world,” as implied by
French & Weaver and Williams et al. We believe that
feature learning mechanisms can also account for the
development of basic-level and superordinate categories
(insofar as the latter requires perceptual encodings). If the
basic level is the most inclusive one at which objects look
alike, the entry point to recognition could change with the
acquisition of new features (see Schyns, in press, for a
discussion). To illustrate, face identification is often thought
to be a clear-cut subordinate categorization (because all
faces have a similar global shape). However, different views
of the same person look more alike than the same view of
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different persons. Thus, our basic categorization could be at
the level of the individual (the level at which face views are
more alike) instead of their assumed “basic” level, the face
categorization (the level at which face views look more
different). However, this effect could be inverted with the
faces of another race, for which discriminative features
remain to be acquired. Faces that are generally less familiar
might look more similar from the same viewpoint. Hence,
the basic level of a category could very much depend on the
features that optimize the perceptual distinctiveness of this
category (parts, configurations, color, texture, and so forth).
We saw earlier how as one achieves expertise nonlinear
encodings of parts could enhance the distinctiveness of an
object set (Tanaka, Williams et al.). Thus, the subordinate
level category for novices might be the basic level category
for experts and the perceptual appearance of identical
objects could change dramatically. If expertise for a given
category changes across individuals, it could have profound
implications for theories of object recognition and categori-
zation. As Tanaka and Taylor (1991) elegantly put it: the
basic level could be in the eye of the beholder.
In sum, future research may reveal that feature creation
applies only to the learning of very specialized (or subordi-
nate) categories such as X-rays, dermatosis, and so on.
Alternatively, it may turn out that feature creation mecha-
nisms pervade the very early stages of conceptual develop-
ment (when the first categories and their structuring fea-
tures must be learned), but that mature categorizers (who
tend to know the relevant perceptual analysis of most
objects) create new features only when they learn expert
categorizations. Whether feature creation mechanisms
have a broad or a limited impact on the development of
familiar object concepts is now an empirical issue of devel-
opmental psychology.
R4.3. The loci of plasticity
It is argued by Tijsseling that elementary features are
fixed, and that flexibility derives from novel combinations
of these elementary features. Neuropsychological evidence
does not provide support for this position in that neural
plasticity is found at very early stages of sensory processing.
For example, practice in discriminating small motions in
different directions significantly alters brain electrical po-
tentials that occur within 100 milliseconds of the stimulus
onset (Fahle & Morgan 1996). These electrical changes are
centered over the primary visual cortex, suggesting plas-
ticity in early visual processing. Karni and Sagi (1991) find
evidence, based on the specificity of training to eye (inter-
ocular transfer does not occur) and retinal location, that is
consistent with early, primary visual cortical adaptation in
simple discrimination tasks. The above evidence suggests
that perceptual plasticity may arise even earlier than the
visual area V4 proposed by Benson, although V4 is proba-
bly also a site of plasticity and the above claims will require
empirical confirmation. In audition, classical conditioning
leads to shifts of neural receptive fields in primary auditory
cortex toward the frequency of the rewarded tone (Wein-
berger 1993). Burgund & Marsolek suggest that the right
hemisphere could participate in the abstraction of holistic
stimulus properties, whereas Williams et al. stress the
potential relevance of an area in the ventral temporal cortex
during the course of expert learning. In short, there is an
impressive amount of converging evidence that experimen-
tal training leads to changes in very early stages of percep-
tual processing. These results are also interesting in that
they all occur in mature animals. The creation of hyper-
columns in the brain throughout development has been
known for a long time (Hubel & Wiesel 1977) and imple-
mented in a multitude of neural networks (e.g., von der
Marlsburg 1973). We agree with Benson’s argument for a
particularly robust period of perceptual plasticity in early
development. However, this stage is not a “critical period”
in that plasticity in perceptual systems continues, if at a
decelerated pace, well into adulthood.
R5. Mechanisms of feature development
Several commentators (e.g., Gauker, Hummel & Kell-
man, Palmeri, Phillips) took us to task for not proposing a
particular mechanism for the creation of new features. Our
primary objective in the target article was to describe an
overlooked but necessary process of constructing featural
representations that are required for many category learn-
ing tasks. It was not our purpose to propose a specific
implementation of this process. In fact, we suspect that the
theoretical analyses of the requirements for representa-
tional flexibility and the constraints on feature learning far
outstrip the performance of any existing computational
model. Nevertheless, if no mechanisms exist that could
conceivably generate novel features, then our approach
would be open to criticism as nonimplementable, at least
given our current understanding.
R5.1. Specific proposals
Fortunately, many computational models have imple-
mented aspects of our proposals. The commentators de-
scribe several of these models, many of which are neural
networks. Neural networks are well suited for our proposed
requirements because they typically have intermediate
“hidden” units that intervene between inputs and outputs
and can be interpreted as the system’s acquired features
(Dorffner, Hummel & Kellman). Several aspects of the
positive proposals for feature creation are worth noting.
Abdi et al. propose that the statistical procedure of Princi-
ple Component Analysis (PCA), which has been imple-
mented by neural networks, can generate the dimensions of
a set of faces by determining the largest components of
variation in a set of pixel-based faces. They also propose
supplementing this process of dimension generation with
task information that selectively weighs regions of pixel
space that are important for categorization. PCA has the
desirable property of compressing a large amount of infor-
mation into a single component (which Abdi et al. construe
as a holistic feature).
The proposal for feature generation via information
compression is supported by neurophysiological evidence
suggesting massive information reduction from primary
sensory maps to later neural stages (Phillips). MacDor-
man suggests that a simplistic interpretation of this neural
process as computing PCA is inappropriate. If neurally
implemented, the entire PCA procedure would need to be
recomputed after the presentation of each object. For-
tunately, neural network models exist that can incremen-
tally adapt the space on which objects are described without
requiring the reanalysis of all previous objects, and without
requiring the creation of orthogonal components.
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In addition to proposals for creating new features from
compressed representations, a second common proposal
from the commentators was to develop units specialized for
the processing of specific instances. That is, units would be
formed to represent entire stimuli (Burgund & Marsolek,
Edelman, Tanaka, Williams et al.). As pointed out by
Burgund & Marsolek, in many cases if processing entire
stimuli becomes more highly efficient over time it is proba-
bly the result of a process of whole-object imprinting.
These proposals gain support from FMRI studies finding
that areas in the ventral temporal cortex become spe-
cialized for complex configurations (Williams et al.).
In short, there has been significant progress on both
computational and neurological mechanisms that could
implement two of the major methods for generating new
features: generating chunked representations by analyzing
sets of objects into diagnostic components, and imprinting
on frequently repeated complex stimuli. Both mechanisms
seem to be necessary, and consequently, we do not advocate
linking feature development to only one process, as Bur-
gund & Marsolek apparently do when they associate
adaptive feature learning with creating complex, holistic
features but not with the componential processing of ob-
jects.
Some commentators (e.g., Tijsseling) argue that not
only do we fail to provide a specific proposal for feature
creation, but that such a proposal is impossible, in that
features can be combined but not created (except through
evolutionary time). There are strong existence proofs
against this claim of impossibility. Pask’s (1960) sound
detection device (described in sect. R3.3 and by Cariani
1993) clearly increases its representational power by mak-
ing pitch discriminations that it was originally incapable of
making. Originally in this case, the device was structurally
incapable of making pitch discriminations because it lacked
the necessary physical links between electrodes. The pro-
cess of physically extending filaments capable of conduct-
ing electricity altered the actual structure of the device, and
hence its ability to register sound features.
The example shows that Fodor’s (1980) argument (raised
by Braisby & Franks and by Tijsseling) that it is impossi-
ble to develop a system with greater representational power
than it had originally does not rule out the possibility of
implementing feature creation. Physical alterations to a
system (“traumas” in Fodor’s framework) may change its
representational capabilities and may be systematic and
error-guided rather than accidental. Whereas Pask’s dis-
crimination learning device obviously changes its physical
structure during training, the structural changes that ac-
commodate human perceptual learning are perhaps more
hidden, but certainly no less consequential. These struc-
tural changes include expansions in the regions of so-
matosensory cortex responsiveness to well-trained sound
(Recanzone et al. 1993) and tactile (Recanzone et al. 1992)
discriminations, and narrowing of receptive fields for neu-
rons tuned to diagnostic aspects of a visual stimulus
(Saarinen & Levi 1995). Like Pask’s device, these neural
mechanisms change the physical structure of the sensory
system and can thereby generate representational changes
that cannot be produced simply by recombining outputs
obtained from existing primitives (Cariani 1993). Structural
modification of sensory devices is not limited to an evolu-
tionary time scale, as maintained by Tijsseling; it occurs
instead within virtually every person’s lifetime.
Finally, several commentators argue that positive pro-
posals for feature learning are not possible because of an
inherent circularity in the proposal (Braisby & Franks,
Huettel & Lockhead, Perruchet & Vinter). Braisby &
Franks suggest that our position is circular, because we use
feature creation to explain categorization, but claim that
categorization itself determines feature creation. We are
indeed making the claim that feature learning is influenced
by the categories we have as well as the more standard claim
that category learning is influenced by the features we
possess. Several neural networks implement exactly this
kind of mutual influence. For example, in the S.O.S. net-
work described by Goldstone et al. (in press), feature
detectors adapt themselves to regions of a novel dimension
and their adaptation is influenced by the categorization.
Feature detectors become densely concentrated at cate-
gory boundaries because the detectors in this region tend to
miscategorize objects and thus send out “S.O.S.” signals for
other detectors to adapt themselves toward the trouble
spots. Categorizations, in turn, depend solely on the out-
puts of the feature detectors. In other words, it is not
necessary to first create detectors and then build associa-
tions between detectors and categories; both processes can
operate in parallel, and should do so to model phenomena
related to categorical perception (see also Harnad et al.
1991). In fact, many neural networks modify the nature of
their internal units based on the backpropagation of errors
from output units at the same time that the output units
depend on the processing of the internal units (Abdi et al.,
Dorffner, Hummel & Kellman). Thus, the circularity
perceived in our proposal can be thought of as bidirec-
tional, and computable, interactions.
R6. Constraints on feature learning
In the target article, we maintained that not every stimulus
aspect can be transformed into a psychological feature.
Features are constrained by the task and by perception. In
developing positive proposals for mechanisms that gener-
ate new features, several of the commentators elaborated
on these constraints. These comments have led us to
organize the constraints on feature creation in relation
to: perception, unsupervised statistical information, super-
vised labels and categories, and task contexts.
R6.1. Perceptual constraints
Although we believe that newly created features are in-
formed by task constraints, we certainly do not adopt an
“anything goes” attitude, whereby any property can become
a perceptual feature if it is required to accommodate a set of
objects or tasks. The commentators present several pro-
posals for specific perceptual constraints. MacDorman
describes neurophysiological evidence that the visual sys-
tem may organize the world into contiguous, oriented
patches at different spatial resolutions – the outputs of
Gabor filters. Given the nature of these filters, it would be
difficult to create a highly coherent feature that encom-
passed widely separated and disjointed patches. Similarly,
Benson provides evidence for a neurophysiological encod-
ing of multidimensional convex hulls; such a coding scheme
would again implement a strong bias for compact, contig-
uous features. Singh & Landau argue that procedures that
find minima of curvature in shape outlines and create “cuts”
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to join these minima place constraints on the parts that are
likely to be found.
The last of these constraints is particularly interesting
because, as Singh & Landau note (see also sect. 1.2.2. of
the target article), it can create part decompositions with-
out assuming any initial analysis of a shape into specific
detectors for these parts. Our only potential disagreement
with these commentators is based on one interpretation of
their claim that certain kinds of part-based categories may
provide initial constraints on which learning can subse-
quently build. It is unlikely that perceptual constraints or
innate categories first select an initial candidate set of parts
that are then further pruned by learning. We believe that all
these constraints act together, in parallel, to create the part
features themselves. As argued in the target article, per-
ceptual constraints by themselves underdetermine part
segmentation, and constraints of the task alone underdeter-
mine the process of reducing high-dimensional retinal
inputs to low-dimensional part descriptions (see also
Schyns & Murphy 1994).
At this stage, it is worth stressing that we advocate a
continuum between interpretations and perceptual de-
scriptions of objects. Interpretations of objects are highly
influenced by knowledge, expectancies, and goals, whereas
perceptual descriptions are not as labile, being constrained
by our sensory transduction system. Two concentric circles
may be interpreted as a bagel, but this does not necessarily
imply that the perceptual features used to encode the circle
are different from those used when they are interpreted as a
doughnut (see Tanaka). Relative to interpretations, per-
ceptual descriptions are more constrained by perceptual
limitations, slower to change, more automatically pro-
cessed, and less cognitively penetrable.
R6.2. Unsupervised statistical information
Some of the commentators were dissatisfied with our
concentration on task constraints, arguing that even in the
absence of strategic processing of stimuli according to a task
or supervision, features can be acquired on the basis of the
statistical properties inherent in the presented patterns
themselves (Cleeremans, Perruchet & Vinter, Phillips).
We did not intend to exclude the possibility that features
could be acquired by picking up on regularities inherent in
a set of stimuli, particularly if these regularities match the
perceptual constraints of the system. We therefore wel-
come these comments as presenting evidence for additional
bases of feature creation.
One reason to believe that unsupervised information
provides an important source of constraints is that it occurs
frequently. Stimuli rarely come with explicit labels at-
tached, and so it makes good sense to look to the stimulus
itself as a source of information to guide the imprinting of
features. In fact, work with competitive learning algorithms
has been important in showing that not only can units be
formed that become specialized to particular inputs, but
the major natural clusters inherent in a set of stimuli can
often be determined without explicit feedback. Unsuper-
vised learning is relatively underconstrained, however, and
a large number of stimulus repetitions is required to ac-
quire a relatively subtle feature if no external signal pro-
vides hints as to its existence, or if more salient features
suggest alternative organizations for the set of stimuli. Via
unsupervised learning, feature acquisition is typically a
rather slow process, as is true of implicit learning devices
(Cleeremans, Perruchet & Vinter).
Several recent proposals have attempted to increase the
power of purely unsupervised learning, and in the process,
have served to blur the line between supervised and un-
supervised learning. De Sa and Ballard (1997) have shown
that two sensory modalities that are trained at the same
time and provide feedback for each other can reach a level
of performance that would not be possible had they re-
mained independent. [See also Ballard: “Diectic Codes for
the Embodiment of Cognition” BBS 20(4) 1997.] This
proposal can be extended to a single modality: acquisition
of a subtle shape feature is possible if no explicit label is
provided, if other shape features strongly suggest a category
and thus supply implicit feedback. Hochberg (1997) has
argued that feedback may not be as rare as it would appear.
Humans tend to make eye fixations to the edge of objects to
be recognized. While gaining experience with an object,
every fixation that falls on a spatial location that is not part of
the object can be taken as a source of feedback. Given the
large number of fixations per minute, a substantial amount
of feedback could guide a person to generate the correct
pattern of fixations for tracing the edge of an object. In
short, there are many proposals that increase the power of
standard unsupervised learning without requiring the ex-
plicit labeling of standard supervised learning, thus estab-
lishing powerful techniques for perceptual adaptation.
R6.3. Supervised learning
Consistent with our claim that supervision is often neces-
sary to guide feature development, several commentators
elaborated on the role of supervised learning and labels on
perceptual adaptation (Abdi et al., Brooks, MacDor-
man, Quinn, Tanaka). Brooks raises several points about
the interactions between verbal labels and perceptual fea-
tures: the same label may be used for different perceptual
features, perceptual features are typically far richer than
their labels, and labeling a feature can make it appear
obvious when it would not otherwise have even been
noticed. This constellation of results is compatible with the
architecture described by Grossberg. During learning in
the supervised artmap system, the presence of the label
leads to the formation of perceptual bundles that are
diagnostic for the label. Presumably, presenting a label
could activate a single unit, which could in turn activate the
entire assembly of perceptual features to which the unit
representing the label is connected.
Other commentators have helped refine the notion of
supervised feedback. Quinn rightly points out that feed-
back involving a single category is much less effective than
feedback on a set of contrasting categories as a guide to
perceptual change. Echoing Gibson’s (1969) claims, people
tend to acquire distinctive features, and the distinctiveness
(“diagnosticity” in our target article) of a feature within an
object depends on the entire set of objects to be differenti-
ated (Lamberts), even though there appear to be limita-
tions on this principle depending on the order in which the
objects are experienced (Schyns & Murphy 1994; Schyns &
Rodet 1997). Quinn also challenges us to describe how
supervised feedback interacts with perceptual constraints
and object recognition processes to create new features. We
have argued that features created by supervised feedback
can be entered into the system’s working vocabulary, and
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are available to be used by subsequent object recognition
processes (Pevtzow & Goldstone 1994; Schyns & Murphy
1994). There are interesting experiments needed to decide
whether particular types of task feedback are more or less
important than particular perceptual constraints such as the
Gestalt laws of organization (Quinn). However, it is gener-
ally not fruitful to consider these sources of constraints to
be in opposition to each other. They are not mutually
incompatible, and the supervised feedback that people
receive in the real world is typically based on categories
informed by perceptual constraints.
R6.4. Task contexts
In the target article we stressed the role of categorical
relevance in developing features. This is one case in which
the task confronting an organism leads to perceptual
change, but the commentators have extended and differen-
tiated this general notion of task dependency (Dea´k,
Dorffner, Lamberts, Tanaka). The task confronting an
organism is partially a function of the organism’s history of
categorization (or expertise, see Tanaka). The task during
category learning may be different from the task required
later, and Lamberts has shown that featural relevance in a
categorization task may alter the perception of features,
even after category learning has been completed. Dea´k,
Lamberts, and Hahn & Chater all argue that perceptual
biases change dynamically and rapidly, rather than being
fixed aspects of the perceptual system.
It is also worth pointing out that constraints of learning,
not simply perception, may also affect how features are
formed. Although some commentators argue for very rapid
changes to feature sets, as a function of the task (Dea´k), the
set of alternative categories (Lamberts), and even the
presentation of a single item (Hahn & Chater), French &
Weaver’s skepticism with regard to fast perceptual changes
is most likely justified. In almost all cases, for a feature to be
added to the permanent vocabulary of a system, a substan-
tial amount of training is required (see also Cleeremans
and Perruchet & Vinter). Generally speaking, the longev-
ity of a feature within a vocabulary will be proportional to its
degree of exposure during training.
R6.5. Challenges for models of feature creation
The above survey of mechanisms and constraints should go
a long way toward reducing the concern that feature cre-
ation is an unimplementable pipe dream. The problem has
certainly not been solved, but the combination of proposals
from robotics, computer science, and neurophysiology in-
dicates that progress has been made in understanding some
of the principles underlying perceptual adaptation and its
uses. At the same time, we cannot point to a current system
that we would hold up as an uncontroversial example of a
device that genuinely creates novel, psychologically realis-
tic features. We offer the following challenges, both to show
how our proposal differs from existing computational
models, and to inspire research into difficult but central
issues concerning perception and learning.
R6.5.1. Perceptual constraints must be accommodated.
The internal representations that are formed to guide
categorization are shaped by the perceptual constraints
mentioned in the previous section. Most network algo-
rithms for creating features do not have biases that match
psychophysical constraints (see Grossberg’s use of adap-
tive filters for an exception). As such, although back-
propagation networks do create internal representations
(Dorffner, Hummel & Kellman), there is more to feature
creation than gradient descent on error. Furthermore, we
do not believe that the strategy of having a fixed preprocess-
ing of the input fed to an error-correction algorithm will go
very far toward implementing the feature creation princi-
ples we discuss. Instead, perceptual constraints will need to
be an intrinsic component of the computation of the error
itself.
R6.5.2. Structured objects must be accommodated. Many
effective models of feature learning create stimulus-wide
features, sometimes called “holons” to reflect the fact that
they are not restricted to a component of the object to be
represented, but are instead spread across the entire object.
PCA (Abdi et al.) and template-construction (Edelman)
are examples of these techniques. It is a challenge for them
to develop efficient representations for structured and
articulated objects – objects that are clearly composed of
individual parts standing in certain relation to each other.
For example, a human body can adopt a wide variety of
postures, from sitting to standing to running (and all pos-
tures in between). To recognize all of these postures as
examples of human bodies it would be necessary to store a
tremendous number of templates, and it is not clear
whether any overall component of a PCA would be able to
distinguish the various postures of a human body from
those of a gorilla. An alternative approach is to represent
bodies in terms of parts (e.g., arms, legs, chest, and head)
and their relations to other parts. If a structural approach
such as this were to incorporate learning as well, not only
could holons be created, but so could local features of the
object. With these local features, articulated objects with
different relations between their parts could be correctly
judged to be related. In sum, articulated objects illustrate
an abstract challenge discussed in section R2: Template-
based approaches need principles to go from holistic to
componential representations, or to decompose their tem-
plates into their components.
R6.5.3. Evidential support from psychology. Currently,
the most concrete proposals for feature creation mecha-
nisms have come from computer science. Considerable
work is still needed to test whether the features devised by
these models are supported by evidence from cognitive
psychology. To take PCA (Abdi et al.) as an example, it will
be important to know whether people actually treat the
statistically derived components as individuated compo-
nents. Using the characterization of a psychological feature
as an isolable unit of stimulus information, the components
of PCA can be tested by observing (1) whether subjects can
attend selectively to one component despite variations on
the other components, and (2) whether they tend to sepa-
rate components perceptually and then automatically re-
combine them in new arrangements. To the extent that the
answer to these empirical questions is “yes,” we would be
more likely to believe that the components pulled out by
the statistical PCA technique are psychologically valid.
R6.5.4. When are new features created? To the extent that
they are viewed as creating feature detectors at their hidden
units, standard backpropagation networks are constantly
revising their feature sets slightly with every trial. Consis-
References/Schyns et al.: The development of features in object concepts
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:1 49
tent with these networks, Williams et al. argue that every
stimulus exposure does in fact alter featural descriptions.
Alternatively, in Grossberg’s artmap system, feature units
are generated only if the mismatch between an incoming
signal and the closest existing feature is sufficiently large.
Deciding when a new feature is required for a stimulus set
and when existing features provide adequate coverage is a
complex process, depending on memory limitations, the
similarity between existing and proposed features, and the
requirements for representational precision. Unless fea-
tures are incrementally adapted on every exposure to a
stimulus, processes must not completely ignore small dis-
crepancies between ideal and current features by regulariz-
ing the stimuli to fit the current feature set. Such an
assimilation process could preserve a suboptimal feature
set despite the occurrence of systematic violations of it. One
possible solution to this problem is not to modify features
on a moment-by-moment basis (a solution that could give
rise to catastrophic forgetting of previously stored objects),
but rather to increase the allowable range of variation along
existing features. But then, when is a variation sufficiently
large for a new feature to be created?
R7. Conclusions
“The main point to realize is that all knowledge presents
itself within a conceptual framework adapted to account for
previous experience and that any such frame may prove too
narrow to comprehend new experiences.” (Niels Bohr
1958).
The primary objective of our target article was to de-
scribe what we believe to be a missing link in categorization
theories: the origin of features. We suggested that features
could sometimes be created in response to new categoriza-
tion demands. Future theories of category learning will
need to include principles for feature creation similar to
those discussed here. Many commentators offered con-
structive comments and specific proposals that helped to
lay out the basic challenges that lie ahead. The fixed feature
stance, however, is by no means the strawman pictured by
French & Weaver. Several commentators (e.g., Palmeri
and Tijsseling) argued that fixed features should form the
basis of category learning theories until specific proposals
for feature creation arise. On the contrary, we feel that
much creative effort will be necessary to lay out the basic
computational principles that will endow artificial systems
with the sort of flexibility that appears to be necessary in
real-life categorizations. Rather than shying away from the
difficulty of the task, we should embrace its challenges.
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